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ABSTRACT
This thesis emphasizes a core concept of the preemptive effect that uniform law may
have on other domestic norms. It exemplifies the situation in which the laws and principles of
contracts, particularly the uniform laws and principles formulated for transnational sales, can
exclude or limit tort liability. This study does not object to the recognition of concurrency of
claims under contract and tort law. On the contrary, it accepts that the contracting party’s right to
both contract and tort actions is commonly recognized in many legal systems, especially the
common law system. Tort liability could be actionable insofar as the actions or words, or even
their omission, trigger the requirements of tort claims developed in many legal systems.
However, when the uniform law of contracts interacts with tort laws in disputes arising from
cross-border transactions, the rules and principles provided under the uniform law, as well as its
purposes, justifiably give priority to such a unified law, which is considered a part of binding
contract law. In particular, the doctrine of party autonomy legitimately and considerably
influences the extent to which the uniform law of contracts affects or modifies liability available
under tort law.
Using the relationship between the CISG and US tort law, this thesis illustrates both the
situation where uniform contract law and domestic tort law govern the matters in question
concurrently, as well as the circumstances in which the uniform law can be said to be dominant.
The principal goal of this thesis is to minimize undermining the CISG’s fundamental
objectives, while reducing the risk of excessive encroachment on the domain of tort law. On one
hand, this thesis recognizes the importance of the elements of extra-contractual obligation and
non-contractual interests under tort law, and thus supports the right to parallel tort claims. On the
other hand, subject to policy concerns under tort law, the CISG’s rules and principles, as well as
vi

the contractual terms in a particular case, may have a preemptive force that excludes or modifies
tortious liability under domestic tort law. In other words, there may be a situation where, because
of the CISG’s doctrine or policy concerns, tort liability could be excluded or limited by the
application of the CISG, even without an express CISG exclusivity provision.
Based on doctrinal perspective and policy concerns, this study adopts the existing
approach of acknowledging the substantive scope and aims of the CISG in determining whether
and to what extent the CISG has a preemptive effect on domestic tort claims, or whether there is
a concurrence of a domestic tort claim based on domestic law and a contractual claim based on
the CISG. The chosen approach recommends that tribunals consider the actual scope of the CISG
and its purposes to see whether the alleged matter of the tort claim, in essence, falls under its
scope. If it does, the CISG has a preemptive effect on the alleged matter. As compared to other
emerging approaches to the CISG’s preemption of a tort remedy, this thesis believes that the
chosen approach is the most appropriate and convincing solution, which requires careful
analysis. This is because such a solution accords with both the general obligation to give effect to
the binding uniform law for international sales, as well as the functions of national tort law in
regulating extra-contractual conduct and compensating for the loss of extra-contractual interests,
thereby establishing a proper division of functions between the CISG and tort law. Further, this
thesis offers opinions on the essential aspects of this approach of acknowledging the substantive
scope and aims of the CISG to make the renewed approach more convincing. Rules and opinions
given by this thesis are primarily offered to assist tribunals with uniform application of the
proposed solution when dealing with the CISG’s preemption and concurrency issues. That is, the
principle of acknowledging the CISG’s substantive scope and the policy of attaining its aims are
the primary notions underlying the preemptive effect of the CISG on tort remedy. From the
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doctrinal perspective of acknowledging the CISG’s substantive scope, its preemption issue is
essentially the problem of the scope of its application, which could be dealt with through the use
of the mechanisms provided by the CISG. To this effect, it is recommended that tribunals adhere
to a dynamic method of interpreting the CISG’s provisions, as well as take sales contracts into
consideration when finding the scope of the CISG’s application to a situation that fully overlaps
with tort law. Considering the CISG’s goals and adhering to its substantive scope, this thesis
suggests that the alleged tort claim should be subsumed under the CISG when a fully
overlapping situation is established in a particular case. Accordingly, the party to a contract
dispute is barred from relying on tort remedy. Further, in solving the issue of the CISG’s
preemption of tort remedy, it is important to note that domestic laws play a secondary role, either
as part of the forum law on characterization or as part of the applicable tort law. In other words,
the rules on doctrinal characterization and the domestic rules and principles on the right to
concurrent claims do not have a considerable influence on determining how the CISG interacts
with tort law.
Additionally, whenever it appears that the application of the CISG does not preclude the
alleged tort claim, this thesis suggests modifying the ancillary rules that govern parallel tort
claims to adhere with the CISG’s protective regulations. Such a modification is suggested as a
policy concern to prevent circumvention of the CISG’s goals or purposes. Therefore, the
modification is limited to occasions when concurrent tort claims are closely connected to the
claim under the CISG. Importantly, such equitable adjustments to tort law may be prohibited,
depending on the existence of a more highly valued policy underlying tort law, or the recognition
of tort law’s mandatory character under the relevant tort law system.
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All in all, although there have been attempts by some jurists and judicial bodies to
suggest various approaches to solving the problem of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims, this
study performs in-depth analysis and provides critiques of those existing solutions. This thesis
also put forth a renewed approach, which facilitates international trade, preserves international
comity, and justifiably places value on both the CISG’s functions and those of the competing tort
laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Contract and tort are core areas of a general law of obligations, or the essential branches
of substantive private law which have been developed and applied to disputes in both civil and
common law systems. Contract law and tort law typically focus on different kinds of
relationships. The law of contract principally plays a role in facilitating and enforcing contractual
relationships based on bargained-for exchanges, and in providing remedies to a non-breaching
party who is in privity of contract. In contrast, tort law primarily regulates wrongful conduct by
persons generally, and allocates responsibilities and losses in society on a large scale. Since
tortious liability is imposed by law, rather than by the parties’ consent, it aims to compensate the
injured person for losses arising from tortious conduct regardless of whether the injured person
has a contractual relationship with a tortfeasor or not. This explains why some legal treatises
treat these two subjects distinctly and deal with them separately. Likewise, in an actual dispute, it
is typical for a plaintiff to assert claims and seek remedies under either a legal theory of contract
or a theory of tort, but not both. Nevertheless, the existence of a contractual relationship does not
preclude the application of tort law, and tort law is not restricted to only non-contractual
relationships. It is legitimate for tort laws to carry out their functions in granting civil protections
to either consumers1 or businesspersons as parties to a contract, unless the laws governing the
contract expressly prohibit tortious liabilities. Thus, legal issues arising from a single factual
situation may involve both private law regimes. The interaction between these two areas gives
rise to the problem of concurrent liability in contract and tort. In cases presenting such an issue,

1

This thesis does not place the primary focus on particular tort rules, which protect consumers who have
relatively weaker bargaining power because consumer sales are excluded from the CISG’s substantive
sphere. Thus, most disputes governed by the CISG arise from the relationship between two sophisticated
commercial parties.
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the division of functions between contract law and tort law is required for parties to ascertain
their respective rights. This thesis aims to examine the legal issues that arise when both
contractual and tort claims are asserted simultaneously, leading to an interaction between
contract law and tort law. Mainly, the focus of this thesis will be on the preemption/concurrency
issue arising from a situation in which the uniform international contract law and domestic tort
law are involved, and the two interact with each other in a cross-border transaction, namely
transnational sales.
Practically, the legal norms of contract and tort get involved in certain ways, in both
domestic and international settings. In a domestic setting, some difficulties arise in determining
the exact nature of a wrongful act, and together with implications of the recognition of a parallel
tort remedy, these have given rise to complicated legal issues on concurrency. This is why a
diversity of academic and judicial perspectives dealing with concurrent liabilities has emerged
within the domestic system.
When the question of concurrent remedies comes up in a purely domestic contract, the
question and its respective consequences are dealt with within the particular national system, in
accordance with its own balance of rules and doctrines on contractual and tortious matters. It is
not surprising that the approaches to the clarification of the hierarchy or concurrency of claims
brought in contract and tort are thus primarily based upon the laws stemming from the limited
borders of a single legal system. Accordingly, the question of whether the parties may be able to
assert those claims concurrently makes it less difficult to navigate such a situation, which is
relatively harmless to the interests protected by both laws, which are at the same level under the
system in question.
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In disputes arising from cross-border contracts, the issue of concurrent claims remains
prevalent in many kinds of transactions, including transnational sales, contracts of carriage,
construction contracts, contracts for service, and employment contracts. The issue of concurrent
claims arising from those cross-border transactions is more complicated than those originating
from a purely domestic contract. It is because tribunals encounter the conflict-of-law problem in
locating applicable domestic laws, including (1) laws governing the contractual relationship; (2)
laws governing tort remedies; and (3) laws governing the issue of concurrent claims. Further,
when an issue of the right to concurrent claims comes up in particular types of transnational
contracts such as a sale of goods or a contract of carriage, international law is involved. The
situation becomes even more complicated then, and could result in unwarranted outcomes. This
is because the tribunals have already struggled with the transcendence of international uniform
rules and diversity of applicable domestic tort laws, and subsequently must deal with two
competing norms that have been independently developed, each with its own distinct objectives.
When a unified international law on contract is involved in regulating a particular kind of
contractual relationship, tribunals are bound to apply the uniform rules on remedies for a breach
of contract, rather than relying on different contract laws. Giving the party free choice of
concurrent claims may be problematic when tort law has the potential to provide the party with a
tort remedy that undermines implementation of the unified law. One way to preserve the goal of
uniformity is to recognize the preemptive power of uniform law by denying or limiting the
contracting party’s right to rely on tort remedies available under domestic laws. However, an
overly preemptive reading of the uniform law inevitably places a risk of an unwarranted
intrusion upon the right to the protections under tort law.
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Specifically looking at the uniform law for international sales, most countries in the
trading world ratified, and have been bound by, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (CISG). This creates a high degree of possibility for the CISG to
govern transnational sales between parties who have their places of business in the different
Contracting States to the CISG. In practice, a tension between the CISG and domestic tort law is
frequently raised and disputed among parties to international sales. Such a problem of the right to
concurrent tort claims available under domestic laws is commonly raised in certain types of sales
of goods, including:
(1) A sale of goods to be designed and manufactured by the seller; (2) a contract for
manufacturing and distributing products; (3) a contract for the sale of goods to be produced
under the desired model and specifications; (4) a contract where the seller agrees to supply labor
or other services, such as installing and repairing goods; (5) a contract where the seller agrees to
furnish goods and operate instructions; (6) a contract in which the seller is asked to arrange for
carriage of the goods; (7) a contract in which the buyer purchases the goods to resale to his
customers; and (8) a contract for the sale of goods to be used in the buyer’s business.
It is agreed that the CISG primarily governs rights and obligations arising from
contractual relationships between the parties. However, there are still controversies over how the
CISG and domestic tort laws should interact, particularly when a party needs to rely on tort laws
for the recovery of damages to properties or economic losses.
Therefore, this thesis aims to address and clarify the research question of whether, and to
what extent, the CISG preempts alleged tort claims under domestic laws that would otherwise
apply to the claims. Answering this question is important for three particular reasons. First,
regarding the issue of concurrent claims arising from different kinds of cross-border transactions
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aforementioned, the issue of the CISG’s preemption/concurrency of tort claims continues to
appear frequently. Secondly, it speaks to the more general question of how and when
international laws preempt national laws, providing tribunals with an example of that dynamic.
Thirdly, given that the CISG’s provisions are unclear regarding its preemptive force, it is
necessary to investigate and provide rational justification for the proposed approach dealing with
such preemption issues.
In addressing this research question, the thesis draws and recognizes an important
distinction between the virtue of the function served by tort law and the merit of the CISG’s
purposes. On the one hand, the proposed approach to this question must reflect on the vital
functions of tort remedies, and ensure that a non-breaching party is provided with protections
that such a party would otherwise have under tort laws against the breaching party’s tortious
behavior. That is, the CISG would not be applied in a way whereby it severely deprives
contracting parties of protections that the uniform sale law does not provide. On the other hand,
it is essential to effectuate the CISG’s purposes of creating uniformity and providing fair and
balanced protections. That is, a concurrent tort claim should be allowed to the extent that it does
not undermine the CISG’s fundamental regulatory rules and doctrines. In this regard, the
approach put forth by this thesis will primarily make an appropriate division of functions
between the governing law of CISG and the applicable law of tort, creating a balance of the
competing values.
In terms of the research methodology, this study adopts a documentary qualitative
analysis. The study exhaustively investigates the entire system of the CISG, along with its
methods of interpretation. All relevant documents, including scholarly writings and judicial
decisions on the interpretation and application of the CISG, mainly when it interacts with the law
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of torts, are the main focus of the analysis. As for judicial decisions, although this thesis mostly
focuses on US court decisions, foreign court decisions are also taken into consideration, such as
those of Canada, Australia, Germany, and Israel. Correspondingly, the US law of torts is
thoroughly explored and then exemplified as a norm with which the CISG competes. US law and
jurisdictions are the key focus of the study because this thesis intends to analyze US tort law as
an illustration to shed light on the justified approach put forth by this study. US tort law serves as
an example because it consists of several causes of action, resulting in a more holistic analysis.
Those various tort claims are optimally sufficient for this thesis to examine the context within
which the variety of tort laws interact with the CISG and analyze the essential aspects of such
interplay. Importantly, there exist the actual disputes in which a contracting party alleged
multiple such causes of action alongside contractual claims under the CISG. Another reason is
that the CISG is likely to govern most international sales relationships involving US business
parties and their trading partners, who have been engaged in business with NAFTA members.2
Thus, it is likely that US tribunals have dealt with this common issue of how the CISG interacts
with the US law of torts. In this event, it is the hope that this research will contribute
significantly in terms of the proposed approach to the issue of the CISG’s preemption of tort
claims available under US laws. Finally, when the question of the Treaty’s preemption is asked,
the US principle of federalism, i.e. federal preemption of state law,3 is of considerable interest
for this thesis. As we realized, the general rule is that “courts must be reluctant in finding federal

2

James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International Sales, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 273, 314 (1999).
3

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the Convention, as a treaty made under the authority of the United
States, is the “supreme law” of the United States and would prevail over conflicting laws of any state);
see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 301, 308 (AM. LAW INST. 2018)
(emphasizing that a treaty as the law of the United States has a preemptive effect on State and local law,
and the United States’ courts are bound to give effect to such a self-executing international convention).
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preemption of a subject ‘traditionally governed by state law.’”4 The plain text of federal law
reflecting a clear and manifest Congress’s preemptive intent is the best evidence to support such
federal preemption.5 Despite the principle of the federal preemption, tribunals must take
precautions to ensure that the Treaty does not overly preempt state law beyond Congress’s intent.
Otherwise, it is possible that such an expansion of the Treaty’s preemptive power might
unreasonably infringe upon the legislative power reserved to the states in promulgating tort rules
in order to regulate unlawful conduct and protect injured parties’ interests.
In light of the requirement for caution in finding federal preemption, the analysis is
primarily based on a presumption against the CISG’s preemptive effect on matters traditionally
governed by domestic tort laws. This thesis asserts that the CISG exclusively governs and settles
the alleged matter of tort in the case at bar only when the fully overlapping situation is
established. Stated another way, an injured party is permitted to bring any putative tort causes of
action alongside contractual claims, as long as the tort claim is distinct, or related but separate
from contractual claims under the CISG. It is then proved in the following chapters that the
Contracting States’ preemptive intent is presented in case of a fully overlapping situation, where
the CISG’s rules and principles justify its preemption. In addition, this thesis provides further
arguments for the CISG’s preemptive force from doctrinal and policy perspectives. Mainly, this
method of the grounded theory is employed to appraise existing approaches, and to then develop
theoretical points of view, rules, and opinions, through the lens of the existing approaches
dealing with the problem of the CISG’s preemption.

4

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 673 (N.D. Ill. 2005).

5

Id. at 673–74.
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This thesis is divided into six chapters, namely the introduction, four chapters, and a
conclusion. The specific details of Chapter One to Chapter Four are as follows:
Chapter One aims to ensure that readers recognize the extent to which domestic tort laws
are involved in disputes arising from international sales. The chapter begins by making known
that a party typically brings claims for breach of contract and tortious action against a breaching
party to attain benefits from generous ancillary rules in tort regarding the prerequisites for, or
restrictions on, remedies. Subsequently, it thoroughly investigates several tortious actions that
possibly emanate from the sales contract and are mostly available under the US law of torts. In
doing so, Chapter One mainly points out the elements of such putative tort causes of action,
together with the circumstances that make those claims, generally, independent from contractual
claims under the CISG. Correspondingly, it reflects the necessary functions of tort remedies in
either regulating unlawful conduct and thus imposing an extra-contractual duty, or protecting a
non-contractual interest. Additionally, the Chapter presents actual cases under the CISG, where
an injured party brings, in one suit, both a contractual claim under the CISG and a tort claim
against the breaching party, as per usual when commencing a lawsuit in a domestic dispute. It is
then necessary for this thesis to propose and discuss in detail the justified approach to the
concerns, posed by such close involvement of domestic tort laws, to the CISG’s
preemption/concurrency.
Therefore, to answer the main research question, Chapter Two aims to primarily
determine what the CISG suggests regarding the preemption/concurrency issue. It presents the
CISG’s essential features, which are connected to, and somewhat guide, the arguments
concerning the interaction of the CISG and tort laws.
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Chapter Three examines and discusses existing academic and judicial approaches to this
question of interaction between the CISG and tort law. As we will see, the CISG’s preemption
issue deriving from international sales is of considerable interest to many scholars. The issue has
been discussed among scholars since it became effective6 and binding on the Contracting States.
Until recently, there have been arguable perspectives on the CISG’s preemption of tort claims.
This chapter further criticizes those academic and judicial solutions so as to appraise whether
each of them is theoretically and practically justified, and appropriate for addressing the CISG’s
preemption of tort remedy.
Chapter Four seeks to achieve the goals of creating an appropriate division of functions
between the CISG and tort law, and of establishing legitimate justifications for applying both
norms to the disputes without fear of the two severely encroaching upon each other. Chapter
Four proposes developing the compromise approach, which acknowledges the substantive scope
and aims of the CISG. Further, this Chapter offers opinions on the essential aspects under the
adopted approach of acknowledging the substantive scope and aims of the CISG to make the
proposed approach more convincing. Rules and opinions given by this thesis are primarily
offered to assist tribunals with uniform application of the proposed solution when dealing with
the CISG’s preemption and concurrency issues. This chapter thus performs an analysis and sets
forth opinions on several aspects including (1) the use of mechanisms existing in the CISG to
solve the issue of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims; (2) the indication of an inconsistency
between competing norms; (3) the criteria for considering the establishment of fully overlapping
situations; (4) the secondary roles of domestic rules and approaches in disputes concerning the

6

The Convention came into force on January 1, 1988. See United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, Texts and Status: International Sale of Goods (CISG) and Related Transactions (Aug. 2,
2020, 9:25 PM), https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/salegoods/conventions/sale_of_goods/cisg.
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CISG’s preemption of tort claims; (5) the legal effect of exculpatory clauses on tort claims; and
(6) the policy of modifying the ancillary tort rules when a concurrent tort claim is permitted.
Lastly, this chapter discusses the legal consequences which arise when solving the issue of the
CISG’s preemption of tort claims raised in a hypothetical case by applying the proposed
approach and following the suggestions put forth by this thesis.

10

I. THE INVOLVEMENT OF DOMESTIC TORT LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL SALES TRANSACTIONS
The availability of potential claims, in more than one branch within an international sales
contract, gives rise to the issue of interaction between the governing laws of the CISG and tort.
In the majority of such cases, the CISG and the law of torts interact when Article 74 permits the
contracting party to seek foreseeable consequential damages to other property or economic
losses, and when tort laws simultaneously confer such a right to the same categories of damages.
This interplay may lead to the CISG’s preemptive power over tort remedies, or result in a
concurrence of both contractual and tort claims. Before beginning the exhaustive investigation of
how the CISG itself, or the scholarly discussions and judicial practices, handle the problem of
the CISG’s preemption of tort laws, it is essential to explain to what extent domestic tort laws get
involved in the international sales contract. This chapter discusses the reasons why commercial
parties to transnational sales prefer to lodge a tort remedy as an alternative, or as an additional
action, to a contractual claim under the CISG. This chapter then identifies the availability of
putative claims possibly alleged by the parties under US tort law. After that, it provides
illustrations of the fact that the party practically proceeds with tort claims arising from, or
relating to, international trade. Finally, the chapter introduces certain CISG’s regulations and
protections that commonly interact with an alleged tort claim in practice. Such an explanation
allows readers to comprehend examples of situations where some rules, especially those
formulated by the CISG, overlap and compete with the alleged tortious actions. Then, it poses
the further question of whether the fully overlapping situations justify the CISG’s preemptive
effect.

11

A. The Perception of Advantages in a Variety of Aspects Given by the Ancillary Rules in
Tort
In disputes at both national and international levels, one contracting party who suffered
from the other’s breaching conduct is inclined to resort to remedies under tort laws, despite
retaining the right to compensation under contract law. This is because the aggrieved party
perceives certain advantages in terms of the compensation granted by tort rules.
In disputes governed by domestic laws, the reasons for resorting to a remedy under tort
law along with the remedy under contract law or sale law, are that a contractual claim and a tort
claim, as a protective device, have considerably different requirements for or restrictions on
seeking recovery for damages, and they vary in the scope of remedies recoverable.7 Undeniably,
each legal regime has its own specificities to be considered and applied to the disputed matter.
However, when the issue of concurrent claims is presented, there are some common areas of the
ancillary rules which motivate a party to prefer asserting a tort remedy alongside a contractual
claim. For instance, limitation periods may differ, such that a plaintiff may be barred from
bringing a claim based on a breach of contract by shorter limitation periods. In contrast, it may
be possible to rely on a remedy based on tort law, since it sets forth a more extended limitation
period. Alternatively, an action in a contract may be time-barred because of an earlier start date
of the limitation period, adopting the occurrence rule.8 Likewise, notification requirements may

7

It should be noted that the issue of a concurrent claim between contract and tort under domestic laws of
a single system might not be primarily significant in a country whose ancillary rules in contract and tort
are identical. For example, Korean law regarding the scope of damages is identically applied to a breach
of contract claim and to a tort action. Accordingly, the injured party might believe that it does not make a
considerable difference to the benefits gained in terms of the scope of recoverable damages between
asserting a claim based on contract and resorting to tort remedy. See Minbeob [Civil Act], Act No. 471,
Feb. 22, 1958, amended by Act. No. 14965, Oct. 31, 2017, arts. 393, 763 (S. Kor.).
8

The statute of limitations frequently states that the start date of the limitation period begins to run when
the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues. Common law courts develop three different rules, which are the
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differ as well, since a strict rule of the contract is the notification requirement. For instance, a
buyer may be barred from asserting a contractual claim for defective goods by domestic sales
law, such as UCC Article 2, § 607, if he fails to notify a seller of the breach, whereas there is no
such prerequisite requirement for seeking damages under tort law. And, importantly, there may
be differences in the extent of rights to the types of damages recoverable. First, as it appears in
certain legal systems, the right to pure economic loss is generally allowed only in a typical
breach of contract, while damages for pain and suffering are usually recoverable in tort. It is thus
said that, from the viewpoint of a contracting party, he will get a greater benefit from tort law,
which also permits a concurrent tort remedy for economic loss. Secondly, punitive damages are
generally available by tort law to punish the defendant who acts with malice, but this is not
typically granted by contract law. Lastly, contract rules regarding the remoteness of damage,
which grant damages which would have been within the contemplation of the parties, are more
restricted than those under tort law, which may allow damages insomuch as such damage was
reasonably foreseeable. Another implication of the exclusion of liability is also taken into
consideration, since an exculpatory clause is basically permitted and generally valid for
excluding or limiting contractual liability, while tortious liability cannot be exempted or limited
so easily. It is thus unsurprising when parties choose to rely on tort remedy, considering that
there is a possibility of gaining better advantages from tort law, than what parties are given under
contract law or sale law. In sum, there are a variety of aspects in which domestic contract law
may be less favorable to plaintiffs, as compared to domestic tort law.

occurrence rule, the damage rule, and the discovery rule, in order to determine what point accrual begins
at. The courts generally adopt the occurrence rule, which considers the occurrence of the legal violation,
or the appearance of a breach of contract, to be the date of the commencement for a breach of contract
action. However, courts also recognized the damage rule, which starts the limitation period for a tort
claim when the damage occurs. See CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 370, 375–76 (1991).
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Similarly, there are reasons that contract rules supplied by the CISG may be less
favorable to plaintiffs than domestic tort law. For example, when the breaching conduct that
invokes a claim for delivery of non-conforming goods under the CISG simultaneously
constitutes a breach of tortious duty under domestic law, the buyer is more than willing to
commence a tort action alongside the CISG claim, because of the advantageous rules in tort.
Some preferred advantages are that, first, unlike the notification required by Article 39 of the
CISG, domestic tort law generally grants damages irrespective of whether the buyer gives the
seller an adequate notice of non-conformity. Secondly, parties may limit or even exclude their
contractual liability by means of exercising party autonomy under Article 6 of the CISG, but
such an exculpatory clause is not commonly agreed to beforehand with respect to tortious
liability, or it is rarely found effective when exempting a party from liability for damage suffered
from fraud, gross negligence, or reckless conduct. As for the favored rule of the remoteness of
damage, Article 74 of the CISG limits the extent of recoverable damages to those which are in
the parties’ contemplation at the time of concluding the contract, whereas national tort law grants
damages that are reasonably foreseen. Another aspect of the CISG, regarding the exemption of
liability by law, may be considered as being more detrimental to the contracting party when
asserting the CISG claim rather than resorting to tort remedy. In explaining, the CISG expressly
exempts parties from liability or limits liability either because of impediments to performance
(Article 79), fault attributable to the injured party (Article 80), or the buyer’s awareness of lack
of conformity at the conclusion of the contract (Article 35(3)). However, these kinds of
exemptions/limitations of liability are not exactly seen under tort laws of all countries. With a
few exceptions, there are similar rules adopted by the common law system, particularly the US,
namely a rule of contributory negligence, as well as a principle of assumption of risk. Such tort
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rules somewhat provide a higher degree of adverse effects to the injured party, provided that the
defendant bears the burden of proof of such defenses. That said, the action in tort will preferably
be brought against a breaching party in the event that the non-breaching party has an interest in
resorting to domestic laws, especially the separate ancillary rules that govern tort claims and thus
provide more advantages in compensation as compared to contractual remedies under the
Convention.9 This is why it is of both theoretical and practical importance to have a justified
solution to the difficult problem of whether a party can resort to all the protective devices subject
to the CISG and national law, especially when both norms state different requirements that are in
conflict with each other.
B. Tortious Actions Relevant to Contracts for Sales: The Availability of Claims
This part of the chapter generates the focal discussion on the availability of claims, to
explain the extent to which tort laws are involved in, and possibly interact with, the CISG’s rules
governing the relationship between parties to international sales.
As we will see, the US law of torts provides for a variety of tortious actions relevant to
sales contracts in order to regulate improper behaviors and protect non-contractual interests.
Thus, contracting parties have various claims in tort, which they resort to as alternative claims, or
in addition to an assertion of a contractual claim, under contract law. At the same time, in
discussing each claim, the following sections will present whether circumstances exist under
which US tort law denies protecting the interests sought by a contracting party, or whether those
laws refuse to regulate the behaviors against which the party brings a claim.

9

Markus Müller-Chen, Part III Sale of Goods Chapter II Obligations of the Seller Section III Remedies
for Breach of Contract by the Seller Article 45, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 720, 732 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 4th ed. 2016) (ebook).
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The discussion on the availability of tort claims mainly demonstrates the elements
required for each claim to be actionable. More importantly, the analysis emphasizes the elements
that reflect the purpose of imposing extra-contractual duties or protecting non-contractual
interests. Further, this thesis supposes that the existence of those extra-contractual elements
arguably considers the putative tort claims as distinct claims, or related but separate claims,
available under US tort law. Inasmuch as each tort claim is distinct, or related but separate from
a claim in contract, the contracting party should be permitted to seek recourse in tort remedies, as
they see appropriate for seeking the protection of rights.
1. Product Liability
Tort theory on product liability recognizes the economic loss doctrine, which originally
developed in the US legal system. Under the economic loss doctrine, where the commercial
enterprise sustains only pure economic losses, including losses to the product itself,10 it cannot
maintain a tort claim for either negligence or strict liability.11 It follows that in a product liability
case, tort recovery for damages to other property separate from harm a product causes to itself,
and loss of customers, sales, and profits sustained as a result of breaching conduct is not barred
by the economic loss doctrine.12
It is said that damages to other property, in the same position as personal injury, are
considered non-contractual interests and are particularly protected under tort law on product
liability. Such a position is supported by the policy underlying product liability actions, which

10

Rem Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 386 Pa. Super. 401, 404 (1989).

11

2-J Corp. v. Tice, 126 F.3d 539, 541 (3d Cir. 1997).

12

Id. at 541–43.
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protect the public from unsafe products that go beyond the protection provided by contract law.13
This thesis thus takes the view that the interest of safety in life, limb, and other property
protected by product liability law, against a dangerous manner in manufacturing, designing, or
supplying the products, is generally independent and separate from the interest and duty under
the sale contract.
As we can see, product liability is developed based on the dominant public policy of a
desire to protect the interest outside of the product itself, such as when a product malfunctions or
is defective.14 Insofar as the trader incurs economic losses, the policy concerned is not
involved.15 Considering such a major approach,16 this thesis holds that the actual question of the
CISG’s preemption regarding product liability claim creates difficulty, especially when the
defective product causes damage to other property. This is because Article 35 could be applied to
impose a contractual duty to deliver a safe product in terms of the manufacturing, design, or
supply process. When parties foresee, or ought to have foreseen, the possibility of suffering a
loss to other property at the time of contract, Article 35 may be interpreted in a way so as to
warrant property interest resulting from such a breach of a contractual duty.

13

Rem Coal Co., 386 Pa. Super. at 404.

14

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1998).

15

Rem Coal Co., 386 Pa. Super. at 404, 408–09 (holding that an action in tort is not an appropriate
mechanism for giving a recovery for economic losses); see E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,
476 U.S. 858 (1986); Marrone v. Greer & Polman Const., Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 288 (App. Div. 2009).
16

The decision of Marrone, 405 N.J. Super. 288 overruled a court decision in Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965), which permitted the plaintiff to redress its economic loss
under tort rule on strict liability and placed on the manufacturer all risks associated with defective
products launched into the market. The decisions of Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110 (3d
Cir. 1987) and KING v. HILTON-DAVIS, 855 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1988) overruled another inconsistent
view in Pa. Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981), which held that
the permissibility of recovery for economic loss based on a strict liability claim in tort depends on the
nature of the unreasonably dangerous risk posed by a defective product, rather than the actual harm
sustained.
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In terms of improper conduct to be regulated, when US courts initially imposed such a
strict liability for manufacturing defects on the sellers, the courts relied on the concept of
warranty, which also holds sellers liable for non-conforming goods without fault.17 According to
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. §§ 1-2, commercial sellers or distributors are
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by their defective products.18 Notably,
the liability for manufacturing defects is imposed without fault on the sellers or distributors for
harm caused.19 In contrast, design defects, as well as defects based on inadequate instructions or
warnings, are predicated on a theory of negligence, thus requiring proof of the reasonableness
standard.20 Moreover, the design defects and defects based on inadequate instructions or
warnings can also be established by identifying a government-imposed standard and showing
that violations of such statutory and regulatory norms exist.21
2. Promissory Estoppel
The traditional type of promissory estoppel invoked under the theory of detrimental
reliance, as a substitute for consideration asking for contract damages, was rooted in the common
law action of assumpsit.22 Although this type of promissory estoppel historically evolved and
was viewed as a substitute for consideration, it later became recognized in the context of

17

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998).

18

See id. §§ 1–2. As for product liability rules applicable to a special product or product markets, the
Restatement provides separate rules in §§ 5–8. See id. §§ 5–8.
19

See id. § 2(a).

20

See id. § 2(b)–(c).

21

Apart from the standards required for design or warning under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod.
Liab. § 2, an identification of a government-imposed standard is recognized as an alternative method of
establishing defects. See id. § 4.
22

See Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., 29 F.3d 821, 824–25 (2d Cir. 1994).
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commercial disputes, and then formed a completely independent theory of recovery under which
it is necessary to avoid injustice.23 Consequently, it is, as a public policy matter, highly possible
for this independent theory to impose pre-contractual liability on a promisor for promises made
during business negotiations as a tort like-claim,24 in order to prevent injustice or unfair
advantages taken by the promisor.25 Furthermore, imposing pre-contractual liability based on this
independent theory of promissory estoppel is effectively justified as the legal means of
controlling opportunistic behavior.26 In order to ensure justice and avoid severe intervention with
the parties’ freedom to negotiate, the court renders an award granting damages incurred, instead
of specifically enforcing the promisor’s promise.27
It is commonly claimed that promissory estoppel under detrimental reliance has the same
purposes as the tort of misrepresentation when deterring conduct that misled others to their
detriment and compensating innocent parties who are misled.28 As far as parties’ reliance without
a bargain is concerned, there exists a prevailing presumption that the CISG’s explicit rule does
not contemplate this kind of reliance protection that is, under the viewpoint of this thesis,
considered as the reliance upon an extra-contractual promise.29

23

See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965); Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
798 F. Supp. 2d 336 (D. Mass. 2011).
24

Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary
Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1254 (1996).
25

Dixon, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 343–46.

26

Id. at 346.

27

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see Clifford R. Gray, Inc. v.
LeChase Constr. Servs., LLC, 857 N.Y.S.2d 347 (App. Div. 2008); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 15 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2020).
28

Katz, supra note 24, at 1254.

29

Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3847, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17,
2003) (affirming that there are distinct types of promissory estoppel and recognizing a separate claim for
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Therefore, this section will mainly demonstrate the elements of promissory estoppel as
adopted in the context of transnational sales.30 A claim for promissory estoppel under Illinois law
requires four main elements to be actionable. That is to say, a plaintiff is required to “allege: (1)
an unambiguous promise; (2) reasonable and justifiable reliance by the party to whom the
promise was made; (3) the reliance was expected and foreseeable by the promisor; and (4) the
promisee relied upon the promise to her detriment.”31
There is great emphasis placed on the existence of an unambiguous promise, which is the
main element of improper conduct regulated by the theory of promissory estoppel. Under the US
theory of promissory estoppel, a mere representation of fact is not generally treated as a promise
of future action, on which promissory estoppel is typically based.32 An act of promise that is
typically alleged for stating a promissory estoppel claim must indicate one’s declaration where
one commits himself to do or to refrain from engaging in something specific.33 It is possible,
though scarce, that the representations regarding existing conditions constitute a promise, such
that representation could be seen as a promise to pay for the consequences of a breach of that
warranty, which is then the basis for a promissory estoppel claim.34 However, the promissory
estoppel claim alleging breach of promise or warranty in such limited circumstance is still barred
by, among other things, the critical reason that the alleged promise emerged out of an express

promissory estoppel, which asks the court to create a new right in the interest of justice where there would
be none otherwise).
30

Please see the elements of a claim as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
31

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 679–80 (N.D. Ill. 2005); see also Geneva
Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
32

Caterpillar, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d at 680.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 680–81; see also All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 868–69 (7th Cir. 1999).
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contract governing the relationship between the parties.35 As a consequence, the alleged promise
is not recognized as independent tortious conduct. In other words, the defendant’s
representations regarding the properties and performance of goods would constitute a promise
for the purpose of the plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim only if the contract did not exist
between the parties, and the alleged breach of such a promise or warranty did not emerge from
the contractual relationship between them.36
Let us turn to consider tort claims for promissory fraud under the Restatement of Torts.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm § 15 (2020) recognizes promissory fraud
claims as a type of fraudulent misrepresentation if the intention to perform a promise does not
exist at the time the statement is made. This claim requires an allegation that the promisor did not
intend to carry out the promise at the time he fraudulently made such a misstatement of intent.
This thesis argues that this specific element arguably makes the promissory fraud claim
independent from the contractual claim given by the CISG because it aims to protect the
promisee’s right in placing value on the promisor’s intention to perform and to control dishonest
conduct.37 Hence, it is significant for the plaintiff to make an allegation with particular facts,
showing that the defendant did not intend to keep a promise at the time it was made.
3. Misrepresentation
Tort claims for misrepresentation are closely connected with the duty to deliver
conforming goods under a contract for sale. Most misstatements of facts are potentially related to

35

All-Tech Telecom, Inc., 174 F.3d at 869.

36

In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, the plaintiff, Caterpillar, could not allege a contractual breach
of promise/warranty claim because of the vertical privity rule. See Caterpillar, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d at
680–81.
37

See discussion infra Section I.B.3.3.
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the purchased goods in some respects, namely the nature and quality of the goods, the suitability
for use or the functions of products for a particular purpose, the durability of products, the
intended design of products, or the feasibility of repair. Such statements could be made either
during the negotiation period or after the contract has concluded. Usually, when incorrect
statements made during negotiation were formed as part of contractual terms, it would be
claimed that liability for those misrepresentations is a matter governed solely by the CISG.38
Also, such a view holds the other way around, in that if incorrect statements are not incorporated
into the contract, a claim for loss deriving from such misstatements lies outside the scope of the
Convention because the wrongful conduct occurred during negotiations.39 The latter opinion is
more compelling insofar as the elements of misrepresentations proved under tort laws do not
overlap with the matters regulated or protected under the CISG’s supplementary rules. In sum, if
it appears that tort laws on misrepresentation impose non-contractual duties or protect extracontractual interests independent from the duties regulated or the interests protected by the CISG
or the contract, a claim for misrepresentation is outside the realm of the Convention.
Some legal systems, in particular US common law, have generally recognized tort claims
for misrepresentation. This section investigates US common law claims for innocent
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent misrepresentation for which the
contracting party typically asks, alongside claims of breach of express or implied warranty
available under the international sales contract.

38

Hans Stoll, Part III Sale of Goods Chapter V Provisions Common to the Obligations of the Seller and
of the Buyer Section II Damages Article 74, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 552, 557 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., Geoffrey Thomas trans., 2d
ed. 1998).
39

Id. at 557–58.
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3.1 Innocent Misrepresentation
Under US law, commercial product sellers are subject to tortious liability for innocent
misrepresentation, although the seller does not make a misrepresentation through fraud or
negligence. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402B subjects the business entity to liability for
physical harm to a consumer of the chattel when he “by advertising, labels, or otherwise, makes
to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel
sold by him.”40 To ascertain that a seller could be liable for an innocent misrepresentation made
to an individual, and not to the public at large, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 9
(1998) additionally insists that a commercial seller could be liable for an innocent
misrepresentation of material fact concerning the product.41
As for the claim of pure economic loss, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552C (1977)
reaffirms that an individual who engages in a sale transaction is liable for the innocent
misrepresentation of a material fact he makes to another in a sale contract.42 Under this rule, a
claim for pecuniary loss is available without regard to the requirement that the sale transaction is
ultimately rescinded by the plaintiff or by the court.
3.2 Negligent Misrepresentation
Most cases have long followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311 (1965), holding
commercial product sellers liable for negligent misrepresentation. Section 311 imposes a duty of
reasonable care upon the seller, in ascertaining the accuracy of the information or in the manner
in which the information is communicated. By giving false information that constitutes a breach
40

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (AM. LAW INST. 1965).

41

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).

42

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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of such a duty of care, the seller is liable for physical harm caused by action taken by the other
party in his reasonable reliance upon such information. Further, given an explicit rule under the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 9 (1998), there is no doubt that commercial product
sellers can be held liable for harm to persons or property resulting from their negligent
misrepresentation of material facts concerning the goods sold.43 Inasmuch as the seller’s liability
for harm to property is recognized under the theory of negligent misrepresentation, it raises the
question of how this tort rule and the CISG’s rule on breach of express warranty or implied
warranty interact, especially when the allegation of false statements concerns the quality of the
product sold.
Additionally, a seller, who in the course of business negligently supplies misinformation
concerning goods sold to the purchaser, is liable for pecuniary loss caused to the purchaser who
relied upon the misinformation and thus purchased goods from the seller. Such liability for
pecuniary loss requires proving a breach of the standard of care in obtaining or communicating
information for the guidance of the other party in his business transactions as stated in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977).44 Such a duty of care is limitedly imposed upon the
seller, who intended to supply the information for a particular purpose whereby he was
manifestly aware of the buyer’s intention to utilize such information for his benefit or guidance
in the sale transaction, as well as the buyer’s pecuniary loss incurred in the sale transaction in

43

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).

44

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Seney, 292 Md. 328 (1982); MM Glob. Servs. v. Dow Chem. Co., 283 F. Supp. 2d 689 (D. Conn. 2003);
Colo. Visionary Acad. v. Medtronic, Inc., 397 F.3d 867 (10th Cir. 2005); Level 3 Communs., LLC v.
Liebert Corp., 535 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2008); BHC Dev., L.C. v. Bally Gaming, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 2d
1276 (D. Kan. 2013) (imposing the tortious duty of care in communicating inaccurate information upon a
party that expects to conclude a commercial contract with another). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 5 (AM. LAW INST. 2020).
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which that information is expected to influence.45 Regarding the measure of damages for
negligent misrepresentation, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552B (1977) enumerates the
recoverable pecuniary loss to the recipient of negligent misrepresentation of which such
misrepresentation is a legal cause.
It should be emphasized here that while some US courts mostly adopted the rule under
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977) and held sellers liable for negligent
misrepresentations which induce buyers to enter into sale contracts with them, the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm (2020) provides rules, which preclude the tort claim in
such circumstances.46 Although the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm
recognizes a negligent misrepresentation claim for economic loss in certain circumstances,
Section 5(5) expressly states that the Restatement “does not recognize liability for negligent
misrepresentations made in the course of negotiating or performing a contract between the
parties.”47 That is, the Restatement Third of Torts has a preference of restricting the seller’s
negligent misrepresentations to the realm of the law of contract and restitution.
As we can see, tort rules on negligent misrepresentation liability for the physical harms
aforementioned aim to regulate the seller’s negligent conduct, either in ascertaining the accuracy
of the information, or in the manner in which the information concerning the goods is
communicated. Also, tort rules on negligent misrepresentation liability for pure economic loss
aim to control the seller’s negligent conduct in obtaining or communicating the information for

45

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2) cmts. i, j (AM. LAW INST. 1977).

46

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 3 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2020); see id. §
5 reporter’s note.
47

Id. § 5(5).
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the guidance of the buyer in the sale transaction. Given that Article 35 subjects the seller to strict
liability for non-conformity even in the absence of fraud or negligence, there is no doubt that, as
a fortiori, the seller is also subject to such contractual liability for his fraudulent or negligent
conduct in providing material facts concerning the goods sold. Tribunals are then possibly asked
to consider whether subjecting the seller to such contractual liability is sufficient to regulate the
seller’s negligent conduct, which threatens certain risks or harms to the buyer. Alternatively, the
question is raised as to whether it is persuasive to imply that insofar as Article 35 is applicable,
there is no need for resorting to any other rules that specifically intend to regulate negligent
conduct. In answering, this thesis presumes that the concept of strict liability underlying Article
35 is not seen as the exclusive mechanism in allocating risks to both parties, when those risks are
caused by the seller’s negligent conduct, which is a matter generally regulated by tort law. An
exception would be made if the contract agreed otherwise to that effect.
3.3 Fraudulent Misrepresentation
There is little doubt that the person who intentionally makes a misstatement is liable to a
defrauded person for physical harm resulting from what he did in reliance upon the truth of such
representation. The first restated provision is the rule of liability for a fraudulent
misrepresentation that involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 310 (1965) subjects the maker of false representation to tortious
liability, since he intended to induce the action of another person, knowing that such action
involves a resulting unreasonable risk to the other.48 Notably, such liability under Section 310 is
based upon unreasonable risks of physical harm, which get involved in the intended
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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misrepresentations rather than being based on the fact that the misrepresentations are intended to
mislead.49 Thus, this liability is enforced in an ordinary negligence action.50 The defendant is
held liable when the representation made by the defendant is one of fact, opinion, or law,
provided that the defrauded party reasonably relies on it.51 It is submitted that tort rules on
fraudulent misrepresentation for physical harm are mostly applicable to a situation where the
misrepresentation made concerns the physical condition of a thing, including a chattel, and such
misstatement induces the other party to believe that the thing is safe to the other or his property.52
Apart from Section 310, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 557A (1977) is another important
provision covering the case of physical harm to a defrauded party or other property in justifiable
reliance on fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Under Section 557A, a defrauded
party is permitted to maintain a tort action of deceit against the person who fraudulently makes a
misrepresentation or fails to disclose a fact that he is bound to disclose.53 Moreover, the injured
party is also allowed to base his claim on liability for fraudulent misrepresentation when he
suffered economic loss that resulted from the physical harm.54 Similarly, the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 9 (1998) expressly recognizes the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation for
harm to persons or property, including economic loss caused by those physical harms against a
seller who engages in selling products, and then makes a fraudulent misstatement of material fact
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Id. § 310 cmt. a.

50

Id. § 557A cmt. a.

51

Id. § 310 cmt. b.

52

Id.

53

Id. § 557A cmt. a.

54

Id.
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concerning the product sold.55 Further, there exist other restated rules of Restatement (Second) of
Torts (1977) dealing with liability for pecuniary loss resulting from fraudulent
misrepresentation.56 The general rule stating the right to maintaining an action of deceit is stated
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (1977). Under Section 525, the seller is subject to
tortious liability to the buyer in deceit for pure economic loss caused to him if the seller
fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law for the purpose of
inducing the buyer to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, and it is proved that the
buyer’s reliance is justified.57 As we can see, this rule regulates the defendant’s conduct that is
called “scienter.”58 Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) also provides other rules
dealing with the fraudulent character of a misrepresentation.59 In practice, a plaintiff is able to
plead actions in both deceit and negligent misrepresentation in one declaration, and then relies on
the same set of facts, attempting to satisfy the different burdens of proof under both claims.60
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §§ 9, 21 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525–551 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM §§ 9–14 (AM. LAW INST. 2020) (stating similar rules
regarding liability for the tort of deceit, which recognizes a party’s claim seeking compensation for
economic loss based on fraud).
57

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2020).
58

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 10 (AM. LAW INST. 2020).
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See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 526–530 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also id. §§ 531–536
(dealing with the requirement of intent to influence conduct—that is, the requirement that the
representation is purposely made to induce the conduct in the type of transaction intended, or a
transaction where a party has reason to expect influencing conduct); id. §§ 537–545 (dealing with the
matter of whether the plaintiff’s reliance is justified); id. § 549 (providing the measure of damages for
fraudulent misrepresentation).
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Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 337 (1982).
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As long as the sale contract is principally concerned, there have been disputes applying
common law rule on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim that is typically brought alongside a
breach of warranty claim. The buyer commonly brings a fraudulent misrepresentation claim,
together with the contractual claim, no matter which law between the CISG or domestic sale law
governs the alleged breach of warranty claim.61 Taking New Jersey tort law as an example, the
court held that a fraud claim requires proof of the elements as follows: “(1) made a material
misrepresentation of present or past fact, (2) with knowledge of its falsity and (3) with the
intention that the other party rely thereon, (4) resulting in reasonable reliance by that party to its
detriment.”62 Breach of the duty to disclose can serve as an element for false representation in
the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, as is adopted by the District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri. Such a duty to disclose arises when there exists “a relation of trust and
confidence between the parties or where one party has superior knowledge or information not
within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party.”63 The party is in breach, amounting to an
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Beth Schiffer Fine Photographic Arts, Inc. v. Colex Imaging, Inc., No. 10-05321, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 36695, at *35–36 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2012) (“In connection with the sale of the Poli 2, the First
Amended Complaint alleges that PoliElettronica and its agents Colex and Waden misrepresented to
Schiffer that the Poli 2 was a professional grade machine that was a smaller and cheaper version of the
Poli 1. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 62-63, 87-88. During the repair period, PoliElettronica allegedly
misrepresented through Colex, Waden, and Poli-Pro USA that the Poli 2 could be repaired when
PoliElettronica knew that repair was impossible due to serious design flaws. Id. ¶¶ 64, 89-90.”).
62

Id. at 37–38.
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Semi-Materials Co., Ltd. v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc, No. 4:06CV1426 FRB, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1790, at *5–6 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2011) (citing Reeves v. Keesler, 921 S.W.2d 16, 21 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996) and the court also found “there to be substantial evidence raising genuine issues of material
fact, including, but not limited to, whether, at the time the parties entered into the contracts at issue,
MEMC, its agents, and/or employees 1) made false representation(s) to Semi-Materials regarding
MEMC’s intent to deliver all of the products as contracted for in the high/low agreements; 2) failed to
disclose MEMC’s intention or understanding that MEMC could unilaterally cancel said contracts without
notice; and 3) knew, at that time, that such representation(s) were false or were ignorant of their truth”).
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act of fraud, when the party is in silence or fails to disclose a material fact despite having such a
duty to disclose.
Additionally, the pleading must meet the requirement of particularity under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 9(b).64 Even if the court demonstrated that the particularity rule is aimed at notification of the
defendant’s precise misconduct against which it is asserted,65 this thesis suggests that the specific
allegations as to fraudulent conduct could make the fraud claim arise independently from breach
of contract claim. In other words, one might be inclined to reckon that the requirement of
particularity makes the fraudulent misrepresentation claim arise independently out of the
contractual claim, i.e. the breach of warranty claim, irrespective of whether the sales contract is
governed by the CISG or not. Given that the seller is strictly liable for breach of warranty under
the CISG, the particularity requiring statements that constitute fraud justifies tort law to serve its
function to regulate fraudulent conduct. For example, a buyer alleges a particular false
misrepresentation communicated by a seller in marketing materials, or during the repair period in
attempting to mollify and defraud the buyer that goods could be repaired, despite knowing this is
impossible because of a severe defect in design flaws. The strict pleading of particularity
presents that tort law on fraud provides an essential safeguard against a contractual action being
recast as a fraud claim. This is especially so when the plaintiff tends to allege that the defendant
made a fraudulent misrepresentation in performing his duty under the contract. With the
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FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s
mind may be alleged generally.”); see also Beth Schiffer Fine Photographic Arts, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 36695, at *38; CIMC Vehicles Grp. Co. v. Direct Trailer, LP, No. H-10-709, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 129931, at *50–53 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2012); It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft
mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107149, at *44 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013) (“This requires
the plaintiff to allege ‘the date, time and place of the alleged fraud or otherwise inject precision or some
measure of substantiation into a fraud allegation.’”).
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Beth Schiffer Fine Photographic Arts, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36695, at *38.
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requirement of particularity, for a party to recover on the fraud claim, he is not required to prove
damages that are separate from losses suffered from a breach of contract where there is a
contractual relationship between the parties.66
In sum, as far as misstatements of facts are related to subject matters67 protected by the
CISG, the defendant may contend that the alleged claim of misrepresentation is subsumed and
thus trumped by the CISG altogether. Apart from interpreting the CISG’s rules, this thesis
submits that tribunals must consider the extent of the contractual duty agreed to under the
binding sale contract to determine whether the uniform law regime expressly or impliedly
imposes on the party a contractual duty not to behave below the standard of care or not to act in a
dishonest manner. Otherwise, considering the rules, as explained in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, this
thesis presumes that a plaintiff, who proves that the misrepresentation causing harm was made
negligently or fraudulently, should have a remedy under tort law that typically aims to regulate
such probable wrongful conduct.
4. Negligence
As we will see, in some circumstances, tort law imposes a duty of care upon those who
have a relationship in the course of business. On the contrary, the CISG does not provide an
express rule generally imposing a duty to adopt the standard of due care in performing
contractual obligations under the contract or the CISG. Thus, one might support the concurrent
application of tort law to deter one party from injuring the other party’s life, limb, property, or
economic interest by the former’s negligent conduct. Another view, however, might state that
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Semi-Materials Co., Ltd., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1790, at *7.
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Those said subject matters are certain features of sold goods, or the trustworthiness of the capability to
perform the contract, or the party’s creditworthiness.
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liability without fault under the CISG encompasses the faulty conduct of negligence that is
merely a state of mind, and it is closely related to obligations under the CISG. Also, the CISG
provides more advantageous rules, which do not require any proof of fault. The latter view thus
opines that the CISG’s rules on remedies exclusively govern the alleged matter of a negligent
breach of warranty or a claim for negligently performing a contractual duty.
In terms of the recognition of claim in negligence, a separate claim in negligence, seeking
recovery for pure economic loss incurred from defective goods, is limitedly recognized in the
case where the contracting parties are in the same bargaining positions to allocate their risks.68
Moreover, it was claimed that the economic loss doctrine has originally come into play in a

68

Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985) (holding that the commercial
buyer should be restricted to assert contract claims under the Uniform Commercial Code. Thus, the
negligence and strict liability cause of action were not allowed when seeking damages for economic loss
incurred from receiving goods that are not as warranted. Importantly, when making its decision, the court
considered the policies underlying both sale law and tort law, and then reasoned that a comprehensive
statutory scheme of the UCC, which satisfies the requirements of the world of commerce, should not be
obviated by tort doctrine for either strict liability or negligence, which primarily intends to protect
personal injuries and society’s interest in freedom from harm); see also City of Lennox v. Mitek Indus.,
519 N.W.2d 330 (S.D. 1994) (extending the application of economic loss doctrine to a case where a
defective component damages the product into which such a component was incorporated. In other words,
the court found that damages to the product as a whole are considered as economic losses, which fall
under the category of consequential losses, and are not losses to other property. Thus, the injured party
was barred from recovering such damages under tort theory); McDowell v. Atco Rubber Prods., 221
A.D.2d 876 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (insisting that the traditional tort claim in negligence must be
dismissed where the purchaser seeks pure economic loss and not personal injury or property damage);
Rotorex Co., Inc. v. Kingsbury Corp., 42 F. Supp. 2d 563 (D. Md. 1999) (providing the primary reason
based on the ground that the sophisticated parties, after lengthy negotiations, already allocated their risks
and limited their remedies through the commercial contract’s detailed provisions); Trinity Indus. v.
McKinnon Bridge Co., 77 S.W.3d 159 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (limiting the alleged negligent breach of
warranty of sale of goods to contract theory, rather than a tort one); Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70
P.3d 1 (Utah 2003) (denying a claim for negligence in the mismeasurement of BTU adjustments,
reasoning that the source of tortious duties, which were breached, are identical to the duties prescribed in
the contract. This is because the purchaser voluntarily assumed the alleged special contractual duties
under the Wyoming contract in dispute. This reasoning is also supported by the fact that the alleged
mismeasurement is based on the same conduct that is asserted in the contract claim, constituting
overlapping duties in this case); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 3 (AM.
LAW INST. 2020) (precluding tort liability for economic loss caused by negligence in performing a
contract between parties).

32

product liability case where a buyer sustains economic loss due to defective goods.69 Thus, it is
not surprising that US courts are inclined to apply economic loss doctrine, and deny imposing
upon the seller a separate tortious duty of care in manufacturing or supplying goods when the
buyer did not incur any personal injury or damage to property other than the goods themselves.
Despite the recognition of economic loss doctrine, one dominant US court, in limited
circumstances, appears to impose the duty of care and then hold the manufacturer liable for an
employee’s breach of due care in the active work of repairing. In Sain v. ARA Mfg. Co., the
defendant’s negligent conduct in repairing the air conditioner installed in the vehicle purchased
sounds in the tort of negligence.70 The court in Sain recognizes an action in negligence, although
the conduct caused a fire and extensive damage only to the vehicle sold.71 In Sain, the court
found that the alleged negligent conduct was not predicated on breach of warranty.72 Instead, the
court reasoned that the warranty was introduced to prove that the manufacturer had a contractual
obligation to repair the air conditioner.73 Also, the buyer in Sain sued the manufacturer for harm
to the goods caused by the negligent conduct in repairing the goods, rather than bringing suit
against the seller/manufacturer for defective goods. The decision in Sain thus illustrates the
possibility of imposing upon the seller, who entered into, e.g., a contract for the sale of
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Ham v. Swift Transp. Co., 694 F. Supp. 2d 915, 922–23 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (noting that the economic
loss doctrine originally lies in product liability cases. The court also reasoned that the UCC gives a
complete set of rights and remedies to the commercial parties to sales contracts, so that there is no need to
provide tort remedies to the party who sustains an economic loss). Cf. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec.
Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462 (Wis. 2004) (holding that the economic loss doctrine does not extensively apply to
a contract for services, which is outside the product liability context).
70

Sain v. ARA Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
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Id. at 502.
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machinery with the agreement to install the machinery and put them into operation, a duty of
care in active performance of installing machinery and putting it into operation.74 Nevertheless,
the buyer’s interest will be protected against such negligent conduct insofar as the buyer alleges
negligent conduct in installing the goods, rather than alleging claims against the seller for loss
suffered from defective goods. From the viewpoint of this thesis, the economic loss doctrine is
likely not applied to deny the imposition of a duty of care upon the party to the sale contract in
two ways. First, an action in negligence is possibly permitted when a party sustains damage to
personal injury and to property other than the goods sold. Apparently, under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the suppliers75 and manufacturers76 are more likely to be subjected to liability
in negligence when a breach of a duty of care causes an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the
other contracting party using the chattels supplied or produced. Second, in the case of economic
loss, a separate duty of care is recognized when the plaintiff alleges negligent conduct that
involves the active performance of additional duties77 agreed upon by the contracting parties,
rather than alleging a negligent breach of warranty of the sale of goods (emphasis added).
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Cf. Trinity Indus. v. McKinnon Bridge Co., 77 S.W.3d 159, 172–74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (denying a
tort claim of a negligent breach of warranty of sale. However, the court further distinguished the case at
bar from a situation in other cases where an active negligent performance was alleged against the
defendant).
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 388–390 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating rules applicable to all
suppliers); see id. §§ 399–402 (stating special rules applicable to sellers of chattels manufactured by third
persons).
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Id. §§ 394–398 (stating special rules applicable to manufacturers of chattels).
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For example, the seller can agree to perform the services of packaging, containing, and shipping the
sold goods for the buyer. The seller may also assume duties to perform the inspection, installation,
integration, and commissioning of the goods. Those engagements require an exercise of care, skill, and
knowledge. Cf. N. Am. Chem. Co. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 4th 764 (1997) (deciding the dispute
arising from contracts for the performance of services, and held that such a contract gives rise to a duty of
care, which requires the party to render such services in a competent and reasonable manner).
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In sum, when negligent conduct is alleged in performing the obligation under a sale
contract, it is important for tribunals to primarily consider whether the applicable tort law
imposes a separate duty of care on the party whose behavior may fall below such a standard
established by law for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of harm. If the
answer is affirmative, tribunals must then consider whether the CISG also provides solutions that
are adequately equivalent to the regulations or protections provided by tort law on negligence.
When similar solutions are not given within the realm of the CISG, domestic tort law is
justifiably applied to provide the injured party with the right to tort remedy on grounds of
negligence.
5. Tortious Interference with Contract or Business Relations
There exists one dominant US decision holding that the economic value received from a
promisee’s contract and prospective business relations is independent of the interests conferred
by the contractual relationship with a promisor.78 This court decision reflects the need for the law
of tort in protecting such economic interests, provided that the independent unlawful conduct is
presented with all the elements of claims required by US tort law.
5.1 Intentional Interference with Contract or Business Relations
In recognizing a claim for intentional interference with prospective business, tort law
acknowledges that a person’s property interest, in engaging in prospective business relationships,
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Orthotec v. Eurosurgical, Nos. B179387, B189213, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5276, at *63–64,
*68 (June 27, 2007) (finding the alleged wrongful breach of contract as a part of a comprehensive plan
designed to disrupt the plaintiff’s prospective economic relationship with the customer); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (stating rules on the right to recover
compensatory damages, including pecuniary loss and emotional distress, or actual harm to reputation
when the actor is held liable to another for tortious interference).
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is entitled to protection from unjustified interfering by another.79 Similarly, the contractual
relation receives a sacrosanct value, and the inviolability of the contractual right takes
precedence over the tortfeasor’s rights to trade competition and prospective advantages.80
Therefore, the tort of interference with an existing contract, a fortiori, protects the contracting
parties’ interests in benefits gained from a contract with a third person.
In establishing a claim for intentional interference with either the existing contract or
prospective contractual relationship, US tort law requires prima facie proof of the main elements.
On the one hand, one must prove the defendant’s intent to interfere with contract or business
relations; otherwise, the plaintiff is unable to be protected, even though an improper interference
is presumably presented.81 Another US court decision also confirmed that an intentional breach
of one party’s direct contract may also constitute tortious interference with a third party’s
contract if done purposely with the effect of impairing the third party’s ability to perform, or if it
prevents the third party from performing its contract with another.82 On the other hand, one’s
purposeful intent to harm another person’s business relationship is not solely sufficient to
constitute a claim for intentional interference. Accordingly, tort law requires proof of facts
indicating that the defendant’s conduct of interference is accomplished through improper
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Belden Corp. v. Internorth, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 551–52 (1980); Miller v. Lockport Realty Grp.,
Inc., 377 Ill. App. 3d 369, 373–74 (2007).
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Belden Corp., 90 Ill. App. 3d at 551–52; Miller, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 373–74.
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Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp., L.L.C., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1024–25 (D. Minn.
2010) (finding that the seller/manufacturer did not deliver damaged goods to the buyer/distributor.
Importantly, the court reasoned that no evidence shows that the seller/manufacturer sought to procure the
buyer/distributor’s breach of existing or prospective contractual relations with the third person).
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Am. Nat’l Petroleum Co. v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 798 S.W.2d 274, 278–79 (Tex. 1990)
(finding that the defendant knew its actions were a breach of its contracts with the plaintiff and would
cause the third parties, the operators, to breach their balancing agreements with the plaintiff. Also, the
evidence suggested that the defendant purposefully engaged in that unprivileged course of action).

36

means.83 In other words, tort law aims to impose upon the individual a general duty to not use
improper means in his intent to interfere with the business affairs of another and to protect the
adverse party’s property interest from being impaired by the defendant’s act with the intent of
procuring a breach of the plaintiff’s business relations.84 For an actor to be held liable for such
intentional interference, US tort law not only requires proving an intentional and improper act in
interfering, but also requires proof of other elements as restated in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 766, 766A and 766B (1979).85
This section emphasizes the elements of intentional and improper interference because
this thesis believes that through the lens of the CISG’s rules on non-conformity or other rules,
such an element is viewed as unlawful behavior that is different from a breach of contractual
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Gruppo Essenziero Italiano, S.p.A. v. Aromi D’Italia, Inc., No. CCB-08-65, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82217, at *26–28 (D. Md. July 27, 2011); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW
INST. 1979) (stating the factors on which the court may rely in determining whether interference is
improper).
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Among other elements, while a claim for intentional interference with prospective business requires
proof of the defendant’s purposeful interference, which prevents the plaintiff’s legitimate business
expectancy, a claim for intentional interference with an already existing business relationship requires
proof of the defendant’s intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of the contract between the
plaintiff and another. See Glob. Material Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., No. 12-cv-01851, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36519, at *18–19 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2014). Cf. Dig. & Analog Design Corp. v. N.
Supply Co., 540 N.E.2d 1358, 1368 (Ohio 1989) (ruling that the adverse party is limited to a contractual
claim, and thus cannot seek recovery for loss based on the tort of business interference when the alleged
interference with a business resulted as a mere consequence of such breach of contract. Also, the court
found no evidence in the case at bar indicating a defendant’s motive to interfere with the injured party’s
business relations, and thus denied the recovery in tort).
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766–766B (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see Belden Corp., 90 Ill.
App. 3d at 551–52; ID Sec. Sys. Can., Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 622, 665 (E.D. Pa.
2003); Glob. Material Techs., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36519, at *18–19; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM §§ 17–18 (AM. LAW INST. 2020) (using a different
framework to define tortious interference with contract or economic expectation for clarity and
predictability purposes. That is, Sections 17 and 18 restate the elements of each type of liability, which
are narrower and more specific. However, this Restatement does not intend to make substantial changes
in the legal outcomes rendered by the courts’ application of rules restated in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts).
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duties, primarily a breach of the duty to deliver conforming goods.86 Importantly, it seems that
when the means of interference are, in nature, found tortious, such as in cases of fraud or
fraudulent misrepresentation, such conduct is improper87 and thus more likely separate from a
breach of contractual obligation under the CISG. Accordingly, the injured party needs separate
protection under tort law in case of such an event. Notably, the breaching party likely points out
that the CISG preempts a claim for intentional interference when alleged improper means are
used through a contractual relationship,88 or the international contract expressly prohibits any use
of improper means to interfere with a business relationship.
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It is more likely that a claim for intentional interference with another’s own contract under § 766A, or a
claim for interference with prospective contractual relation under § 766B(b) normally creates a situation
where the defendant’s conduct simultaneously constitutes both a breach of contract with the plaintiff, and
a breach of the duty to not interfere with the plaintiff’s contract or prospective business relations with a
third person. This is because when the defendant is in breach of a direct contract with the plaintiff, such a
breach tends to impair the plaintiff’s ability to perform his binding duty under the contract with the third
person, or the breach prevents the plaintiff from acquiring or continuing prospective relations. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766A, 766B(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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See id. § 767 cmt. c (noting that among other factors, the nature of the actor’s conduct enumerated in
section 767(a) is the main factor in determining whether interference is improper); see also Gruppo
Essenziero Italiano, S.p.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82217, at *26–27 (ruling that “to recover for tortious
interference with business relationships, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct was
independently wrongful or unlawful.” Also, the court insisted that “Maryland courts have defined
independent ‘improper means’ to include ‘violence or intimidation, defamation, injurious falsehood or
other fraud, violation of the criminal law, and the institution or threat of groundless civil suits or criminal
prosecutions in bad faith’”). Cf. K & K Mgmt., Inc. v. Lee, 557 A.2d 965, 979–80 (Md. 1989) (finding
that the means employed were not sufficiently improper because they were neither illegal nor tortious).
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Cf. Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 612, 618 (1993) (affirming the dismissal of
intentional tort of interference. Also, the court reasoned that if the contracting party is allowed to plead
the elements of the tort of interference with prospective business relations by way of a conclusory
allegation, which merely claims that the defendant maliciously intended to destroy the injured party’s
business, this tort claim would be routinely pleaded in the case of breach of contract). Cf. Arntz
Contracting Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 4th 464, 478–79 (1996) (ruling that the
contracting party’s unjustified breach of contract by failure or refusal to perform his contract cannot be
transmuted into tort of interference by alleging that the wrongful breach detrimentally interfered with the
promisee’s business relations). Cf. JRS Prods., Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 115 Cal. App. 4th
168, 182–83 (2004) (providing reasoning that the existence of wrongful termination of a contract is
insufficient to establish independent interference with the plaintiff’s interest).
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5.2 Negligent Interference with Contract or Business Relations
As stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C (1979), there has been no general
recognition of a liability for negligent interference with a contract or with prospective business
relations.89 Nevertheless, the court in Orthotec v. Eurosurgical90 applied California tort law and
held the defendant liable for negligent interference with a prospective economic advantage.
6. Conversion
Regarding conversion, the general rules on the elements of a claim are restated in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1965). As is related to the sale contract, US court
decisions also articulate existing common law rules on the tort of conversion, deciding the issue
of whether conversion is available alongside claims in a contract for sale.
Given that both the seller and the buyer have an ancillary duty to preserve goods under
Article 8591 and Article 86,92 respectively, the CISG seemingly imposes on the parties the
responsibility similar to that imposed on the bailee by the bailment contract.93 Accordingly,
when it appears that the seller or the buyer breaches his duty of preservation of the goods, the
89

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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This thesis observes that the element of the duty not to commit independent unlawful conduct is
essentially similar to the main element required by a claim for intentional interference with contract or
prospective business. See Orthotec v. Eurosurgical, Nos. B179387, B189213, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 5276, at *58–65 (June 27, 2007).
91

Under Article 85, when the buyer delays taking of the delivery, the seller who is in possession of the
goods, or in the position to control the disposition of the goods, must adopt reasonable steps to preserve
the goods. The seller also has a similar duty when the buyer fails to pay the price at the due date
scheduled concurrently with the delivery of the goods. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods art. 85, Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CISG].
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Article 86(1) imposes a duty to preserve the goods that the buyer intends to reject. Such an obligation
requires taking steps that are reasonable in the circumstances to preserve the goods. See id. art. 86(1).
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DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORT 118 (2d ed. 2016); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 237 cmts. e, f, g (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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other party may bring tort of conversion against the breaching party, alleging that he converted
the goods by non-return or otherwise, and thus recover damages or the goods themselves.
Subject to the right to deposit goods to a warehouse and to sell them,94 US tort law is likely to
protect the parties’ possession or ownership and to regulate one’s intentional conduct that
seriously interferes with another’s rights. In Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. v. Gentec Enters,95 the
terms of the contract required the seller (plaintiff) to hold the molds used to create the products
sold, until the buyer (defendant) requested their delivery. The seller’s refusal to relinquish
possession of the molds when the buyer requested the delivery was seen as an adequate
allegation of the elements of conversion under California law.96 The elements of conversion are
(1) injured person’s ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of conversion;
(2) tortfeasor’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of the property; and (3) damages.97
Based on the same elements required to allege conversion,98 another decision ruled that under
Pennsylvania law, the right to payment under a contractual agreement does not suffice to create a
property interest for purposes of a conversion claim.99 In terms of recoverable damage, the
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See CISG, supra note 91, arts. 87–88.
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Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. v. Gentec Enters., No. CV 13-08799-RGK-SSx, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
199891 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2014).
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Id. at *6–7.
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Id.
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It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107149, at *61 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013).
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Id. at *62; see also NovaCare, Inc. v. S. Health Mgmt., CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-5903, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12326, at *6–13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1998) (noting that money could be the subject matter of
conversion, provided it belongs to the plaintiff before it is converted. The court then denied the claim for
the tort of conversion when enforceable agreements adequately protect the plaintiff’s rights to payments
due); Duane Morris, L.L.P. v. Todi, 2002 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 57, 2002 WL 31053839, at *12–13
(C.P. Sept. 3, 2002) (denying the plaintiff’s claim for conversion seeking the amount of income
contracted over).
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injured party can recover for monetary damages, including the market value of the goods at the
time and place of conversion, damages for loss of use, and other consequential damages.100
Significantly, punitive damages are allowed in a conversion action.
In this regard, one might argue that a claim in conversion is separate from a contractual
claim under the CISG. This is because conversion requires the intentional act of deprivation,
committed by exercising substantial control over an injured party’s possession of the goods in
different ways, including dispossession, destruction, acquiring possession or ownership, or
refusal to surrender goods.101 This thesis agrees that when the intentional act of conversion is
proved, the injured party should be simultaneously protected by tort law against conduct
amounting to conversion. Importantly, the injured party must show a degree of departure from
both the contractual duties and rights provided by the CISG or contractual terms, if any.
7. Tort Remedy for Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
A claim for tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is typically
brought alongside a cause of action for breach of contract. Under the relationship in an insurance
contract, US law justifies a bad faith claim against the insurer, and it treats such an action as a
separate claim for breach of duty of good faith implicitly established by a particular contractual
relationship under the contract of insurance.102 As a consequence, violation of a duty to act in
good faith sounds in tort, notwithstanding the fact that the same bad faith conduct may also
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DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 93, at 125–26.
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Id. at 107; see JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & ANITA BERNSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING
TORTS 21 (4th ed. 2010); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 223 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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Bullet Trucking, Inc. v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 84 Ohio App. 3d 327, 332–34 (1992). Notably, the tort
remedy for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing occasionally expands to the
relation under employment contracts. See Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 174–79 (1980);
Cleary v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453 (1980).
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constitute a breach of contract.103 The required element of bad faith is met when the breaching
party’s action or inaction showing his wrongful intent or his conduct for a dishonest purpose is
proven.104
A cause of action for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is rarely recognized in business litigations outside the cases of insurance contracts, unless
there exists a special relationship between the business entities with similar characteristics to
those found in insurance contracts.105 It is more important to observe that there are hardly cases
where US tort law imposes a separate and distinct duty of good faith and fair dealing upon
parties to the sale contract. The reason is that there appears to be a general duty of good faith and
fair dealing imposed under both the UCC106 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,107 which
could be applied to the relationship under a sales contract.108 With limited recognition of the tort
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Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Said, 63 Ohio St. 3d 690, 694–95 (1992); see Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9
Cal. 3d 566, 573–75 (1973).
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Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 63 Ohio St. 3d at 698–99.
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See Seaman’s Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768–69 (1984)
(characterizing special features of the relationship between the insurer and insured by taking into account
the elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility). The special relationship can be
found upon the indicia of unequal bargaining, as is stated in Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc.,
222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1398–1400 (1990). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (AM. LAW
INST. 1979) (stating that one is liable to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the
fiduciary relation). However, it should be noted that later, a decision of Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher
Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 679–80 (Cal. 1995) overruled the court’s decision in Seaman’s Direct Buying
Serv., Inc., 36 Cal. 3d at 768–69, which allowed tort recovery for bad faith denial of liability under a
noninsurance contract. Cf. Thompson v. Asimos, 6 Cal. App. 5th 970, 984–85 (2016) (affirming the trial
court’s holding that non-contract relief based on the theory of breach of the covenant of fair dealing claim
duplicates the breach of contract theory, and thus fails for lack of any showing of a special relationship).
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U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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It is also submitted that those factors constituting special relationships do not arise in commercial
contracts, particularly a sales contract between merchants where parties possess presumably equal
bargaining power. See Matthew J. Barrett, “Contort”: Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good
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remedy for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a noninsurance
contract, particularly in the contract for sales, US tort law is likely to not give parties to
international sales contract the right to the same cause of action either.109
C. Illustrative Cases Where the Party Proceeds with a Claim in Tort alongside a
Contractual Claim under the CISG
This part exemplifies the real problems underlying the issue of the CISG’s
preemption/concurrency of tort claims. The court decisions referred to in this part illustrate that,
in practice, it is common for contracting parties to assert tortious actions, as explained in Part B,
alongside a contractual claim, under the CISG.
In theory, most scholars generally take national tort law on product liability as the typical
situation where tort law coexists and competes with the Convention.110 However, in practice, a
product liability claim is mostly alleged alongside a warranty claim, available under domestic
sale law.111 In court decisions under the CISG, as far as it is published and accessible, a situation
where the party alleges both a contractual claim and product liability claim has not yet arisen.
Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance, Commercial Contracts—Its Existence and Desirability, 60
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510, 523–25 (1985).
109

See Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. ltd. v. Gentec Enters., Inc., No. CV 13-08799-RGK-SSx, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 199889, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014) (insisting that California law does not recognize a
tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim when a special relationship
with fiduciary characteristics does not exist between parties. Further, the court stated that the language of
good faith in Article 7(1) indicates that the CISG intends for an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to exist in contracts, which fall under the sphere of its application); see also RENÉ FRANZ
HENSCHEL, CONFORMITY OF GOODS IN INTERNATIONAL SALES 40–41 (2005); AYSE NIHAN KARADAYI
YALIM, INTERPRETATION AND GAP FILLING IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 113–21
(2019) (suggesting that the observance of good faith referred to in Article 7(1) could be applied to
consider the relationship between the parties, as long as it reflects the general principles on which it is
based).
110

See discussion infra Part III.B.
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See Rem Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 386 Pa. Super. 401 (1989); 2-J Corp. v. Tice, 126 F.3d 539 (3d
Cir. 1997).
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Seeing this in practice, the party to international sales governed by domestic law has
brought a claim for a breach of contract, along with some claims in tort, e.g., claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation,112 and a claim for tortious interference.113 Similarly, there are several cases in
which the contracting party asserted a contractual claim and other tort claims, namely promissory
estoppel, misrepresentation, negligence, tortious interference, conversion, and tort remedy for
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing simultaneously in the context of the
transnational sales governed by the CISG. In a range of claims asserted in different cases, some
courts were confronted with the CISG’s preemption issues, which were contended by the party
against whom the alleged tort claims were brought.114 On the other hand, other courts determined
such preemption/concurrency issues relevant to the CISG without a request from either party.115
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See Ho Myung Moolsan Co. v. Manitou Mineral Water, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127869, at *45
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2010) (“Plaintiff’s original complaint contained a claim for fraud in the inducement of
the contract based on defendant’s representations, made before the contract was executed, ‘that
[defendant] [was] fully capable of providing as much water as plaintiff[] required for sale and distribution
anywhere including the United States and Korea.’”).
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See Orthotec v. Eurosurgical, Nos. B179387, B189213, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5276 (June 27,
2007); Gruppo Essenziero Italiano, S.p.A. v. Aromi D’Italia, Inc., No. CCB-08-65, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82217 (D. Md. July 27, 2011).
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See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing
Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76748 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10,
2006); Sky Cast, Inc. v. Glob. Direct Distribution, LLC, No. 07-161-JBT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21121
(E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008); Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120183 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009); Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. ltd., 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 199889; U.S. Nonwovens Corp. v. Pack Line Corp., 4 N.Y.S.3d 868 (Sup. Ct. 2015).
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See TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
22, 2006); Al Hewar Envtl. & Pub. Health Establishment v. Se. Ranch, LLC, No. 10-80851-CV, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128723 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2011); It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft
mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107149 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013); Weihai Textile Grp.
Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Level 8 Apparel, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014);
Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods LLC, No. 13 CV 4358 (PKC)(LB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71289 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2014); Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. v. Gentec Enters., No. CV 13-08799-RGKSSx, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199891 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2014).
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First, it is worth taking up the phenomena in which a range of tortious actions mentioned earlier
are practically asserted alongside contractual claims under the CISG.
As for promissory estoppel, three particular cases are worth highlighting. In Geneva
Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,116 the plaintiffs alleged claims against defendants based
on breach of contract, in that they failed to supply clathrate in response to a specific purchase
order. One of the plaintiffs, Invamed, asserted promissory estoppel along with the contractual
claim. The issue of the CISG’s preemption of promissory estoppel was principally discussed and
determined as a matter of first impression.117 Subsequently, other court decisions118 cited and
referred to the analysis and holding of Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. as the relevant authority
when dealing with the CISG’s preemption of promissory estoppel. In the first case of
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, it is shown that the immediate buyer and the downstream
purchaser alleged breach of express and implied warranties, as well as failure to deliver
conforming goods in violation of the CISG, along with promissory estoppel.119 In the second
case, Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. ltd. v. Gentec Enters., Inc., the manufacturer/seller brought
claims for breach of contract under the CISG alongside promissory estoppel, alleging that the
defendant refused to pay for the ordered products in violation of the agreement.120
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Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 280.
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Id. at 285–87.
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Caterpillar, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 659; Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. ltd., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
199889.
119

Caterpillar, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
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Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. ltd., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199889, at *9–11 (following the authority of
Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. in holding that the CISG does not preempt state promissory estoppel claims.
Besides, this court reasoned that the CISG does not have any provision concerning equitable causes of
action).

45

Let us examine the CISG cases where the parties brought claims for misrepresentations.
On the one hand, most cases show that the buyer typically brought claims for negligent
misrepresentation or fraudulent inducement along with a contractual claim under the CISG.121 As
can be seen, the alleged misstatements communicated by the seller in each case are most likely
related to the seller’s duty to deliver goods as promised or as required by the CISG. Taking the
allegation of TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH case as an example, TVT asserted
both the contract claims under Articles 35 and 36 of the CISG, and a fraudulent
misrepresentation claim. The allegation states, “Schubert represented that it had the expertise and
experience to design, build, and service a reliable Biobox system, knowing that such
representations were false, to induce TVT to enter into the February 1995 Quotation
Contract.”122 The court in TeeVee Toons, Inc. was then faced with the issue of whether the fraud
claim was duplicative of the contract claim. Similarly, in another case, Al Hewar Envtl. & Pub.
Health Establishment v. Se. Ranch, LLC, the plaintiff filed a breach of contract claim under the
CISG and a fraudulent inducement claim, alleging non-delivery of goods purchased and a false
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In Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., as for negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant, ACIC/Brantford, failed to disclose the fact regarding the defendant’s intent and ability to
supply the plaintiff with clathrate for a commercial launch. See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 201 F. Supp.
2d at 281, 287; see also TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2006); Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05CV-00702, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76748, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2006); Miami Valley Paper, LLC v.
Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GMBH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25201, at *31–32
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009) (“As evidence of misrepresentation, Plaintiff points to Defendant’s statement
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deal. The owner is selling them because of bankrubsy [sic]. Therefore we should act fast on this.’”); Sky
Cast, Inc. v. Glob. Direct Distribution, LLC, No. 07-161-JBT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21121 (E.D. Ky.
Mar. 18, 2008); Al Hewar Envtl. & Pub. Health Establishment v. Se. Ranch, LLC, No. 10-80851-CV,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128723 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2011); Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods
LLC, No. 13 CV 4358 (PKC)(LB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71289 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2014).
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TeeVee Toons, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455, at *49.
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statement as to the possibility of shipment of goods presented by the defendants.123 This court
principally decided the merits of the case regarding the plaintiff’s right to recovery for loss in
expectancy, consequential damages, and punitive damages as a result of the fraudulent
inducement claim against the defendants.124 On the other hand, other examples, such as It’s
Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH and Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co. v.
Level 8 Apparel, LLC,125 manifest in that the seller who bargained for a payment also proceeded
with a breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation claims regarding the intention to pay
the contract price against the buyer.
Let us turn to discuss negligence cases arising from international trade.126 Electrocraft
Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd. is one significant illustration where the plaintiff alleged
liability for negligent conduct in manufacturing and furnishing allegedly defective refrigerator
motors, alongside claims for breach of express/implied warranty.127 The defendant moved to
dismiss this action in tort, contending that the CISG preempts and subsumes the negligence/strict
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Al Hewar Envtl. & Pub. Health Establishment, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128723, at *3 (stating that the
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107149, at *1, *40 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013); Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Level 8 Apparel,
LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014).
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liability claim.128 Another example where the buyer asserted a negligence claim against the seller
can be seen in TeeVee Toons, Inc.. The complaint stated,
“Schubert had a duty to exercise the reasonable care and prudence that is
customary in the high-speed packaging industry” in “its efforts to design, develop,
manufacture, install, service, and repair the Biobox production system,” and that
Schubert “failed to live up to its duty of reasonable care” such that TVT suffered
“monetary damages” (including the “loss of funds” paid for the Schubert System
itself and spent on maintenance to support use of the Schubert System and use of
the Cinram facility and lost profits).129
Given such allegations, the court then applied New York law to the negligence claim, so
as to decide the actionability of the alleged claim.
Regarding claims for tortious interference, the party usually filed either a claim for
intentional interference or a claim for negligent interference with prospective economic
advantage. Evidently, when the buyer discovered that the seller delivered defective goods130 or
that the goods did not conform to the agreed terms regarding the specifications,131 the buyer
usually brought claims for tortious interference with business expectancy in connection with
defective goods or non-conforming goods against the seller. Taking Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v.
Seneca Hardwoods LLC case as an example, the buyer asserted a tort claim based on negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage, claiming that by delivering wooden planks
that did not conform to the agreed terms regarding the specifications, the seller negligently
interfered with the buyer’s prospective economic advantage.132 Additionally, another setting
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shows that the buyer asserted a claim for tortious interference relating to a breach of duty other
than that imposed with regard to the products purchased.133 In Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. v.
Gentec Enters., the buyer filed a counterclaim based on a claim of intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage, and a claim for negligent interference with prospective
economic relations against the seller’s refusal to deliver the molds, tooling, and dies (“the
molds”) that the seller used to create the products purchased.134
Taking the illustrative case of conversion, It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim
Hotelgesellschaft mbH shows that the plaintiff-seller proceeded with a claim for conversion
along with a breach of contract claim against the defendant-buyer and its employee, alleging that
the buyer’s employee withheld payment from the plaintiff.135 Instead, the buyer in Shagrow filed
a counterclaim based on conversion against the seller’s act of refusal to relinquish possession of
“the molds” used to create the products sold when the buyer requested delivery.136
The last common instance of a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is also worth mentioning. While one court considered the issue of the CISG’s preemption
of such a claim sua sponte, the party in another court moved for a motion to dismiss for failure to
state causes of action because the CISG preempts state law claims. Taking Weihai Textile Grp.
Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Level 8 Apparel, LLC as an example in the former, the defendants brought
counterclaims against the plaintiff, alleging a breach of contract and breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing for the plaintiff’s continued possession of defendants’ materials, and other
133
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state law claims as well.137 In deciding the parties’ claims other than the contractual claim under
the CISG, this court ruled that “[w]here the parties’ claims are duplicative or preempted by the
CISG, the Court will dismiss them sua sponte.”138 As it was held, the counterclaim for an
implied covenant was dismissed based on the ground that it is duplicative of the claim for breach
of contract under the CISG because its allegation rested on the same underlying facts and
conducts.139 Considering U.S. Nonwovens Corp. v. Pack Line Corp. as an example in the latter,
the plaintiff, in this case, asserted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith, along with
causes of action for breach of contract and other claims for breach of warranties against one of
the defendants.140 Instead, the defendant contended that the CISG preempts state law claims.141
Referring to Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co., this court held that the plaintiff’s claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith is duplicative of the claim for breach of contract
due to the allegations being based on the same underlying facts.142
All in all, what is of interest for this thesis is to discuss a range of court decisions above,
whereby US tribunals encountered the real issues of the CISG’s preemption/concurrency of tort
remedy regardless of a prior motion from either party, or which party brings such a tort claim.
Thus, the following chapters will further analyze and understand the approaches which
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judiciaries would adopt in solving such issues at bar. Also, it aims to assess whether the
approaches adopted are justifiably appropriate to deal with the tension between the CISG and tort
law.
D. The CISG’s Contractual Claims Commonly Interact with a Range of Tort Claims:
Scope of Regulations and Protections
It is necessary here to introduce a claim for non-conformity under Articles 35 and 36,
which intend to protect the seller from excessive liability and thus provide for a balance of the
parties’ interests in the goods purchased.143 This is because a claim for non-conformity under
Articles 35 and 36 is typically brought together with other tort claims, as illustrated in Part C
when the buyer suffers losses from defective goods. Thus, it is exclusively of practical
importance to investigate the CISG’s rules on non-conformity to determine whether the alleged
tortious actions and a claim for breach of warranty under the CISG possibly overlap each other.
Likewise, the contracting party commonly asserts promissory estoppel, along with a claim for
breach of contract under the CISG. Typically, the defendant attacks the promissory estoppel
claim on the ground that the CISG preempts such a claim. Also, tribunals are inevitably required
to consider the protection granted by Article 16(2)(b) to determine whether the alleged
promissory estoppel claim falls within the CISG’s scope and is thus preempted. Article 16(2)(b)
is of primary relevance when considering the interplay between the CISG and tort law. Thus, it is
worth investigating the extent to which this provision provides for the protection of the offeree’s
reliance on the offer received, which might overlap with tort law on promissory estoppel.
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1. Claim for the Delivery of Non-conforming Goods
Articles 35 and 36 are the pivotal provisions to be considered, to define the scope of
regulations and protections when a claim for delivery of non-conforming goods is brought
against a seller. While Article 35 is of importance for establishing the seller’s obligations with
respect to the conformity of the goods, it is under Article 36 that the seller is held liable for lack
of conformity of the goods existing at the time the risk passes to the buyer.144 This means that the
CISG intends to regulate the duty to deliver conforming goods, and holds the seller liable for loss
suffered from breach of such duty only at the time when the risk passes to the buyer.145
The assessment of the non-conformity of goods under Article 35(1) encompasses
variations in quantity, quality, and description, as required by the contract, as well as variances in
a container for, or packaging of, the goods required by contract. As such, it could be said that the
respective terms agreed to under the contract must be considered146 and interpreted to indicate
the contractual duties and the respective interests to be protected under the contract and the CISG
regarding this kind of express warranty claim.147
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Apart from the requirements, as described by the contract, conformity standards would be
required by the default rules under Article 35(2), as an implied warranty148 or the parties’
presumed intentions.149 The first implied standard of Article 35(2)(a) requires the seller to deliver
goods that are fit for all purposes150 for which goods of such description are ordinarily used. As
regards another implied warranty, Article 35(2)(b) imposes the duty to furnish the goods to be fit
for a particular purpose. The particular purpose under Article 35(2)(b) includes a special
condition of merchantability, or of being capable of resale, which is principally determined by
compliance under the public law of the seller’s country. It is also submitted that the seller may be
obliged to supply goods that conform to those standards under the regulations of the buyer’s
country or as per the laws enforced at the sub-purchaser’s country, when the goods are delivered
directly to a sub-purchaser in a third country. The imposition of such a duty depends upon the
seller’s knowledge of those particular requirements.151 If the special requirements under the
148
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relevant country’s public law were applied to impose a duty on the seller, in either case, this duty
would become a contractual duty under the CISG. Accordingly, the duty to comply with public
law is likely identical to the duty imposed by the tort law of the country that is the buyer’s place
of business, or the law of a third country, which is the place of delivery.152 Besides, the seller is
deemed to warrant that the goods possess the qualities which he has presented to the buyer as a
sample or model according to Article 35(2)(c).153 Lastly, the seller implicitly warrants that the
goods are “contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where there is no such
manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods.”154
That being said, Article 35 imposes duties on the seller with respect to the contractual
performance in delivering conforming goods in terms of their types, quantity, quality, and
packaging. Thus, if any tortious duty, as recognized, involves those aspects of the contractual

Seller’s Obligations and Liability: Annotation to German Supreme Court Decision of 2 March 2005 [VIII
ZR 67/04], in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
(CISG) 2005-2006 197, 201–02 (Pace Int’l Law Review ed., 2007) (noting that Article 35(2)(b) also gives
protection to the seller by stating that the seller could not be reasonably expected to know all public law
regulations or other local restrictions of merchantability in some circumstances). Cf. Austria 13 April
2000 Supreme Court (Machines case) (Aug. 7, 2020, 10:19 PM),
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000413a3.html (stating that the special requirements, which apply in the
buyer’s country, could only be applied to impose upon the seller a duty to comply with such standards “if
they also apply in the seller’s country, if they are agreed on, or if they are submitted to the seller at the
time of the formation of the contract, according to Art 35(2)(b) CISG”).
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performance, it could be the case whereby the seller’s same conduct in failing to comply with the
standards of conformity under Article 35 inevitably invokes elements of tortious action, thus
resulting in the involvement of tort law. It is then necessary to discuss whether tort law still
serves its function in regulating tortious conduct and giving the buyer a right to tort remedy in a
situation where the CISG also regulates such a tortious obligation. Thus, the following chapters
will discuss and analyze relevant rules and doctrines in order to answer this question.
2. The Protection of the Offeree’s Reliance on the Offer Received under Article
16(2)(b)
Article 16(2)(b) states that an offer could not be revoked “if it was reasonable for the
offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the
offer.”155 According to Article 16(2)(b), the CISG protects the offeree’s justified reliance on a
received offer, provided that the offeree also acted in reliance. It is submitted that Article
16(2)(b) is not restricted only to cases where the offeree’s reliance is detrimental, whereby he
suffers any provable damage because of the revocation.156 Another comparable view holds that
Article 16(2)(b) is similar to the doctrine of promissory estoppel under US law,157 even though
promissory estoppel has stricter requirements than those outlined under Article 16(2)(b).158
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Further, it is predicted that tribunals will more likely interpret and apply Article 16(2)(b) in the
same way as US courts have used the common law for promissory estoppel.159
One significant protection of reliance on an offer is that the revocation made is
ineffective.160 Consequently, the offer can be accepted and the sales contract concludes when the
acceptance becomes effective, creating rights and obligations under the contract and the
Convention. In this event, when the offeror fails to perform his duty as promised, the failure to
fulfill his obligation constitutes a breach of contract.161 Accordingly, the offeree has the right to
remedies for breach of contract under the CISG. Thus, it is submitted that as long as the offeror
has not acted fraudulently, claims for damages under domestic law on promissory estoppel must
be excluded, because the offeree can treat the revocation as a refusal to perform his obligations
under the contract governed by the CISG.162
However, one may argue that the only remedy explicitly stated in Part II of the CISG–
that is to hold the offer open so the offeree can conclude a contract– is insufficient when it is
economically impractical for the offeree to accept and thereby complete the contract.163 In this
setting, given the fact that the offeree had reasonably relied on the offer and acted to his
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detriment, recourse to promissory estoppel under domestic tort law is necessary and
simultaneously permitted. Otherwise, tribunals are invited to develop general principles under
the Convention regarding a remedy for damages suffered from the offeror’s wrongful revocation
through the method of gap-filling under Article 7(2).164
Apart from the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel, the European doctrine of
culpa in contrahendo, recognized under the civil law system, is seen as a corollary of the
irrevocable offer doctrine.165 The problem of the CISG’s scope, in relation to pre-contractual
liability based on the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, thus resembles the main problem asked
regarding the Convention’s scope of promissory estoppel. Since this concept of pre-contractual
liability could not be developed and adopted as the uniform rules under the CISG, Peter
Schlechtriem and John O. Honnold thus concede that the quest of pre-contractual liability for
breaking off negotiations is a matter outside the CISG’s boundaries.166 Nevertheless, Michael
Joachim Bonell argues that, given that the concept of pre-contractual liability may, in essence,
encompass different situations, a distinction should be drawn between such cases, in order to
determine the extent to which they probably fall under the Convention’s scope.167
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Based on Bonell’s idea of distinguishing the different situations of pre-contractual
liability, it is persuasive to consider promissory estoppel under American law as a kind of extracontractual liability, when it has been developed to protect contracting parties from damages
incurred at a stage prior to concluding the contract. Accordingly, that matter falls outside the
realm of the CISG, provided that the contract is not concluded due to improper conduct of the
offeror during negotiation or because, in the view of the offeree, it would be uneconomic to
accept the offer and continue the preparatory work in reliance on such offer, predicting the
offeror’s breach.168 However, this thesis raises a critical point, which is that it would impair the
uniform application of Article 16, along with Article 74, if the offeree were allowed to ignore the
protection under Article 16 and then rely on the domestic claim of promissory estoppel to
recover specifically expectation interests, which would reach the same outcome as under the
protection provided by the Convention (emphasis added). If, in contrast, the offeree claimed that
promissory estoppel made the offeror bound by his unilateral promise, and then, upon the
effective acceptance, based his right as agreed to under the contract, the alleged promissory
estoppel matter would entirely overlap with Article 16 and other relevant provisions on remedies
for breach of the sale contract, and thus fall under the CISG’s scope. In such an event, it is
necessary to discuss further the extent of the degree of the preemptive force the CISG may have
over a tort claim in the case where both norms entirely overlap each other.
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E. Preliminary Conclusion
In practice, there exist several cases in which an injured party brought tort actions
alongside a breach of contract claim under the CISG. Each contracting party proceeded with the
tortious actions in hope that, for legitimate reasons, the right to a concurrent tort claim is
recognized by the applicable law of tort, and that the party would gain benefits from the
incidental rules of the law of torts.
On one hand, US tort laws recognize a variety of claims for breach of tortious duties. The
existence of the extra-contractual duty or interest under the law of torts is intended to support
domestic tort laws to serve their particular functions alongside the CISG. On the other hand,
some alleged claims in tort, such as those based on product liability and negligence for pure
economic loss, or a tortious breach of duty of good faith, are not available under US tort law.
Notably, US tort laws on the availability of claims in tort might not be similar to the laws of
other countries. Given that the applicable tort law of a foreign country presumably recognizes the
alleged tortious actions, tribunals inevitably encounter the involvement of tort laws, and thus
need to deal with the CISG’s preemption of those tort claims when resolving disputes arising
from international sales. Therefore, the following chapters will further discuss the CISG’s
features and its interpretive dimension, as well as analyze scholars’ viewpoints and judicial
practices concerning the essential aspects of the CISG’s preemption problem posed in theory and
practice.
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II. THE FEATURES OF THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) AND ITS PREEMPTIVE FORCE ON TORT CLAIMS
It is generally accepted that regard must be had for a uniform law for international sales
when tribunals are confronted with any controversial questions posed due to the involvement of
this Convention. Likewise, to answer the question of whether, and to what extent, the CISG
preempts the alleged tort claims, as specifically stressed by this thesis, the primary need is
therefore the exploration of the CISG itself. Before exploring the diverse scholarly and practical
legal opinions, it is essential to first investigate whether, and to what extent, the CISG and its
historical legislation suggest regarding the scope of the CISG and its preemption of tort remedy.
This chapter discusses the history of the CISG’s rules, the CISG’s text, its purposes and
functions, the CISG’s approach to remedies, and its approach to party autonomy. Subsequently,
these explorations will navigate and justify the academic and juridical arguments concerning the
interaction between the CISG and tort laws.
A. The CISG’s Historical Evolution and Its Preemptive Power
This part presents the CISG’s historical evolution, so as to investigate what the history of
the uniform law for international sales suggests about the CISG’s preemption of tort claims.
The Draft of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods – the CISG draft – was reviewed and considered by sixty-two countries at the
diplomatic conference in Vienna in 1980.169 Before the preparation of the CISG draft, its two
predecessors, namely a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS),170 and a
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Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF),171 had
laid the foundation for the uniform laws governing the international sales of goods. The CISG
draft was established from work on a revision and a modification of the ULIS, which only has a
few Contracting States, most of which are from Western Europe.172 The work on harmonization
and unification of uniform rules for international sales was carried on by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), established by the United Nations
General Assembly.173 The UNCITRAL appointed a Working Group of fourteen Member States
to study the ULIS and consider what changes should be made to this Convention.174 The
modifications to the ULIS were expected to make the uniform sale laws more acceptable to
various countries with their variety of legal, social, and economic systems.175 In this regard, the
text of the CISG draft was finally formulated by adopting, rewriting, modifying, and deleting
some provisions of ULIS.176 It is worth noting that throughout the process of improving the text
of the CISG, the revised CISG draft, together with the commentary, was sent to the governments
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that a final text of the ULIS did not justify United States’ ratification).
171

The United States did not ratify the ULF which came into force on August 23, 1972. See Ndulo, supra
note 170, at 2–3.
172

Kazuaki Sono, The Vienna Sales Convention: History and Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS: DUBROVNIK LECTURES 1, 2 (Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds., 1986) (Reproduced by Pace
Law Sch. Inst. of Int’l Commercial Law with permission of Oceana Publications).
173

Farnsworth, supra note 169, at 18; John Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: An Overview, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 223, 225 (1979).
174

Honnold, supra note 173, at 225–26.

175

United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 11
April, 1980, supra note 150, at 4; see also Farnsworth, supra note 169, at 18; Ndulo, supra note 170, at 3.
176

Henry Landau, Background to U.S. Participation in United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 18 INT’L L. 29, 30 (1984).

61

of various nations and interested international organizations so as to gather their comments and
proposals.177
In revising relevant provisions regarding the preemptive effect of the uniform sale law,
three relevant proposals were worthy of being considered. The discussions and decisions of these
proposals are the main focus of this thesis and are presented as follows.
Firstly, the Working Group considered the proposal to delete Articles 34178 and 53179 of
the ULIS.180 The Working Group’s main discussions were primarily focused on deleting Article
34. In the third session, the Working Group considered the ULIS draftsmen’s intention in
enacting Article 34. It was noted that the drafters intended “to protect the uniformity of the rules
of Article 33 regarding conformity of the goods by preventing recourse to other remedies
available under some national rules, like a plea of nullity, based on mistake as to the quality of
goods.”181 The Working Group feared that the retention of Article 34 might go considerably far
beyond what the draftsmen intended. It was further argued that the text of Article 34 could
“possibly be interpreted to preclude not only remedies under the national law but those remedies
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that the parties might have agreed upon in the contract.”182 Although there were proposals to
modify the text of Article 34 to prevent ambiguous interpretation, the proposals were not
accepted.183 Finally, the Working Group concluded that “[A]rticle 34 should be deleted
altogether for lack of appropriate language that would clearly reflect the intention of the
draftsmen of this article.”184 It was also noted that the requirement for resolving the tension
between the rules of Article 33 and national laws, which were referred to as the intention of the
draftsmen of the ULIS, would arise only in exceptional cases.185 However, the Working Group
clearly reported, and submitted in its fourth session, that the decision to remove Article 34 does
not indicate disagreement with the objective of protecting “the uniformity of the Law by
prohibiting recourse to other remedies provided under some national rules that would be
different than those established by the present Law for failure to perform the contract of sale.”186
It was also stated in the report that varying national rules on the matters covered by the
provisions of the Uniform Law are displaced by virtue of “the general obligation to give effect to
the Uniform Law.”187 It was suggested that “this obligation has been reinforced by the Working
Group’s revision of [A]rticle 17,188 which specially directs attention to the international character
of the law and the need to promote uniformity in its interpretation and application.”189 From the
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viewpoint of the Working Group, it is impractical to specifically insert a statement reiterating
that inconsistent national laws are replaced in connection with each of the rules of the Uniform
Law.190
This thesis argues that there are two primary reasons for not including any exclusivity
provision similar to the text of Article 34 of the ULIS when revising the previous uniform sale
laws. On the one hand, the Working Group needed to prevent the exclusion of remedies which
the parties might have otherwise agreed to in their contract. On the other hand, the Working
Group decided to leave open the problem of the interaction between the Convention and
inconsistent domestic laws, instead giving the tribunals some guidelines under the text of the
revised Article 17 of the Uniform Law,191 when they are to be faced with the issue of the right to
remedies apart from those provided by the Uniform Law. Accordingly, it is impossible to infer
from the deletion of Article 34 of the ULIS that the drafters intended to give the parties
unrestricted recourse to domestic remedies under tort laws. Nor is it clear that the drafters
supported a recourse to remedies under the Convention as mutually exclusive, so long as the
drafters were more willing to honor party autonomy in its decision when deleting Article 34.
Subsequently, the Working Group, at its fourth session, decided to delete Article 53 as per the
suggestion given in the Secretary-General’s report, based on the ground that Article 53 paralleled
with Article 34, which the Working Group had decided to delete.192 Consequently, at
UNCITRAL’s tenth session, the Committee decided not to retain a proposed exclusivity clause,
which stated that “the Convention limit the rights of the buyer to those conferred on him by the
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Convention so that, except in cases of fraud,193 remedies based upon national law are
excluded.”194 Similar to the reasoning provided by the Working Group, it was explained that
such a proposal would add a risk of interpretation, in the way that it prevents the buyer from
relying upon remedies agreed in the contract.195 Furthermore, it was also pointed out that it may
be inadvisable to protect a seller who delivers defective products, thereby causing damage by
precluding a buyer from asserting claims in tort.196
Secondly, the Working Group decided to delete Article 89197 of the ULIS, which
expressly grants the determination of damages, in case of fraud, to the domestic rules applicable
to contracts of sales not governed by the ULIS. Comments provided by governments and
international organizations claimed that the reasons underlying this decision seemed to be,
among other things, a need for uniformity.198 In its disagreement with the deletion of Article 89
of the ULIS, Norway suggested the Committee take into consideration that “the convention does
not govern and cannot unify the effect of fraud regarded as a tort independent of contract, in
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particular where the fraud is committed before or during the conclusion of the contract.”199
Norway thus proposed that this decision to delete Article 89 of the ULIS be revised, and that the
draft Convention should also regulate whether, and to what extent, fraudulent conduct in
performing a contract affects recoverable damages.200 However, at UNCITRAL’s tenth session,
although the Committee was asked to reconsider deleting Article 89 of ULIS, the proposal did
not attract sufficient support to be discussed any further.201 Rather, it is assumed that the
proposal regarding uniform rules on damages in fraud cases was not accepted. This is primarily
because it appears that no provision of the CISG regulates the effect of fraud in the performance
of the contract on damages that could be recovered.
Thirdly, the Diplomatic Conference by the First Committee considered a joint proposal202
at its third meeting, to exclude claims for death and personal injury from the Convention’s
coverage. While discussing a joint proposal, some delegates further called for a modification of
the proposal, so as to exclude damage to other properties.203 Otherwise, it was suggested that the
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joint proposal should not be interpreted a contrario in relation to material damage. It was also
proposed that product liability claim for damages to property should be considered as tort claims
falling outside the scope of the CISG.204 However, France’s delegation reasoned that their joint
amendment is based on the belief that damages to property were included in economic loss, and
excluding these kinds of damages would contradict other provisions of the Uniform Law,
especially those that cover the conformity of goods.205 Because a joint proposal received greater
support from other delegates, the First Committee ultimately denied the proposal of excluding
claims, for loss to other goods caused by the goods sold, from the CISG’s scope 206 and
forwarded the joint proposal to a Drafting Committee.207 Considering the drafting history of
Article 5, it is unlikely that the drafters intended to exclude all claims for product liability and
reserve the issues of product liability to domestic law (emphasis added). Additionally, it would
go against the drafters’ intention if it were believed that the exclusion of liability for death and
personal injury could be analogized to liability for damages to property.
In conclusion, there were efforts to synthesize and harmonize the legal concepts and rules
of sales contract in both common and civil law systems.208 After various attempts to modify and
revise previous uniform sale laws, as well as analyze and improve the text of the revised draft in
accordance with the comments and proposals given by governments and international
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organizations, the drafting committees finalized the 1978 UNCITRAL Draft Convention. The
Draft Convention was considered and approved at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries,
comprised of the Representatives from sixty-two Member States.209 According to Article 99(1),
the Convention entered into force on January 1, 1988. It has eighteen signatories, including the
United States of America.210 Currently, the Convention has been ratified, accepted, approved, or
acceded by ninety-three States.211 The CISG is voluntarily adopted, which means that contracting
parties can opt out of it and are not legally bound.212 The option to withdraw is important
because the CISG mainly applies to the international sale of goods213 that may concurrently be
subject to other domestic laws, bringing about a tension between the Convention and domestic
law. Considering historical accounts through the drafting process is thus extremely important in
providing guidelines to deal with the issue of the interaction between both legal bodies. As
investigated, it seems that the historical perspective is likely to support the prevention of conflict
between the CISG and tort law in some circumstances, i.e., in case of liability for death and
personal injury. Also, the drafters aimed for matters falling under the scope of the Uniform Law
to be subject to the same balanced rules of the Convention. Nevertheless, the drafting committees
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did not explicitly suggest that the CISG be applied as an exclusive instrument and thus
completely prevent the party from relying on any domestic tort remedy. The reason may be that
the drafters, other governments, and interested international organizations seem to accept that the
CISG’s rules could not possibly be established to extensively govern all matters that can arise
relating to international sale contracts, such as fraud cases. Regardless, the drafter insisted that
both, the international character of the Convention and the need to promote uniformity in its
application, be prioritized. At this point, it should also be said that the historical development of
the CISG, however, does not definitively point in any clear direction in terms of its preemption
of tort remedies.
B. The Text of the CISG and Its Preemptive Power
Dealing with the question of the CISG’s preemptive effect begs the question of whether
the text of the CISG tells us something about the interaction between the CISG and other
domestic laws. In comparison with either the predecessor of the uniform law for international
sales214 or other uniform laws for international carriage,215 no provision of the CISG expressly
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provides for the preemptive power of the CISG and directs application of the CISG in a way that
excludes all other remedies available under domestic law. Likewise, no express rule of the CISG
provides for concurrent tort action based on the condition that it can only be brought subject to
the CISG’s rules and principles. It is, however, assumed that the omission of provisions
indicating the exclusivity of the CISG does not necessarily translate to the notion that parties can
resort to domestic remedies without any restrictions.216 Possible restrictions on the right to
domestic remedies arguably depend upon whether the matters in question fall under the CISG’s
sphere of application.
The CISG itself limits its sphere of application to cross-border transactions,217 particular
types of contracts,218 and a set of questions within its scope.219 Hence, the CISG, in essence, has
not decisively displaced domestic contract laws or other areas of laws that govern the matters
outside its sphere of application. It is also clearly stated that the CISG does not displace rules of
contract law governing matters that the CISG excludes from its scope.220
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The tribunals are, however, challenged by more complicated situations when the CISG’s
sphere of application overlaps with the domain of domestic laws. As for the CISG’s preemption
of contract law, it is agreed that the CISG entirely replaces domestic contract laws,221 and that it
exclusively governs disputes that fall under the CISG’s coverage regarding the international sale
of covered goods. This is because the CISG was intentionally established as a uniform law
governing the contractual relationship between the parties. However, it is possibly controversial
to reach a similar assumption in terms of such a replacement when it comes to the concurring tort
laws, for which the drafters of the CISG intentionally did not substitute this uniform law.
Given that the CISG does not explicitly state its interaction with domestic tort laws, it is
necessary to investigate the provisions regarding its sphere of application, especially those
expressly limiting its scope of application. An understanding of the substantive scope of
application is required because, a fortiori, the matters of tort remedies that are outside the
potential scope of the CISG should generally be permitted. That is to say, if it were proved that
the issues of tort remedies fall under the limited scope of the CISG, it would likely be accepted
that tort remedies are suppressed in order to sustain uniformity. After recognizing the CISG’s
provisions concerning its scope, the tribunals would be able to further determine in what way,
and to what extent, the CISG interacts with domestic tort laws governing the relevant matters.

221

Beth Schiffer Fine Photographic Arts, Inc. v. Colex Imaging, Inc., No. 10-05321, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 36695 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2012); U.S. Nonwovens Corp. v. Pack Line Corp., 4 N.Y.S.3d 868 (Sup.
Ct. 2015).

71

1. The CISG’s Text regarding the Limited Types of the Contract Falling under Its
Substantive Sphere and Its Preemptive Power
The CISG’s substantive sphere of application is limited to a contract for the sale of
goods, notwithstanding the civil or commercial character of the parties or of the contract itself.222
In addition, Article 3 of the CISG provides that some other types of contracts could be
considered a sale contract and thus fall under the CISG’s sphere of application. According to
Article 3(1), contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced can be governed
by the CISG, unless it appears that the party who orders or purchases the goods to be
manufactured or produced undertakes the duty to supply a substantial part of the materials
necessary for the manufacturing or production. In Article 3(2), the CISG itself excludes those
contracts that impose a duty on the seller to supply labor or other services, alongside the
obligation to furnish the goods insomuch as the supply of labor or other services occupies a
preponderant part of the seller’s obligations. In other words, if the preponderance of the seller’s
obligations does not consist of the supply of labor or other services, such a contract will be
subject to the CISG. Thus, the contractual liability arising from international sales contracts
could involve a breach of the duties in manufacturing goods, in supplying labor, or in
undertaking the services that the seller agreed to under these particular types of contracts.
Consequently, it is often argued that negligent conduct in the performance of these obligations is
essentially a breach of a contractual duty, so the CISG, rather than domestic tort law, governs the
right to a remedy for losses incurred from this breach.
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Furthermore, Article 2(a) excludes from its substantive sphere the sale that is termed a
consumer contract, which includes the sale of goods bought for personal, family, or household
use.223 Nevertheless, the CISG still governs consumer contracts if the seller does not know, nor
ought to have known, the intention with which the goods were bought, i.e. for personal, family,
or household use, prior to or at the conclusion of the contract. The reason underlying this
exclusion of consumer contracts is because many legal systems intend to govern consumer
transactions under laws and regulations designed to specifically protect consumers.224 Also,
based on the idea that the consumers are in a weak negotiating position when faced by
professional sellers, the drafters did not wish for the CISG to override the imperative rules of
national systems aiming to implement public policy and providing for special protection.225 This
thesis proposes that there are two potential viewpoints concerning the preemption problem,
which can be inferred from Article 2(a). One perspective is that, as long as both parties are
businesspersons who engage in arms-length commercial bargaining through contract negotiation,
the drafters were not afraid of the CISG’s overriding power over tort remedies. Also, the drafters
preferred applying the CISG irrespective of the fact that the relationship between merchants also
falls under the protections provided by domestic laws. In other words, as far as the matter was
between international corporations and falls within the CISG’s scope, the drafters did not want it
to be governed by contradictory domestic laws. Evidently, the same is true in a case where the
seller does not know, nor ought to have known, about personal, family, or household use.
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Accordingly, parties’ contemplation of the characteristics of international commercial trade is
seemingly one supportive justification for giving the CISG preemptive force in its application to
matters falling under its scope. The second perspective is that the uniform law should not be
applied in a way so as to replace tort laws, if those rules are especially established to protect
extra-contractual interests, have a mandatory character, or embrace public policies, which aim to
provide for special protection.
2. The CISG’s Text regarding the Scope of Application and Its Preemptive Power
The standardization of a specific area of law inevitably causes the problem of
delimitation between the uniform law and national law. The CISG attempts to solve this issue by
defining its scope in both a positive and negative manner. From what has been said thus far, it is
possible to give the CISG a preemptive effect when the matters in question fall within the
CISG’s scope. Admittedly, it is even more critical to preliminarily consider the language of the
Convention itself so as to uncover the extent of the CISG’s scope.
2.1 The Provision Expressly Says That Specific Types of Questions Fall within the
Scope of the CISG
Article 4 is the most important provision in regards to the matters falling under the
Convention’s scope. The literal wording of Article 4 seems to exclusively draw a clear line
between matters within the CISG’s scope, and matters left to domestic law. One scholar
nevertheless opines that it is not so simple to answer what rights and obligations arise out of a
contract for the sale of goods, when considering matters under the CISG’s scope.226 Accordingly,
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this scholarly opinion further suggests that the best approach is to give the CISG the widest
possible scope of application, so long as the application is consistent with the CISG’s aim as a
global uniform rule governing the relationship between parties to transnational sales.227 This
suggestion of granting a wide scope to the CISG, and extending its scope to cover matters of tort
remedy, may be unpersuasive so long as no provision sufficiently indicates how the CISG’s rules
include the alleged matters of tort remedies. Moreover, one may argue that granting this wide
scope is not recommended as the proper way to sustain uniformity, insofar as the parties can
exercise the freedom to opt out of the Convention or to deviate from its rules. Nevertheless, a
restrictive consideration and a narrow interpretation of the text of Article 4, irrespective of
whether other provisions stipulate otherwise, are inadvisable. If the tribunals strictly adhered to
the literal wording of the first sentence of Article 4, the alleged tort claims would almost always
be considered as matters outside the CISG’s scope. Accordingly, a party who is detrimentally
influenced by the more restrictive uniform rules of the CISG is inclined to resort to those tort
remedies to avoid the uniform rules. Thus, this thesis takes the view that the language of the first
sentence of Article 4 is insufficient to assess the CISG’s scope of application. In this regard, the
extent to which the CISG concurs with, or preempts, the alleged tort claims does not depend
solely on the text of the first sentence of Article 4. Article 4, in essence, says that any disputed
matters concerning contractual relationships are to be governed by the CISG. From the viewpoint
of this thesis, Article 4 correspondingly conveys that in considering the scope of the CISG,
regard must be had to a range of rights and obligations to which the parties agree, and indicates
that the agreed terms are integral parts of the CISG. It is thus extremely necessary to consider
Article 4 in connection with other relevant provisions of both the CISG and the contract
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providing for rights, obligations, and remedies among the parties, in order to infer the substantive
scope of the CISG.
2.2 The Provisions Expressly Say That Specified Matters Are outside the Scope of
the CISG
Some matters are explicitly excluded from the ambit of the CISG by virtue of the second
sentence of Article 4. The words “in particular” as used in the text of Article 4 indicate that the
matter of validity and the issue of property in goods sold, set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b)
respectively, are not the only matters which fall outside the scope of the Convention. Also, it is
specifically stressed by Article 5 that a seller’s liability for death or personal injury caused by
goods is to be addressed under applicable domestic law. In this regard, this thesis takes the view
that apart from the matters listed in Articles 4 and 5, there are other legal issues that could
possibly be considered as matters outside the CISG. It does not matter whether or not those
matters are explicitly specified. For instance, a tort claim for damages to property could be
exclusively governed by rules of applicable domestic law if it were concerned with the interests
and obligations of the parties, which are separate from rights and obligations arising from a
contract of sale, or those which come out of the substantive contents of the CISG’s rules.
(1) Article 4(a): The Validity of the Contract or of Any of Its Provisions or of Any
Usage
As Article 4(a) expressly states, the CISG is not concerned with the validity of the
agreement, the contractual provisions, or of any usage, unless otherwise expressed in the
Convention. One scholar suggests that the validity-exclusion leaves the issues of “error, mistake,
fraud, duress, unconscionability, and illegality to be determined solely by the application of
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municipal law.”228 Another reliable view, however, suggests that substance determines whether
the issue falls within the Convention or is instead excluded by Article 4(a).229 According to this
view, the label or characterization of validity issues, specified by different domestic laws, is
irrelevant.230 Besides, an exception of Article 4 stating, “except as otherwise expressly provided
in this Convention” arguably supports the requirement to consider the substance of the issue. To
exemplify, domestic contract laws of some States characterize the requirement of a written form
of contract as a validity problem. As we can see, the substance of such a rule entirely overlaps
with the substantive contents of Article 11, which explicitly provide otherwise.231 The defense of
failure to conclude a contract in writing is thus solely governed by Article 11, though the CISG
does not expressly state that Article 11 will replace domestic laws on validity requirements as to
form. Thus, the scholarly view aforementioned is likely to support the idea of considering the
substance of issue deduced from the exception of Article 4 in determining the question of
whether the competing tort laws are displaced or affected by the Convention.
As far as the validity issue is concerned, the validity of contractual clauses is significant
and thus worth considering. The agreed terms regarding rights and obligations that differ from
the CISG provisions may, for example, result in unfairness and tension between the parties’
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rights and duties.232 Therefore, such terms will be controlled by domestic law insofar as the
validity of contractual clauses is called into question under Article 4(a).233 According to Article
4(a), the validity of an exculpatory clause excluding or limiting the parties’ contractual liability
is to be determined by applicable domestic law. It follows that the exculpatory clause would be
found enforceable under applicable domestic law, and the breaching party is thus released from
contractual liability under the CISG. Nevertheless, no provision of the CISG explicitly suggests
whether concurring tort liability is terminated or limited when preventing an outcome that is
inconsistent with the result of the contractual claim, which respects the party autonomy in
excluding or limiting the contractual liability.
(2) Article 5: The Liability of the Seller for Death or Personal Injury Caused by the
Goods
Article 5 of the CISG expressly excludes from its scope the liability of the seller for death
or personal injury caused to any person by the goods. This provision therefore prevents the
overlap between the CISG and certain types of tort remedies available under domestic law. On
one hand, the reasons for excluding liability for death and personal injury recognize the rapid
development of national laws concerning product liability, and perceive an immediate
requirement for specific international solutions to deal with such claims on product liability.234
On the other hand, the wording of Article 5 was adopted to avoid conflict between the CISG’s
rules and domestic rules concerning product liability, especially since some are not based on
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tort.235 However, the final text of Article 5 reads that the Convention excludes liability for death
and personal injury from the CISG’s scope, irrespective of whether the issue in question is
actually governed by product liability rules or not,236 provided that the goods cause such
losses.237 It is also noted that the drafters considered the policy to not permit the seller’s liability
for extra-contractual interests, i.e. death and personal interest, be subjected to and limited by
regulatory requirements, such as the requirement of notice imposed by the CISG.238 Regarding
the scope of Article 5 itself, it is assumed that a similar approach is adopted in cases where the
breaching conduct causes personal injuries in other ways, such as breaching a contractual duty to
advise the buyer on the operation of a machine sold to him.239 There are also two opposing views
over another disagreement regarding the scope of Article 5. The majority holds that recourse
action over personal injury,240 brought by the buyer against the seller, is also excluded from the
scope of the Convention.241 Contrarily, the opposing view argues that a claim for recourse would
not explicitly be sought in certain categories of losses specified in Article 5, unless the buyer
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suffered from death or personal injury. Adhering to the majority’s opinion will undermine the
importance of the “liability of the seller for death or personal injury” and place too much
emphasis on the words “any person.”242 Also, any recourse action is taken to recover economic
loss, which consists of the sum paid by the buyer/re-seller to compensate his customers or
employees; this could be understood as a consequential loss covered by Article 74.243 Thus, this
recourse action is exclusively governed by the CISG, thereby precluding any claim based on the
applicable domestic law, whether this recourse claim is characterized as a contractual one or
not.244 This view also reasons that the policy in question is not undermined when the recourse
claim falls under the CISG’s scope, since the buyer has already compensated for the third
person’s injury. As we can see, the way in which Article 5 is construed defines the scope of
application of the CISG regarding recourse action, and such a construction influences the CISG’s
preemption of other domestic claims, particularly recourse claims based on tort law. From the
perspective of this thesis, it would be unfair that, on one hand, the buyer’s right to a recourse
action is restricted under the CISG’s rules and principles such as the notice requirement, and on
the other hand, the buyer’s liability for personal injury or death to the third party is subject to
domestic law, which is most likely to protect the injured individual. In addition, the legal
consequences should not vary between the case in which the third party, relying on domestic
law, asks for damages directly against the seller, and the case in which buyers have paid for the
same losses, and then filed recourse action against the seller. Moreover, the manufacturer or
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seller could not ascertain his liability if the reseller or the buyer was allowed to alternatively
bring a recourse action under both the CISG and domestic law, despite the fact that the third
person is only able to rely on domestic law.
From what we have considered regarding the history and plain text of Article 5, it is quite
clear that the CISG leaves a gap for this thesis to consider further and attempt to find an answer.
Such an inquiry focuses on whether, and to what extent, the CISG’s rules overlap and thus
preempt product liability law, which otherwise governs buyers’ claim for damages to property.
C. The Objectives and Functions of the CISG and Its Preemptive Power
In discussing the plain meaning of the CISG’s text regarding its sphere of application, the
inclination is to suggest that the party’s right to competing domestic remedies should be
precluded or restricted insofar as such matters fall under the substantive scope of the Convention.
Nevertheless, in granting the CISG such preemptive power over other domestic laws, which are
inconsistent with the CISG’s rules and principles, one might ask how important this power is. It
is also important to question what the objectives and functions of the CISG are. The last question
to consider is why these objectives and functions are maintained by treating the CISG as the sole
doctrine governing international sales. This part of the thesis aims to present the purposes and
functions of the CISG, and then suggests that the CISG’s objectives and functions should be
considered in two respects. On the one hand, its objectives and functions primarily justify the
requirement to grant a preemptive force to the CISG in governing matters that arise from or
relate to international sales contracts. On the other hand, its purpose somewhat supports the
possibility of applying other domestic laws to such matters.
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1. The Objectives of the CISG and Its Preemptive Power
Firstly, the CISG aims to overcome the crucial shortcomings of ambiguity and the harsh,
far-reaching effects of two antecedents, namely the ULIS and the ULF. Studies of the ULIS and
the ULF conducted by the Working Group raised concerns of ambiguity and error that
presumably result from the abstract and complex concepts of the two Hague Conventions.245 For
the sake of simplicity, practicality, and clarity, the drafters thus avoided the use of any legal
shorthand expressions, rather providing clear definitions for terms used.246 Moreover, the drafters
tried not to employ complicated legal theories, in attempts to provide concrete legal concepts,
rather than abstract rules.247 As a result, the CISG’s rules do not cover all possible situations.
Some matters relating to a contractual relationship may fall outside the CISG’s ambit, and those
that are left are governed by domestic laws. Thus, one might argue that in order to apply the
CISG so as to completely exclude the right to domestic tort remedies will contradict the aim of
limiting its scope to the specific matters that directly invoke the concrete rules of the CISG.
Likewise, a complete exclusion of tort remedies will contradict the CISG’s aim of leaving other
matters to protections provided by domestic laws.
In terms of adopting the rules of private international law, the CISG was intended to
eliminate the concept of completely eliminating the rules of private international law, which
appeared in the ULIS.248 As we can see in Article 7(2), the CISG expressly recognizes the
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possibility of applying the rules of private international law, and thus relieves the authority of the
ULIS on national laws, which could have been identified by private international law. In other
words, the CISG does not entirely exclude the rules of private international law, though it seeks
to promote uniformity in its application.
By attempting to remedy these shortcomings, the CISG’s drafters took a different
position than the draftsmen of the ULIS did, regarding the intersection between the Uniform Law
and other domestic laws. According to the perception of the drafters of the CISG, it is possible
for tribunals to concurrently apply both the CISG and other domestic laws. In particular, it is
possible to simultaneously apply the CISG and tort laws mainly regulating wrongful conduct that
arises independently from the contractual relationship, or that primarily protect extra-contractual
interests. However, this thesis will argue that the CISG’s novel approach to recognizing the rules
of private international law does not always encourage the tribunals to apply domestic laws
without caution. Such a precaution requires having regard for the CISG’s international character,
the uniformity in its application, and the hierarchy of rules indicated in Article 7(2). In particular,
the tribunals must give priority to the CISG’s explicit rules and general principles when being
faced with the interaction between the CISG and domestic laws, so long as the matters fall under
the CISG’s scope. Adhering to applicable law by virtue of private international law as a last
resort, it could be said that such domestic law, applying to the matters in question, would
function as a subsidiary to the CISG.

based.” See Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, Hague, 1 July,
1964, supra note 178.
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Another primary objective of the CISG is to promote international trade with its balanced
rules that are established based on equality and mutual benefit.249 The CISG’s intent was to
implement a single set of clear, articulated, and universally applicable rules to remove
unnecessary obstacles to the free flow of trade.250 Applying these well-balanced rules to decide
on the rights, obligations, and remedies of both sellers and buyers will help to remove legal
barriers, contributing to the development of international trade. In advocating this dominant
purpose, tribunals must stick to the international character not only in their interpretation of
individual provisions, but also in developing general principles when dealing with disputes.251 In
other words, the CISG still discourages tribunals from referencing domestic legal concepts while
interpreting the CISG.252 Thus, when resolving the CISG’s preemption, this idea of disfavoring
domestic legal concepts should be taken into account. Additionally, one might think it would be
justified to grant the CISG’s rules and principles the preemptive force, if the predominance has
led to encouraging the application of well-balanced rules to international sales. Stated clearly,
throughout all the stages of drafting the CISG’s rules, there were many attempts to strike a
balance between the respective rights and duties of the seller and buyer, and ensuring the CISG’s
rules were acceptable for the requirements of international trade. The drafting committees were
highly concerned about establishing a fair balance between the conflicting interests of both
parties, and did not wish to unduly favor either the seller or the buyer. Thus, the argument for
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precluding concurrent tort claims in such fully overlapping situations, is that favoring the nonbreaching party to exercise concurrent rights under tort law might disturb this fair balance.
It also appears that the goal of uniformity was referred to in practice. US courts decided
that the issue of whether a certain action under domestic law is preempted by federal law is one
resolved by looking at congressional intent.253 The US court also uses this analysis for the
question of preemption by a treaty.254 The court then focused on the intent that is recognized in
the introductory text or the Preamble, of the Contracting States, particularly the United States,255
together with the President’s Letter of Transmittal of the CISG256 to the Senate and the Secretary
of State’s Letter of Submittal of the CISG257 to the President. The US court concluded that this
expressly-stated goal indicates the intent of the Contracting States to allow the CISG to preempt
state causes of action.258 It was further emphasized that the availability of independent, domestic
contract law causes of action would disrupt the goals of uniformity and certainty embraced by
the CISG.259 It should be noted here that this court considered the issue of preemption by the
CISG to determine its federal jurisdiction over the case.260 The court’s analysis primarily focused
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on the preemptive effect of the CISG on state contract claims,261 rather than preemption of the
alleged tort claim. Subsequently, the court decided that the plaintiff’s assumption that “the CISG
leaves open the possibility of other, concurrent causes of action”262 is unpersuasive. Based on all
the reasons above, the court finally concluded that “the pleaded state law claims are
preempted”263 insofar as those state law causes of action fall within the scope of the CISG.264 In
Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., another US court submitted that the court’s
decision in Asante Techs., regarding the preemptive effect of the CISG, was limited to only the
issue of the CISG’s preemption over domestic contract law claims.265 However, the plaintiff in
Asante Techs. brought claims sounding in both tort and contract.266 Therefore, the practical
implementation of sustaining uniformity to decide the issue of the CISG’s preemption over tort
remedy remains doubtful and arguable today.
2. The Functions of the CISG and Its Preemptive Power
Turning now to the CISG’s main functions, this Convention was formulated to serve as a
set of unified rules for the international sale of goods, particularly when the parties’ places of
business are in different Contracting States.267 In this regard, the CISG was intended to replace
several domestic laws, in particular those of sales, governing the relationship established by the
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contract of sale. Predominantly considering domestic laws of sales in the United States as an
example, the CISG would replace Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which dealt with
the international sales of goods (hereinafter UCC Article 2).268 UCC Article 2 applies to purely
domestic transactions or international sale transactions which do not meet the requirement of
internationality under Article 1 of the CISG. The CISG thus claims the status of lex specialis,
thus being considered as an independent body of international contract law, governing specific
subject matters, and is separate from state law governing contracts, as well as UCC Article 2.
Moreover, when the CISG is considered the federal law applicable to the contract in question, it
substitutes for a general state contract law.269 Notably, the same status and relationship explained
above are, of course, true for the relationship between the CISG and either contract laws or sales
laws of other Contracting States. To this effect, the CISG takes the place of national contract or
sales laws, as the applicable law for international sales. These uniform international rules will,
therefore, generally govern and play a significant role in controlling the contractual relationship
between the parties to the international sale of goods, especially when parties do not anticipate
and agree to solve the disputed issue.270 Likewise, once the dispute arises, as in the CISG’s
preemption/concurrence of tort remedies, one might suggest that tribunals should first consider
the CISG’s scope, and apply the CISG’s rules and principles found within the Convention. Also,
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relying on domestic legal concepts of the right to concurrent claims originating from the
interaction between general contract law and tort law seems to be ill-advised and unconvincing
in solving the CISG’s preemption and concurrence of tort remedies.
D. The Approach of the CISG to Remedies and Its Preemptive Power
Proponents of the CISG claim that the uniform law provides well-balanced rules and
approaches to remedies based on equality and mutual benefit. Accordingly, the remedial system
established by the CISG should be exclusively applied to any breach of contractual duty, even
though such a breach constitutes tort liability. At this point, it is significant to explore the rights
and remedies provided under the CISG, and consider what the provisions of remedies suggest
about the CISG’s preemption of tort law.
To begin with, in a case in which the seller is in breach of his obligations under the
contract or the CISG, the buyer can resort to four main kinds of remedies based on the concept of
full compensation. Those kinds of remedies include specific performance, avoidance, damages,
and reduction in price. Let us then consider Article 45, which provides the buyer with both the
right to other remedies, as well as the right to claim additional damages. As we can see, this
article indicates a single consolidated set of remedial provisions for any breach of contract by the
seller. It thus brings together the seller’s obligations in one place with a single set of remedies.271
Consequently, it is clear for the merchants to ascertain what they are required to do in case of a
breach. This consolidation of remedies is one of the CISG’s improvements, in comparison with
the ULIS, which regulated the remedies for a non-breaching party in connection with every
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particular obligation and its respective breach.272 The drafters seemingly intended to give the
buyer a single set of remedies, no matter what obligation was to be breached by the seller.
Nonetheless, many articles referred in Article 45 have their roles in setting forth either the
substantive conditions under which that right to remedies may be exercised, or the rules for the
calculation for the amount of damage. Similarly, Article 61 grants to the seller both rights to
other remedies, and to the recoverable damages for breach of contract by the buyer. Since the
buyer has only two principal obligations, i.e. to pay the price and to take delivery of the goods,
the seller’s right to remedies is not as prominent as the buyer’s. Clearly stated, the seller has the
right to ask for specific performance (Article 62-63), to declare the contract avoided (Article 64),
and to recover damages (Article 74-77). However, he does not have the right to reduce the price
of the goods. Further, Article 45(2) and Article 61(2) explicitly say that the parties’ right to claim
damages is not impaired by exercising the right to other remedies.
Some remedies under the CISG are granted upon the essential element of contractual
violation, which is defined as a fundamental breach of contract.273 Under the CISG, when the
seller committed the fundamental breach of contract, the buyer could ask for substitute goods
under Article 46(2), or declare the contract avoided under Article 49(1)(a). The same is true for
the buyer’s breach of his duties to pay the price and to take delivery of the goods. Under Article
64(1)(a) of the CISG, the seller could declare the contract avoided if the buyer failed to perform
his obligations, and such a violation amounts to a fundamental breach of contract as defined.
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As to the right to avoidance aforementioned, it is important to point out that the concept
of an automatic or ipso facto avoidance in certain circumstances appeared in the ULIS, but was
denied by the drafters when they enacted the provisions regarding the remedial systems under the
CISG.274 Under this Convention, the contract would not have been avoided unless the nonbreaching party had made the declaration of avoidance pursuant to the conditions specified in
Article 49 or Article 64. As we can see, the requirement of declaration of avoidance is aimed at
ensuring that the contract is still enforced, and the contractual relationship is still subject to the
Convention’s remedial rules in the case of a breach. After a fundamental breach of contract
occurs, so long as the parties do not exercise the right to declare the contract avoided, the parties’
intent to keep their contractual relationship should be respected. The view in support of
exclusively applying the unique remedial systems provided by the CISG seems to be consistent
with the parties’ intention, and is thus highly convincing. Further, it is significant to point out
that even in a case where a valid declaration of avoidance terminates the contract, Article 81(1)
of the Convention still protects the injured party by allowing for the right to damages due under
the CISG. Thus, although the parties would be released from any contractual obligation when
one party declared the contract avoided, this relief is still subject to any damages which may be
due.275 In other words, the avoidance of the contract does not terminate the party’s obligation to
pay any damages caused by the failure to perform the contractual obligations. Likewise, as is
expressly stated in Article 81(1), it is clear that the avoidance does not impact any provision for
the settlement of disputes, or “any other provision of the contract governing the rights and
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obligations of the parties, consequent upon the avoidance of the contract”276 (emphasis added).
Therefore, it should be noted that the avoidance of the contract would not eliminate contract
clauses relating to the settlement of disputes, such as provisions for arbitration, and clauses
governing the right to damages, such as exculpatory clauses or liquidated damages clauses. If the
CISG did not specifically indicate the effects of avoidance, all rights and obligations arising from
the existence of the contract might be eliminated under some legal systems’ rule of contract
avoidance. Consequently, the party might have no claim for damages for breach of contract. If
this were the case, it would be necessary for tort law to play its role in filling the gap left by the
CISG. When the CISG, in fact, expressly recognizes a claim for damages due, and enforces
contractual terms governing the rights and obligations of the parties, contingent upon the
avoidance of the contract, one might think that these results replace the role of tort remedy. It
then comes as no surprise that proponents of the CISG will argue that it is unnecessary to give
the injured party any tort law protections that are otherwise invoked by the same breaching
conduct.
It should also be noted that any proof of fault, lack of good faith, or any breach of an
express promise is not required to seek damages.277 On the one hand, this means that the
objective failure to fulfill the seller’s obligations is the only condition for a buyer to exercise the
right to damages resulting from the seller’s breach of duty. On the other hand, it can be inferred
that whenever the buyer fails to objectively fulfill his obligation, the seller can exercise his right
to damages, irrespective of any consideration of whether the buyer is in breach by his fault or
because of a lack of good faith. Since the claim for damages under the CISG does not require
276
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proof of fault, one might suggest that tort remedy should not be prohibited when it aims to
control unlawful behavior that is not deliberately regulated by the CISG or the contract itself.
There is another significant provision of Article 66278 that implicitly accepts the need for
domestic tort law in compensating the damages to the goods sold when the buyer cannot rely on
the damages provided by Article 45(1)(b). As we can see, Article 45(1) makes the CISG’s
remedial rules applicable only if the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the
contract and the CISG. Because the buyer is unable to claim damages based on lack of
conformity, which exists after the risk has passed to him despite the fact that the seller failed to
deliver conforming goods as required by the contract or Article 35,279 a recourse to tort remedy is
thus required. Correspondingly, it was noted that under Article 66, the buyer would have the
right to deduct the loss of goods caused by a tortious act or omission of the seller as they would
be calculated and claimed under the applicable tort law.280 So, as it can be inferred from Article
66, if the tribunals applied the CISG to the exclusion of tort remedy in all cases, this would be
inconsistent with the extent of protection which the CISG’s remedial systems intend to provide.
All in all, it seems generally convincing to argue that the remedial systems under the
CISG are sufficiently fair for parties to rely on, when they decide to conclude their international
sale contract and maintain an enforceable contract. The main reason is that the Convention
provides a wide range of remedies in case of a breach of contract, particularly the right to
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damages, which is always accompanied by other remedies. Therefore, it is safe to say that it
would cause unfairness to the merchants and generate uncertainty if tribunals allowed alternative
remedies under domestic tort laws, as they entirely overlap with recoverable remedies under the
CISG. However, tort remedies remain available when necessary to compensate for particular
kinds of breaches. As we can see, putative tortious actions typically asserted include promissory
estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent inducement,
negligence in performing obligations imposed by contract, negligent liability for defective
products, tortious interference with contract or business relations, conversion, and tortious breach
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In some circumstances, as illustrated in
Chapter One, the alleged claims in some types of international sales relations281 are considered
independent torts, and thus should be better protected by tort laws.
E. The Approach of the CISG to Party Autonomy and Its Preemptive Power
By depositing the instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, and accession, it
could be assumed that the Contracting States have found the provisions adopted in the
Convention to serve as proper rules for the requirements of international trade. However,
establishing a fair balance between the rights and duties of the parties within the CISG finally
operates in coordination with the doctrine of party autonomy explicitly recognized in Article 6.
The doctrine of party autonomy is uniformly recognized as a fundamental principle of
contract law, and Article 6 also embodies a vigorous recognition of this principle.282 It is thus
unquestionable that the principle of party autonomy is extremely respected in the area of sale
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contracts among other international trade transactions. Article 6 recognizes parties’ right to
contract and freely determine their rights and obligations, as well as the respective remedies. It is
thus clear that tribunals are bound to honor parties’ intent regarding their rights, obligations, and
remedies, and to prioritize the agreed terms over the CISG’s respective rules and principles.
Where the issue of concurrent tort remedy is concerned, the question becomes what the Article 6
doctrine of party autonomy suggests about the interaction between the CISG and tort laws. In
answering such an inquiry, it is worth exploring the recognition of party autonomy in the realm
of international sales contracts, and also considering to what extent a party’s freedom to contract
controls parties’ relationship in international sales.
Article 6 allows parties to freely exclude the CISG, in whole or in part, even where all the
applicability requirements are fulfilled. Notably, the prevailing views of US courts hold that an
express exclusion is necessary.283 Moreover, an implicit exclusion of the Convention, in the case
where the parties agree to resort to the law of a single Contracting State, is discouraged and
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would not be recognized.284 Given that an awareness of the CISG among both sellers and buyers
has increased in recent years, parties’ agreement on the choice of law does not always
undoubtedly indicate the parties’ true intent to exclude the CISG and its provisions.
It is even more paramount to explore the doctrine of party autonomy with regards to the
derogation of the CISG’s provisions. The CISG’s text states that “[t]he parties may . . . derogate
from or vary the effect of any of its provisions,” clarifying that the parties may agree to other
rules or results which supplant, modify, or supplement those rules of the CISG.285 It is also
evident through other provisions, in particular Articles 30, 35(1), and 53 with their phrasing of,
for example, “required by the contract,” that the CISG is essentially based on the general
principle of freedom of contract. Accordingly, it could be deemed that all the rights and
obligations agreed by contract are an integral part of the CISG, which may either take priority
over,286 or supplement, some of the CISG’s default provisions. In respect to the dispositive
nature of the CISG’s provisions,287 one should keep in mind that the CISG’s dispositive rules
yield only to the parties’ intent to agree otherwise. Nevertheless, it does not appear from the
CISG’s text or historical account that the drafters allowed competing domestic laws to
undermine the uniform rules, even if those uniform rules embrace the dispositive nature. Insofar
as the CISG has a preemptive effect on tort remedy, it therefore comes as no surprise that the
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agreed terms hold preemptive power over tort claims, at least, to the same degree as the
preemptive force of the CISG’s default provisions on tort remedy.
Most likely, the parties exercise their autonomy by incorporating an exculpatory clause
into their contract. According to Article 6, it is clear that the parties’ will to exclude or limit
contractual liability is respected. In exercising such autonomy, the parties, for instance, agree
that the goods are sold “as seen,” or the seller’s liability to pay compensation is exempted, and
this liability is limited to only repairing or exchanging defective goods.288 Nevertheless, Article 6
does not say anything about (1) the validity of the contractual clauses purporting to exclude or
limit a party’s liability in contract, (2) the right to sign a waiver of tort remedies or the effect of
such a waiver, (3) the validity of the contractual clauses purporting to exclude or limit a party’s
liability in tort, and (4) the effect of the contractual clauses legally purporting to exclude or limit
a party’s liability in contract on tort action. Thus, Article 6 only guarantees the right to derogate
from, or vary the effect of, the CISG’s provisions. However, the exercise of freedom remains
restricted and limited to some extent.289 As we can see, the control of unfair terms poses a
problem for the validity of exculpatory clauses. Thus, the validity of clauses purporting to
exclude or limit a party’s liability falls within the realm of domestic law, according to Article
4(a). It follows that the agreement resulting in either the exclusion or limitation of liability in
contract, or in varying the effects of the CISG’s provisions, is controlled by the national law
applicable to the contract.290 If the parties agree to relinquish the right to tort remedy, it is thus
likely that applicable domestic law governs and determines whether such a clause is valid, and
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thus precludes tort remedy. For instance, if US law was identified as the applicable law, the issue
of the validity of certain contractual terms would be subject to, for example, rules on
unconscionability or UCC Article 2 §§ 302, 719. Regardless, the following chapters will
ascertain whether the enforcement of exculpatory clauses that exclude or limit a party’s liability
has a legal effect on the right to pursue tort claims under domestic law.
F. Preliminary Conclusion
It is further challenging to define the borders of the CISG and its interaction with tort
laws. This is because the CISG’s text, together with other features, such as the history of its
evolution, its purposes and functions, and the approaches to remedies and party autonomy,
suggest various implications. The CISG provides limited guidance in dealing with its scope, to
the extent that its substantive scope preempts relevant domestic tort laws. Finally, the features of
the CISG do not provide a definitive statement about its preemption. As a consequence, many
different approaches to this preemption issue have emerged over time. As we will see in the
following chapter, each solution attempts to make an analysis based on the doctrines and policies
underlying several areas of laws, including uniform law, contract law, tort law, and private
international law. We thus need to consider which approach can bring about the legal outcomes
that, on the one hand, prevent one uniform norm from overly encroaching on another area of law,
and, on the other hand, grant international merchants sufficient, fair, and balanced protection of
their interests. Importantly, the rules and principles of the CISG itself should be appreciated in
determining the relationship between the Convention and national tort laws. Also, all relevant
factors of the CISG delineated in this chapter must be placed in perspective when dealing with
the issue of preemption and concurrence, because the CISG is specially formulated to bring the
contractual balance of rights and obligations of the parties to transnational sales, and to remove
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obstacles to international trade, such as the existence of different national sales laws across the
world and the uncertainties inherent in the choice of law rules.
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III. AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ACADEMIC AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE ISSUE OF
CISG’S PREEMPTION OF TORT REMEDIES
Given that the drafters of the CISG did not provide an explicit rule to cope with the issue
of the CISG’s preemption, and based on the implications explained in Chapter Two, this chapter
aims to delineate the existing approaches put forth by both jurists and court decisions in
determining whether and to what extent the CISG has its preemptive effect on domestic tort
claims, or whether there is a concurrence of domestic tort claim based on domestic law and a
contractual claim based on the CISG. At the same time, any arguments for or against the
emerging approaches will be discussed, to examine and assess how such solutions work. Also,
this chapter will explain domestic rules and approaches adopted by US jurisdictions when
deciding whether the contracting party’s right to a concurrent tort claim is recognized. The
following part will show that domestic rules and approaches that deal with concurrence issues
influence existing solutions which were suggested to solve the issue of the CISG’s preemption of
a tort claim. Finally, it will be pointed out which solution is the most compelling from the
viewpoint of this thesis.
A. Background: The US Courts’ Decisions regarding the Right to Concurrent Claims
between Contract and Tort in Disputes outside the CISG’s Sphere
This part of the thesis aims to delineate the rules and approaches applied to domestic
disputes, interstate cases, and international disputes within US jurisdictions, examining how US
courts deal with questions of concurrence between contract and tort arising from contracts
outside the CISG’s sphere.
It is worth noting that the US laws of contract and tort applicable to disputes falling
outside the CISG’s scope are typically matters of state law, rather than federal law. Also, a
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conflict-of-law issue in cross-border disputes is a question of state law. Accordingly, US
tribunals consider the question of concurrent claims arising from contracts not governed by the
CISG as a question of state law, and apply various applicable state laws to solve such issues.
Hence, a party’s right to assert parallel contractual and tort claims is subject to the rules and
approaches deriving from state laws of contract and tort, as adopted within each state of the
United States.
Under US laws and practices, it is generally accepted that concurrent claims are permitted
as long as the conditions for concurrent remedies are met.291 However, a plaintiff is not allowed
to have double recovery in both contract and tort.292 Mostly, a plaintiff can exercise their
freedom of election to assert a cause of action between a contract and tort claim,293 which seems
to be the most advantageous. In addition to the election, US courts often determine the “gist” or
“gravamen” of the allegation, to decide whether the alleged claim is founded on contract or
tort.294 Generally speaking, on the one hand, US courts have moved towards recognizing
concurrent tortious liability either by the party’s election, or by considering the nature of claim.
On the other hand, courts also impose certain restrictions on the right to allege tort claims
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primarily when a plaintiff seeks recovery for economic loss.295 It could, therefore, come to a
premise of economic loss theory, holding that tort claims, for recovering losses not resultant
from physical harm or damage to property, may be refused296 or permitted under limited
circumstances.297 Subject to the economic loss theory, in granting tort remedies despite the
existence of a contract, judgments typically consider the existence of a special relationship,298 the
emergence of alleged independent obligations299 including but not limited to proof of breach of
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an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing300 or proof of additional losses,301 the nature of the
injury asserted,302 as well as any public policy concerns.303 It is worth further emphasizing that
some US courts tend to follow the independent duty doctrine. Under this doctrine, courts find the
alleged tort claim to be independent of the contractual claim if such a claim were not premised
on any duties explicitly or impliedly required by the contract. An example is the case where a
tort claim is predicated on a separate legal duty, or in which the tort claim alleged conduct that is
extraneous or collateral to the terms of the contract.304
Given that US case law rules which regulate the party’s right to parallel claims are
diverse, it is beneficial to explore the Restatement of the Laws governing such issues. This is
because both the Contracts and Torts Restatements are intended to reflect the “consensus view”
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across all states on matters of common law.305 This approach is therefore easier than attempting
to discuss fifty different legal systems, in order to figure out how common law rules regulate the
right to concurrent claims. Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, there is no black-letter
rule regarding the contracting party’s right to assert a concurrent tort claim. However, the
Introductory Note of Topic One of Chapter Seven306 notes that apart from the common effect of
making a resulting contract voidable, a misrepresentation may concurrently be asserted as an
affirmative tort claim which seeks recovery for damages due to misrepresentation.307 This
introductory note conforms to the rules stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts regarding a
distinctive tortious liability for pecuniary loss resulting from misrepresentation308 or
nondisclosure.309 Accordingly, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 196310 states a rule
controlling a contractual term that precludes a party from asserting any claims for
misrepresentation given as alternative remedies by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Also,
certain rules regarding negligence, including strict liability stated in the Restatement (Second) of
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Torts, affirmatively grant a contracting party the right to alternative grounds of claims for
liability for supplying chattels for the use of others when such conduct causes physical harm.311
In terms of an attempt to restate clear rules regarding tort liability for unintentional
infliction of economic loss arising from contract, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Economic Harm §§ 1-8 (2020) further provides rules and conditions concerning a party’s right to
a concurrent tort claim for economic loss.312 This Restatement (Third) of Torts § 3 (2020)
generally states that tortious liability for economic loss, alleging a negligent performance or
negotiation of a contract between the parties, is precluded313 so that the plaintiff can only seek
relief in a contract action. This is because the contract regulates negligent conduct causing
pecuniary damages and such a contract has been readily used to allocate the risk of economic
loss. However, a party can enjoy exceptions to such pure economic loss rule in certain
circumstances, such as malpractice claims to recover loss resulting from professional
negligence,314 or claims for economic loss resulting from a plaintiff’s reliance on a defendant’s
statements315 or services.316 As we can see, these Restatement rules giving clear formulations of
common law adopted by the national courts mostly appear to be along the lines of case law rules
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explained above, which restrict a party’s right to allege tort claims to seek recovery for economic
loss.
At this point, it can be said that where a particular regional or international instrument
does not get involved in a cross-border contract, the questions of right regarding concurrent
claims are left to all relevant domestic laws of states/countries involved. However, when the
issue of concurrency arises from a cross-border transaction, it remains controversial, in the
conflict-of-law regime, as to which domestic law determines the hierarchy or concurrency of the
two actions between contract and tort. In other words, a preliminary question is asked: “should
an applicable law to such issue be the lex loci contractus, the lex loci delicti, or the lex fori?”
Regardless of the answer to such an issue, this thesis primarily focuses on the situation where US
law is identified as the applicable law governing the issue of concurrent claims. The
investigation of US laws in this part is thus essential for the following discussions. The focal
issue of discussion is questioning to what extent domestic rules and approaches adopted in US
states have, in juridical practice, played their roles in the dispute concerning the CISG’s
preemption/concurrency of tort claims.
B. The Issue of the CISG’s Preemption of Domestic Tort Claims as Addressed by Scholars
and Decided by Courts
The CISG’s preemption of domestic tort claims is most likely seen as the primary dispute
between parties to international sale contracts. Once the Convention entered into force, it was
suggested that a new boundary be formed between national law and international uniform law,
relating to the borderline between contract and tort.317 Since no provision of the CISG expressly
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addresses the right to tort claims for property damage or economic loss arising in the context of
international sales of goods, the issue of a conflict between domestic tort and uniform remedies
is thus left open. Provided two requirements are met, jurisdictions would not experience
difficulty in applying the CISG in a way that it entirely preempts national remedies in all cases
governed by the CISG. The two prongs are, (1) if the structures and basic legal notions of the
CISG and national laws be identical, and (2) if both instruments provided similar remedies.
Given that a uniform law is primarily formulated to comprise the diverse national laws of each
legal system, it is unlikely that both the requirements mentioned above are met. Therefore, it
cannot be denied that the tribunals are still confronted with the controversial issue of the CISG’s
preemption/concurrency, which needs to be resolved in the same manner. As we will see, the
opinions are divided in terms of the question of whether and to what extent the Convention
should be interpreted and applied in a way that it replaces domestic sale and contract laws, but
that it also tends to affect tort claims. Therefore, this part will present and criticize the legal
solutions that have been proposed by academic and law-applying mediums. In doing so, this part
of the thesis considers the relevant legal literature and judicial decisions which touch upon the
issue of preemption/concurrence. In terms of judicial perspectives, this part attempts to provide
decisions that are relevant to this thesis and are believed to be of importance to represent the
approaches to the CISG’s preemption issue. This part will begin with an explanation and analysis
of three competing lines of thoughts, which directly deal with the issue of the CISG’s preemption
of tort claims. All three approaches include (1) an idea that supports a complete preemption of
tort claims; (2) a view that essentially suggests competing tort claims with no preemptive effect;
and (3) an idea suggesting a moderate level of preemption that provides an argument against
severe encroachment of the CISG’s scope and goals. These lines of thoughts will be presented in
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turn. The last section will then include an alternate solution, which shifts the analysis from the
question of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims, to the secondary matter of the characterization
of such claims.
1. The CISG Applies to the Exclusion of Tort Claims by Exclusively Acknowledging
the Main Purpose of Uniformity by the CISG
1.1 An Overview of Academic Perspectives
John O. Honnold is the dominant scholar who takes a restrictive approach and supports
the exclusive preemptive effect of the CISG on tort claims.318 A strong reason raised for this
perspective is that allowing concurrent claims under domestic law will extinguish the uniform
remedial solution created for disputes arising from international trade.319 According to Honnold,
domestic tort law cannot be applied as an alternative to the governing provisions of the CISG,
where the same operative facts trigger both domestic law and the CISG.320 The restrictive
exception to the CISG’s preemption is, however, allowed in the case where a domestic claim in
tort depends on the factual situations that differ, in terms of the facts proved to trigger the
contractual claim under the CISG.321 One example of this exception is the remedy for fraud,322
which explains that the CISG does not address or settle factual situations involving fraud, as this
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imposes a duty to act in an honest manner. Honnold further takes the view that proof of the
seller’s breach of a duty of care does not alter the essential character of a contractual claim under
the Convention.323 According to Honnold, the buyer cannot argue that his tort claim, which also
requires proof of breach of duty of care, would not be based on the same facts as a claim for nonconformity under the Convention. Honnold further argues that permitting access to tort claims
based on such proof of lack of due care would possibly circumvent the uniform international
rules of the Convention.324 Following this view, one may become skeptical of whether the
ignorance of the element of tort claim regarding breach of duty of care is, in essence, in line with
the same-facts solution that needs identical operative facts invoking both claims under the CISG
and tort law. However, proponents argue that the identical operative facts occur where they are
needed under the CISG and tort law on negligence. For instance, “(A) failure of the goods to
conform to the contract (Art. 35) and (B) damage resulting from this defect (Art. 74)”325 overlap
with the same facts proved for tort claims, although tort law requires a third element of lack of
due care. It seems that this approach defines the extent of having the same operative facts in the
broadest manner, primarily supposing the occurrence of the same operative facts and strongly
supporting a recourse to remedies under domestic tort law or the CISG as mutually exclusive,
rather than concurrent. Moreover, by adhering to the interest of uniformity in international sales
contracts, this view purports to believe that product liability claims seeking compensation for
losses suffered from non-conforming goods are limited to CISG provisions pertaining to quality
and the rights of the buyer. It is stressed that product liability claims under tort doctrine be
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excluded altogether.326 Under this opinion, there will only be one exception in case of a product
liability claim for personal injury or death, which is governed by domestic tort law as explicitly
stated in Article 5.327
Based upon the underlying idea of unifying the law, Enderlein and Maskow also suggest
a functional interpretation of the Convention in order to identify the substantive scope of the
Convention.328 Enderlein and Maskow indicate that Honnold takes a similar view to theirs, of
functional interpretation in order to decide the scope of the CISG’s application, but Honnold puts
forward relatively more extensive criterion for considering the preemption, as explained
above.329 Enderlein and Maskow also support the notion that the same facts entail legal outcomes
both under the CISG and tort, and can relate product liability cases and others. In either case,
they hold that the rules of the Convention should preempt domestic laws.330 It is noteworthy that
this view depends on the question of whether the Convention is invoked; if yes, then the
Convention is exclusively applied. In other words, the complete exclusion of claims under
domestic tort laws exists insomuch as the Convention is invoked so it is applicable as it is and
excludes claims under tort laws.331 Enderlein and Maskow also affirm that the CISG supplants
existing rights through certain other rights.332
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In conclusion, whenever the Convention applies to the matter in question, it leads to a
replacement of domestic tort laws, even if those laws govern the same matter and confer rights to
the injured party. According to this approach, the exception for the non-breaching party to resort
to the concurrent application of tort law is extremely restricted to the situation where the party
proves the existence of another separate set of facts that only invoke domestic law.
1.2 Critiques Based on Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Against a Complete
Exclusion of Tort Remedies
From a theoretical point of view, a person who claims the protection of tort law should
not be denied receiving such parallel civil protection just because he is in the domain of
international sales, if tort law grants them the right to remedies. In this regard, the standpoint of
the same-fact approach, which states that the availability of national tort remedies is generally
barred due to the comparable invocation of the contractual claim under the CISG, is
unacceptable insofar as it does not appear that rights and obligations established by tort law and
the Convention really are the same. Considering an extreme encroachment of tort remedies, a
scholar who formerly preferred the approach of excluding tort remedies altogether has been
doubtful as to whether the risk of circumventing the policy considerations underlying the CISG
is severe enough to justify the application of the Convention to the exclusion of tort remedies.333
Another argument is that the State’s ratification of the Convention on sales contracts could not
implicitly show the intention to merge contract with tort,334 or to replace tort law with the
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PRACTITIONERS 27–28 (2007).
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Joseph Lookofsky, In Dubio Pro Conventione? Some Thoughts about Opt-Outs, Computer Programs
and Preëmption under the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (CISG), 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 263,
286 (2003).
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Convention.335 This approach is supported by a view stating that the drafters did not intend to
take away rights that the parties would otherwise have under the applicable domestic law.336 This
argument is supported by the reason given in UNCITRAL’s deliberations and decisions,337
whereby the Committee decided not to retain the proposal on exclusivity provision, which is
similar to the ULIS Article 34.338 It is also argued that the exclusivity clause of Article 34 of the
ULIS was, nevertheless, intended to preclude the parallel domestic remedies that are allegedly
based on contract law, rather than to intervene with extra-contractual remedies based on areas of
laws, such as tort law, falling outside the scope of the Convention.339 Moreover, a uniform law
naturally cannot reach a consensus regarding all aspects, so it is inevitable to have gaps that must
be filled with other areas of laws, especially laws that are developed to govern extra-contractual
matters. All the arguments suggest a shortcoming in the drafters’ intention to preclude tort
remedies. Lack of such a clear intention to prohibit tort claim weighs against recourse to CISG
remedies as mutually exclusive and against a replacement of the whole system of tort liability.
Pragmatically, Honnold’s proposition of the same-facts rule may be considered
problematic and difficult to employ. This is because tribunals still need precise criteria to
determine whether the operative facts triggering the elements of both claims are principally
335

Joseph Lookofsky, Not Running Wild with the CISG, 29 J.L. & COM. 141, 150 (2011).
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Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Tenth
Session, supra note 194, at 42 (pointing out that it may be inadvisable to protect the seller from tortious
liability where defective products caused damage to the buyer).
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Article 34 of the ULIS states that “In the cases to which Article 33 relates, the rights conferred on the
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Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, Hague, 1 July, 1964, supra
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identical. The contractual claim under the CISG always requires proof of the existence of a valid
contractual relationship as one of crucial elements to show a breach of contractual duty, but facts
proving an enforceable contract are not generally needed to invoke tort claims. Rather, tort
claims generally require proof of facts involving a breach of tortious duty which is mostly, by
nature, independent from the contractual one.340 Accordingly, it would be unlikely to say that
both contractual and tort claims supposedly require proof of the same set of operative facts in
most cases insofar as the CISG requires proof of the principal element of a contractual
relationship, but tort law does not. The schematic argument of supposing the same sets of facts
needed under both the CISG and tort law, in supporting the analysis made by Honnold,341 is thus
unpersuasive and doubtful.
In practice, the US court in Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd.342
delineated this approach of the completely preemptive effect of the CISG on tort remedies,
together with another competing approach, in its discussion of the CISG’s preemption.
Nevertheless, the court turned to a new question of characterization, and saw that this does not
require a determination concerning the CISG’s preemption of tort remedies.343 The Israeli
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Supreme Court also considered this approach; however, this court did not follow such a solution.
The Israeli Supreme Court considered the view of complete preemption as a narrow approach
that should not be adopted when there appears to be complex situations, which cannot easily be
fitted into a pre-defined framework.344 Instead, the Israeli Supreme Court adopted an approach
that is more tolerant, i.e. to accept concurrent tort claims when reaching its final decision on the
preemption issue.345 Importantly, it should be noted here that tribunals scarcely support this
overly broad reading of preemptive power of the CISG, even though this far-reaching approach
was mentioned in the court discussion to present the various commentaries on the issue of the
CISG’s preemption of tort remedies.
2. The CISG Applies to Contractual Claims while Domestic Law Concurrently
Applies to Tort Claims: Permitting Competing Tort Remedies and Confining the Scope of
the CISG to the Matters Expressly Stated in the Wording of Article 4
2.1 An Overview of Academic Perspectives
There also exists a second approach which permits concurrent claims arising by virtue of
applicable domestic tort law.346 In considering Article 4 of the CISG, Lookofsky submits that the
Convention applies only to “the rights and obligations of the seller and buyer arising from the
contract,” and that the CISG does not govern the rights and obligations arising out of domestic
tort laws, which he considers to be a separate rule set.347 He further explains that the law of torts

344

Israel 17 March 2009 Supreme Court (Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd), paras. 54–55, 73
(Aug. 12, 2020, 6:09 PM), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090317i5.html.
345

Id. paras. 56–57.

346
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and international sales contracts are distinct, since the sale transaction is made by and for the
parties in privity, whereas extra-contractual obligations and tort laws are contrary to such
character of sale contracts governed by international sale laws.348 Lookofsky further reasons that
domestic tort laws designed to provide remedies for unfair or culpable conduct should be
permitted to even compete with the CISG regime, similar to tort laws that are applicable
alongside domestic contract laws.349 It might be said that Lookofsky, on the one hand, supports
the availability of a competing tort remedy by reason of considering tort action as a claim not
arising from the contract, and is completely different from a contractual claim under the CISG.350
On the other hand, he further strengthens his view by comparing and taking into consideration an
approach permitting concurring tort law to compete with contract law in a domestic system.351
This thesis is thus inclined to conclude that Lookofsky’s argument for permitting competitive
tort law, in essence, is based on the approaches adopted within the domestic system dealing with
the interaction between general contract and tort laws.352 One legitimate reason raised in arguing
for competitive rules between the CISG and tort law is that a Contracting State’s ratification to
the CISG does not oblige the State, whose domestic sales law and tort law are simultaneously

2000) (Reproduced by Pace Law Sch. Inst. of Int’l Commercial Law with permission of the publisher,
Kluwer Law International).
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supra note 335, at 147–49; Howard Marine & Dredging Co. Ltd. v. A. Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd.
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applied to disputes, to merge the CISG with domestic tort law.353 Instead, it only requires a
substitution of domestic sales law with the CISG. Nevertheless, Lookofsky accepts, by referring
to the domestic system, that it is difficult to find a distinction and draw a clear line between
contract and tort.354 He further signifies that locating national law applicable to the action
brought may be further complicated by the issue of whether to classify the matter in question as
one of contract or tort.355 According to his statement on classification, it is also doubtful whether
he agrees with applying the method of characterization to deal with the interaction between the
CISG and domestic law. It might be presumed here that any matter which is characterized as tort,
according to him, is outside the CISG’s scope. Such an assumption is, in essence, based on
Lookofsky’s view that emphasizes a high likelihood of national tort law on product liability
coexisting and competing with the Convention, when product liability action has traditionally
been based on tort rules within domestic system.356
As such, through relying on the plain text of Article 4 and the other reasons mentioned
above, Lookofsky allows domestic remedies available under tort laws including product liability,
the rule of misrepresentation, and principles of liability for negligence to be brought alongside
contractual claims under the CISG.357 As opposed to the first approach, Lookofsky further argues

353
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that there would be competing rules on product liability in some situations because he did not
believe that the Convention covers all possible product liability rules and principles necessary so
as to absorb tort claims.358 He also exemplifies the situation of bad-faith termination of
contractual negotiations (culpa in contrahendo) in supporting the notion that where a sales
contract could not be made, a recourse to domestic law is thus necessary.359
Significantly, Lookofsky has recently adopted a method of distinguishing between
contractual interests created by the international sales contract, and extra-contractual interests or
general interests intentionally protected by tort law, in supporting competition between the CISG
and tort law.360 He suggests that it is a required prudent approach which accounts for the nature
of the possibly contradicting tort rules in the jurisdiction concerned when making the difficult
choice between preemption of and competition with domestic laws.361
Apart from Lookofsky, the same position of granting a concurrent tort remedy is also
emphasized by Michael Bridge. Bridge takes the view that without an explicit provision stating
so, the CISG does not intend to deprive the buyer of freedom to sue in tort, especially if domestic
law allows freedom of election between causes of action in contract and tort.362 In other words,
the CISG cannot limit the application of tort rules of a Contracting State or dispose of the
domestic problem of overlapping between contract and tort, so the buyer who is capable of
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choosing to sue in tort ought to be able to do so in the domain of international sales.363 He further
argues that there is no concept of tort within the Convention because uniformity of the
Convention is partial, and does not run through the entirety of private law.364 Finally, he suggests
that the legally distinct nature of tort action must be respected, although the alleged tort claim
arises out of the contractual relationship between the parties.365
Other scholars also give an example of the tort claim that creates the room for choice-oflaw rules and the application of some national tort rules, arguing a simple reason which could be
subsumed by those raised by Lookofsky. This common reason is that non-contractual claims of
negligence or strict liability in tort do not arise from the contract, so it is thus excluded from the
scope of CISG according to Article 4.366 As a result, domestic tort laws and the provisions of the
CISG apply concurrently to such claims of negligence or strict liability, unless national laws
provide otherwise.367 Another argument for allowing tort remedies is that parties to international
sales transactions should not be placed in a worse situation than any third person who suffers
from the defective goods.368
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2.2 An Overview of Judicial Perspectives
Apart from the academic perspectives, this approach is supported and followed by the
majority of US court decisions. One US court decision directly cites the opinion of Lookofsky in
its analysis. In Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH,369 the
defendant argued that (1) the CISG preempts any common law claims under state law; and (2)
the plaintiff cannot plead tort claims for negligent misrepresentation or fraudulent inducement
because its rights to tort claims are prohibited by the pure economic loss doctrine.370 The court
started by considering the CISG’s preemption issue, and held in favor of the plaintiff’s
argument.371 Relying on Asante Techs. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc.,372 and Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v.
Greeni Oy,373 the plaintiff contended that the CISG only preempts state contract law claims, and
only to the extent that such claims fall within the scope of the Treaty.374 The court referred to the
opinion of the learned jurist – Joseph Lookofsky – as expressed in his article,375 and held that the
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CISG does not preempt the plaintiff’s claims for negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent
inducement under state law.376 Notably, after determining the preemption issue, the court then
moved on to the second issue of the economic loss doctrine. It is worthy to point out that this
court subsequently considered and applied domestic tort law to further determine whether the
plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement claims are precluded by the
economic loss doctrine and are thus not actionable. According to Ohio law, the court held that
the economic loss doctrine does not prevent the plaintiff from pleading negligent
misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement claims in connection with goods that did not
conform to the desired model and specifications.377
There are other US court decisions378 that did not conduct an analysis on the CISG’s
preemption issue in detail and discuss whether the alleged tort claims fall within the scope of the
Convention and are thus preempted. Some decisions merely concluded that the CISG does not
apply to a tort claim, while others assumed a right to concurrent tort claims and then performed
an analysis on the actionability of alleged tort claims. As long as courts found the alleged tort
claim available under tort law, the plaintiff would then be given the right to the concurring tort
claim irrespective of further consideration of whether such available tort remedy overlaps with
the CISG’s rules. In TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, plaintiffs asserted a
376
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contractual claim and tort claims seeking recovery for damages suffered from a Bioboxproduction system that was delivered and appeared to malfunction frequently and severely.379
The court in TeeVee Toons, Inc. took a liberal approach by impliedly assuming the availability of
plaintiffs’ negligence claim, and then deciding the actionability of such tort claim under
applicable domestic tort law.380 As for another common law fraud claim, the court applied New
York law on fraudulent misrepresentation.381 The court then decided the issue of duplicative
relief concerning a fraud claim, and held that a fraud claim is not duplicative of the contract
claim and thus does not, as a threshold matter, bar the action.382 Additionally, the court reasoned
that a fraud claim is not duplicative since plaintiff-TVT based his claim on the misrepresentation
of a fact, which induced it to enter into the Quotation contract at issue, rather than alleging the
conduct during the course of performance.383 However, the fraud claim was dismissed because it
did not meet the element of justifiable reliance under New York law.384
A similar position of assuming the availability of concurrent allegation of a tort action
can be shown in Al Hewar Envtl. & Pub. Health Establishment v. Se. Ranch, LLC.385 After
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upholding the plaintiff, Al Hewar’s, contractual claim under the CISG, the court then turned to
consider the plaintiff’s right to the claim of fraudulent inducement. Finally, without
consideration of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims in detail, the court applied Florida tort
law, finding the fraudulent inducement claim as a tort cause of action arising independently from
breach of contract.386
In Sky Cast, Inc. v. Glob. Direct Distribution, LLC,387 the court concluded that “negligent
misrepresentation is a tort claim completely different from a claim for breach of contract”388 and
thus is not governed by the CISG. In considering the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
on a negligent misrepresentation claim, the court based its decision on the facts that the plaintiff,
Sky Cast, provided the defendant, Global, with false information regarding the delivery of the
light poles, and applied Kentucky law to those facts.389 As is stated in its analysis, the court
relied only on Kentucky case law,390 which had adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552
when deciding whether the alleged negligent misrepresentation is valid.391 This thesis observes
that this court permitted the defendant’s negligent misrepresentation counterclaim in tort without
considering whether such a claim may overlap with the contractual claim and thus fall under the
CISG’s scope.
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Apart from the decisions concerning the seller’s tortious liability in regard to his
obligations to deliver conforming goods and deliver goods as obliged, there is also a US court
decision under It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH,392 emphasizing the
seller’s right to commence a concurrent tort claim against the buyer who has a duty to make a
payment. In It’s Intoxicating, Inc., the US seller-plaintiff simultaneously asserted a fraud claim
against the German buyers-defendants.393 Similar to TeeVee Toons, Inc., in deciding the validity
of a fraud claim, the court assumed the availability of the plaintiff’s alleged tort claim, and then
applied the elements of fraud action and statute of limitation under applicable law to decide the
merits of the case.394 Clearly stated, the court did not consider whether the alleged fraud claim
falls under the CISG at the same time, and is thus prevented by the Convention. Similarly, by
assuming a right to assert a concurrent conversion, the court did not consider the CISG’s
preemption of the tort of conversion, and then the court referred to the Erie Doctrine to apply
Pennsylvania law on conversion to determine whether the claim is actionable.395
The line of reasoning for granting concurring claims adopted in these US cases is
supported by decisions in other countries as well. To begin with, a foreign court decision under
Canadian jurisdiction396 permitted the buyer to make a claim in tort for negligent design and
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manufacturing of goods sold. The court did not prudently consider whether such an alleged tort
claim will contradict and thus destroy the uniform application of the CISG.397 Also, the Canadian
court did not thoroughly analyze whether there exists an extra-contractual interest protected by
applicable tort law, or whether the party’s negligent conduct violates an extra-contractual duty
imposed by tort law, which would not be trumped by the CISG. Another foreign decision
rendered by the Supreme Court of Western Australia also held that not only was the seller bound
by an express term of the contract to supply goods that would be manufactured according to the
requirements of the Australian Therapeutics Goods Administration and that such goods would be
sterile, but also that the seller owed the buyer a duty of care to provide goods manufactured in
accordance with the requirements of the TGA and were sterile.398 Similarly, the Australian
Supreme Court did not discuss in detail whether the alleged tortious duty of care owed is
separate from, or identical to, the obligation imposed by the express contractual terms which
appeared to be governed by the CISG. The last example of the German court decision was
revealed in a scholarly writing.399 It is said that the German court applied the rule governing the
issue of rights to concurrent tort claims (the principle of cumul) derived from the domestic
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system to disputes involving international sales contracts.400 The court, in this case, was bound to
apply the ULIS, pursuant to Article 100 of the CISG. Despite the existence of Article 34 of the
ULIS, and the fact that the buyer failed to give notification of non-conformity, the court found
that the question of tortious liability falls outside the scope of the CISG, and allowed the buyer to
rely on tort remedies pursuant to applicable Italian law regarding the right to concurrent tort
claims. As we can see, the German court followed the applicable foreign law to determine the
issue of concurrence involving the relationship in the international sales contract governed by the
International Convention.401
From the line of cases demonstrated in this section, most court decisions principally
adhered to the narrowest scope of the CISG, and applied the applicable tort law located by
private international law to uphold the availability of the alleged tort claim and to consider its
actionability or its validity. Clearly stated, not only did these decisions402 adopt a liberal
approach, but they also applied rules and approaches based on the right to concurrent claims
between contract and tort deriving from a single domestic system so as to uphold the availability
as well as consider the validity of a tort claim.
400
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2.3 Critiques Based on Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Against Extensive
Permission of Competing Tort Remedies
The first angle of the criticism takes into consideration the existing provisions of the
Convention and the underlying reason for enacting Article 5 to argue against the most lenient
approach. It is reasoned that no other provisions of the CISG regarding the competence for tort
claims can be considered sufficient to justify the application of domestic law in regard to the
right to tort claims.403 Instead, this thesis argues that if the buyer were generally allowed not only
to assert certain claims according to the CISG, but also to resort to a wide range of other
concurrent claims under domestic laws, it would be unnecessary to include Article 5 for two
primary purposes. The first is to prevent conflict between the Convention and domestic product
liability law governing claims for personal injury and death. The second is to avoid infringing on
domestic laws that protect such extra-contractual interests. Insofar as Article 5 is necessary to
prevent applying the CISG to claims for personal injury and death, and thus avoid its preemptive
effect, this leads to the implicit inference that the CISG is possibly applied in a way to exclude
other tort remedies not covered by Article 5.
The other standpoint of the critique accords with the CISG’s objectives and functions
discussed in Chapter Two and criticizes more along the lines of the method of interpretation
navigated by the CISG. This trenchant criticism starts with the interpretive dimension of Article
4. This is because the expansive approach primarily adheres to the plain text and confines the
CISG’s scope to matters expressly stated under Article 4 when suggesting the permissibility of
concurring claims. Considering the phrase that “[t]his Convention governs only . . . the rights
and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract,” one argues that the
403
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terms of the first sentence of Article 4 describing the scope of the Convention are general, vague,
open to and in need of interpretation.404 When there is a conflict, it is submitted that the problem
of the CISG’s scope should be solved in favor of the Convention and its application.405 One
reason for the pro-CISG approach is that the Convention is widely accepted as a suitable
international doctrine, formulated specifically for relationships formed under the international
sales transactions. Thus, the CISG should apply whenever a sufficient basis for the application of
its uniform rules exists, provided that its language does not preclude such application.406 Another
reason is that a narrow reading of Article 4 is not consistent with the entire system of the CISG,
and such a limited interpretation should not be adopted.407 Given the main goals indicated in the
CISG’s preamble, an application of domestic law bringing about an alternative to fundamental
rules and principles of the CISG would be deemed unacceptable as it disrupts the consensus of
international communities to remove legal barriers in international trade. It is solemnly insisted
that a fair balance between plaintiffs and defendants intentionally equipped by the Convention
should not be subverted by way of giving plaintiffs the right to choose more favorable domestic
law.408 Additionally, permitting competing tort remedy without restriction can be detrimental to
the breaching party when he engages in business with the other party. As a result, this can bring
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about adverse effects on the economy in terms of international trade. To achieve the goals of the
Convention, it is then suggested that the general provision of Article 4 should be interpreted and
applied in conjunction with Article 7(1) and (2) so as to identify the substantive scope of the
Convention and assess its boundaries with domestic laws.409
As far as the goal of uniformity is concerned, the critic emphasizes the intention of
drafting committees to impose a general obligation on the Contracting States to give effect to a
uniform law. In this regard, the scholarly view which advocates promoting the uniform rules is
willing to heighten the need to promote uniformity, as is expressly directed by Article 7(1). Also,
this view argues against the broader approach that careful consideration should be taken when
granting plaintiffs additional appeals for domestic law as the other exceptions were not
persuasive to the international legislative body and were not expressly carved out within the
Convention.410 The reason is that such additional “exceptions to the area of uniformity seem
inconsistent with the compromises on scope and substance that led to the international
agreement.”411
Furthermore, in supporting this liberal approach stating that there is little threat to the
goal of accomplishing the uniformity in interpretation,412 the argument seems unpersuasive.
There are two aspects to consider. The first is that the scope of the CISG’s application as is
interpreted by different jurisdictions will vary depending on differences in the ways of
characterizing claims relating to sales as regards to whether it is a contract or tort. In explaining,
409
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tribunals primarily look towards their law when characterizing the alleged claim, to identify the
availability of a tort claim. If the alleged claim sounded in tort, it would be treated as a matter
outside the CISG’s scope. As we can see, such a qualification process is closely related to, and
inevitably affects, the court’s decision regarding the CISG’s preemption and concurrency
problem. Accordingly, the CISG’s goal of uniformity is put at risk due to the non-uniform results
of the characterization arising from different jurisdictions. The second point is that even in the
domestic system, there have been different rules and approaches adopted by domestic courts to
consider whether the right to concurrent tort claims should be permitted. Accordingly, if
tribunals followed the solution of permitting tort actions, the risk of having a competing tort
remedy encroaching upon the rules of the CISG would possibly depend on national laws, which
are different in various ways, in respect to the right to concurrency. Therefore, it is not
convincing to defend the risk of non-uniform results as attributable to the distinctions among
domestic tort rules, which the CISG does not intend to align with each other.413
2.4 Critiques Based on Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Against the
Consideration of Domestic Rules and Approaches to the Right to Concurrent Claims
As we have noticed from domestic approaches which the aforementioned court decisions
referred to, there is essentially no domestic rule directly formulated to decide the issue of the
preemptive effect of the International Convention on a domestic claim or its concurrency
problem, particularly the CISG’s preemption or concurrency of a tort claim. This thesis thus
agrees with the criticism of the scholarly view arguing that it would be problematic to consider
the general rules deriving from a single legal system to determine the concurrence of

413

Lookofsky, supra note 335, at 150.

128

international sales law and national tort law, which is inherently dissimilar from national
concurrence of contract and tort norms.414 The critical difference is that the competing norm of
the Convention is the unification of the special supranational instrument and that it has an
international autonomous character. There is also the criticism that it is inappropriate to leave the
question of concurrence arising out of the international sales of goods to domestic law, which is
predominantly up to the municipal court.415 More specifically speaking, it would be ill-suited, to
give a striking example, if the court applied the French principle of non-cumul to prevent a trader
from asserting his tort claim, especially when such tort claim essentially falls outside the scope
of the CISG. It is because the non-cumul principle has originally developed due to the
competition between French national laws of contract and tort. Significantly, the development of
non-cumul has been stimulated by many structures, notions, and elements of French laws of
contract and tort. Taking a domestic solution of merging liability of contort put forth in the
literature of the Death of Contract416 as another example, Peter Schlechtriem points out that,
following such merging of the liability of contort, part of the CISG’s fundamental regulations
regarding the parties’ liabilities and right to remedies, e.g. the prerequisites for liabilities, would
be abandoned.417 More critically, it would negate the very essence of the CISG and its objective
to create a uniform law, because the contort remedy may be different depending on the varying
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grounds of domestic tort laws where the dispute of concurrent claims are decided by different
jurisdictions of Contracting States with their diverse tort law systems.418
The proponents of the following approach419 would argue that considering the CISG’s
substantive scope according to the entire system of its rules could produce outcomes of the
CISG’s preemption problem, which would be more theoretically satisfied than results simply
concluded by way of shifting the analysis from the preemption issue to the general question of
concurrence of claims within the domestic system. As we can see, some domestic mechanisms,
e.g., the principle of cumul or merging liability of contort, bring about a legal consequence that
inevitably places a risk of non-applicability of the Convention’s uniform rules when in
interaction with tort law. In this respect, without an express or implied intention of the drafters,
the tribunals should not bring the problem of the applicability of the CISG into the system of
national law, and solve such a question through different applicable laws and approaches to the
right to concurrent claims. For instance, when dealing with the preemption issue, it would be
inappropriate for the US courts to follow the traditional domestic approach, and then discover
that the matter sounded in tort action merely because they are motivated by the public policy
underlying rule of tort, such as a rule on the limitation period.420 Furthermore, when a conflict of
law in regard to the concurrence of the two actions arises, tribunals would be inevitably
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confronted with a dilemma as to which approaches and what laws should apply between lex loci
contractus and lex loci delicti.421 Accordingly, the different courts are highly inclined to apply
different laws in a complex situation as such. Given that there is a spectrum of applicable
domestic laws and approaches attempting to solve concurrency problems within different
domestic systems, it is highly concerning that the Convention’s goal of uniformity is again at risk
of being disrupted whenever a party lodges both a CISG remedy and tort one.
3. A Tort Claim Is Generally Allowed with Exceptions: By Acknowledging the
Substantive Scope and Aims of the CISG
3.1 An Overview of Academic Perspectives
This part deliberates over an alternate approach which primarily accounts for the
substantive scope and aims of the CISG so as to suggest a moderate level of preemption. This
approach may be considered the compromise approach. Importantly, this approach requires
tribunals to take caution in allowing inconsistent domestic tort claims. It is suggested that courts
are not free to permit tort claims or grant remedies against torts if doing so would push aside the
regulations of the CISG, or the prerequisites and restrictions for its remedies.422 To illustrate, it
would be an infringement of the Convention if the buyer who fails to give timely notice of nonconformity is able to choose to bring the action in domestic tort so as to ask for damages caused
by non-conforming goods.423 To avoid severe encroachment of the CISG’s rules and principles,
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the analysis requires an exhaustive investigation of both the entire system of the CISG’s rules as
well as of domestic tort laws that might concur with the CISG424
Peter Schlechtriem suggests that an incompatible domestic law should not be allowed.425
According to Schlechtriem, tort law is considered incompatible when it relates to the seller’s
actual obligations regarding the quality of the goods, or when it performs functions that are
equivalent to those of the CISG or the contract itself.426 The primary mechanism under this
approach is to take the scope and aims of the CISG into account,427 when coping with the
preemption issue. It is submitted that the Convention regulates its relationship with domestic law
in terms of the permissibility of concurring claims based on the CISG and remedies based on
domestic law.428 In any case, Schlechtriem suggests that the quality of the Convention as a
binding treaty, as well as its objective to enhance global uniformity in dealing with sales disputes
arising out of international sales, must be maintained.429 Domestic tort rules cannot be supported
if the application of these rules may supersede legal rules especially established by the
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Convention, and thereby violate obligations of an international treaty.430 Accordingly, the
CISG’s rights and remedies are exclusive only in cases where the matter can be protected and
governed by the Convention. The CISG Advisory Council also reiterates that the basic concerns
are, on the one hand, to avoid destroying the balancing of interests and uniformity of law
purported by the CISG, and, on the other hand, to avoid overly broad preemption of domestic
tort claims by the CISG.431
If it turned out that the application of the CISG did not prevent recourse to the alleged
tort claims, another question would be whether those claims are always concurrently allowed, or
if it would further depend on domestic rules regarding the permissibility of resorting to
concurrent claims. This approach would answer that in any case, domestic laws and approaches
to issues regarding the right to concurrent assertion of other remedies must be further
considered,432 after already having decided that the CISG does not replace domestic claims.433 In
other words, although the application of the Convention does not suppress the alleged tort claim
according to the criteria of acknowledging the substantive scope and aims of the CISG,
considering domestic law is required for permitting concurrent tort claims. A plaintiff will be
permitted to assert tort claims alongside contractual claims under the CISG, only if domestic law
also permits concurrence of the remedy.434 It should be noted that domestic rules on the
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permissibility of resorting to concurrent claims are irrelevant at the first stage in deciding the
preemption issue, but it later becomes involved as substantive law applicable to tort claim so that
the final outcome is beyond the reach of the CISG.435
In determining whether the CISG governs a matter in question, Schlechtriem provides a
guideline of what is to be considered: the protected interests, the respective duties, and the
relationship between interests and obligations.436 Schlechtriem thus differentiates between
contractual obligations designated to protect economic interests, and extra-contractual duties that
are imposed independently of contractual obligations to protect other interests, such as life, limb,
health, and property.437 Accordingly, rules and principles of the CISG exclusively regulate the
essence of contractual interests and provide protection for international sales, which should not
be altered by protections for economic interests granted through tort laws.438 Notably,
Schlechtriem considers property damages that are incurred from defective goods as the interest
that is protected by domestic tort law. He then concludes that a tort action seeking property
damages to either the goods themselves or other property, is “outside the principal domain of
interests created by contracts,”439 even though such damages are recoverable under Article 74 of
the CISG.440 He reasons that even if the drafters decided not to exclude product liability from the
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CISG’s scope altogether, it is difficult to imagine that the Contracting States’ legislators intend
to reverse the policy underlying tort law by preempting important sectors of this area of tort law,
and elevating the Convention to a lex specialis status in regards to consequential damages to
property.441 Therefore, he opines that claims for damages caused by the goods to property could
be concurrently asserted based on grounds of both contract under the CISG, and tort under
domestic law.442
However, there is an opposing view that considers property damages to goods purchased
as the interest protected by the CISG.443 Additionally, the materials which are typically affected
by the delivery of non-conforming goods,444 and the properties which are “attached to the goods,
or with which the goods are combined or commingled, or which are processed by the goods, in
the normal course of business or in the course of normal use,”445 are considered as contractual
interests and are thus exclusively protected by the CISG.446 This is because parties usually
contemplate the well-being of these properties when they engage in the bargain.447 Given such a
contemplation, it is justified to regard these properties’ well-being as a contractual interest for
which the uniform protection was intended. Another view advocating for modifications of tort
laws also suggests that the CISG dominates over the national tort claim in cases where the goods
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themselves are destroyed.448 Such a view further reasons that an adaptation is required, because
domestic law granting compensation for damages done to sold goods may lead to an
inconsistency between the protective regulations of the CISG and domestic tort laws.449 As such,
to prevent contradicting legal outcomes, a tort remedy for damages to goods must be subject to
the specific protective regulations of the CISG, such as the notification requirement under Article
39.
Regarding compensation for damages to other property, the proponents of the
compromise approach still agree that domestic claims seeking recovery for such damages are
seen as a protection of extra-contractual interests and thus not excluded by the application of the
CISG.450
In addition to opinions based on the premise of extra-contractual interests, the
compromise approach will result in the same outcome in cases where an allegation of tort action
relies on a breach of extra-contractual duties which exist independent of obligations imputed by
parties’ agreement or the CISG.451 This premise of extra-contractual duty, as well as the noncontractual respective interests, is supported by the policies of the Convention, through its
exclusion of personal injury from its scope. Such policies indicate that where a seller violates the
standards of due care in the marketing of his goods, causing harm to the buyer’s life and limb,
the buyer can resort to remedies in tort regardless of their contractual obligations.452 The
remedies available under tort law will not be subject to the standard restrictions applied to
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remedies under the Convention.453 Under the majority views, which support the idea of extracontractual duty, the CISG exclusively governs claims for property damage, i.e. the typical result
from a breach of contractual obligation, while a concurring claim under domestic tort law is
permitted when loss to other property results from a breach of the general duty of safety.454
However, the same result is not true in the case where parties expressly or impliedly incorporate
clauses imposing an additional duty of care so as to not cause harm to the buyer through the
contract.455 Such an outcome, which permits a concurring tort claim, is also not reached in
situations where the parties include interests, in their contract, that are otherwise extracontractual.456 By having such agreements, the buyer’s claim for the seller’s breach of due care
in rendering his performance can be based exclusively on the CISG, even if the buyer makes a
personal injury claim.457 An example is the case where parties agree to impose a duty of care in
performing service obligations under the contract of sale, which falls under the CISG’s sphere by
virtue of Article 3(2) of the CISG.458 Another instance is the case where parties alter the
substantive duties under the CISG in a way that requires the standard duty of care to be imposed
upon the seller in his performance of all contractual obligations.
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Considering the interests protected and parties’ respective obligations, Schlechtriem
suggests adjusting tort law in cases where the alleged tort remedy involves economic interests
and their respective contractual duties. Schlechtriem opines that if the CISG genuinely protects
the matter in question, it is sufficient to adjust the concurrent tort liability, which is protected by
domestic tort rules, to the rules and principles of the CISG.459 He reasoned that this adjustment is
appropriate due to the need for a uniform application of the CISG, as per Article 7(1).460
Other commentators also provide support for the approach of the CISG being exclusively
superior to tort law, when it appears that tort laws impose duties that are essentially related to
those owed by the CISG or the sales contract. In adherence with the prevailing view among legal
scholars, Warren Khoo uses the case of defective machinery to explain the difficult problem of
the interaction between the CISG and domestic law when a buyer asserts claims for lack of due
care in providing a recommendation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and non-conformity.461 Khoo
suggests that in dealing with the problem as to whether the CISG will displace domestic law,
tribunals should follow the guidance of Article 7 and grant the widest possible scope of
application to the CISG, due to its aim of unifying legal rules governing international sales
contracts.462 Another suggestion to prevent excessive liability is highlighted by Rolf Herber, who
states that tort claims are generally outside the scope of the CISG, and can be asserted
concurrently with claims under the CISG in accordance with applicable tort law, but such claims
must be prohibited when the buyer uses them merely to extend the seller’s liability.463 Herber
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further affirms that Article 5 cannot be analogically applied to exclude product liability claims
for property loss from the ambit of the CISG.464 He also advises that the tort of product liability
for defective goods may not be applied concurrently with the CISG, inasmuch as tort remedies
relate to either typical or atypical obligations according to the quality of the goods purchased,
and the delivery of goods that are free from legal defects in title.465
In connection with the scope of the CISG, a functional equivalence test, advanced by
Franco Ferrari, should be investigated. To begin with, Ferrari opines that besides Article 4 of the
CISG, other provisions must also be taken into consideration to determine the scope of the
CISG’s application, since other provisions also regulate issues not listed in the first sentence of
Article 4.466 The functional equivalence test is further explained by pointing out the essential
function of Article 4, providing an exception to the exclusion of both the validity issue and the
tort issue from the scope of the Convention. The wording of “except as otherwise expressly
provided in this Convention” clearly indicates that the CISG provides a functional equivalence
solution to the validity issue.467 In Ferrari’s view, this functional equivalence test does not
require an express rejection of particular national concepts; rather, it is adequate that the CISG
contains rules or principles that provide other options to settle the disputed matter.468 As we can
see, since the matter of tort liability is not expressly listed in Article 4, it is more difficult and
arguable whether a party’s concurrent tort claim is included in the Convention, or otherwise
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covered by domestic law. To this question, Ferrari proposes that apart from the apparent solution
under Article 5, the functional equivalence test is justified to deal with the preemption and
concurrence dilemma that arises in terms of domestic remedies based on tort laws.469 In light of a
functionally equivalent solution, he believes that tribunals can apply the exception to an
inapplicability of the Convention, as stated in the second sentence of Article 4, to the issue of tort
liability when it appears that the CISG’s rules and principles provide protection of the parties’
interests, which is functionally equivalent to the protection provided by tort laws.470 As a result,
in the case of equivalent overlapping, the Convention applies exclusively to the matter and then
replaces domestic law.471 Similar to Schlechtriem’s position, in the case where the overlapping
condition is not met, Ferrari suggests that tort remedy is not replaced, but whether it is allowed to
be concurrently asserted depends upon the applicable domestic laws and the domestic system’s
approach to the issue of concurrency.472
At last, the approach of considering the actual scope of the CISG when deciding the
question of preemption is further supported by Ulrich G. Schroeter. Schroeter agrees with the
CISG’s prevalence and its corresponding preemption only in the case where its rules attempt to
govern the matters in question exclusively, and those matters are not outside the substantive
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scope of its application.473 He strongly denies exclusive reliance on the strict wording of the first
sentence of Article 4,474 or on the classification of domestic law as “contracts” and “torts,” in
defining the scope of the CISG.475 He develops a renewed two-step approach due to the
international character of the CISG’s interpretation and the uniformity of its application.476 He
claims that this approach can result in a more international uniform and tenable solution to
defining the border of the CISG. According to the two-step approach, domestic laws will be
displaced only if (1) the national law and CISG’s rules are simultaneously triggered by the same
factual situation, and (2) the national law concerns a legal matter and the matter is also regulated
by the CISG.477 Schroeter takes the view that the factual circumstances should be taken into
consideration in finding the precise scope of the Convention and its relationship with other
domestic laws. One reason for this is that focusing on the factual criterion effectively means that
tribunals look at the substance of concurring laws, rather than their labels.478 Also, it is good for
merchants, when conducting their business, to anticipate and determine the legal consequences
that could result from their business behavior under the relevant laws.479 Apart from factual
specifications, considering the regulatory purpose and focus of concurring laws is an additional
necessary factor, since different laws have different purposes in regulating the same factual

473

Schroeter, supra note 427, at 555.

474

Id. at 556–58.

475

Id. at 560–63.

476

Id. at 563.

477

Id.

478

Id.

479

Id. at 564.

141

situations.480 If different purposes were shown in the case with the Convention and competing
domestic law, the CISG would not exclusively govern the disputed issue.481 This could be the
case where domestic law addresses various types of risk or legal matters which are distinct from
the risks undertaken and protected by the CISG.482 In following this idea, tribunals must only
consider the matters or the particular types of risk to the parties’ interests that the Convention
wants to regulate and allocate between the parties, no matter how the Convention dealt with
those matters.483 This thesis observes that the legal criterion considers the risks to the parties’
interests, whereas the factual criterion, in essence, focuses on the parties’ behaviors which the
concurring laws regulate or control. This two-step approach thus helps in clarifying the need for
consideration of the protected interests and respective duties under the compromise solution put
forward by Schlechtriem, and other proponents who advocate a moderate level of preemption.
3.2 An Overview of Judicial Perspectives
A handful of US court decisions have considered the preemption issue, two of which are
explained here in order to show an implementation of the compromise approach. Though the
court did not apply Schlechtriem’s suggested approach in its analysis of all the alleged tort
claims, the court in Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc.484 considered whether
promissory estoppel overlaps with the CISG and thus subverts the Convention’s goal of
uniformity in its application to international transactions. In considering the CISG’s preemption
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of promissory estoppel and tort claims, the court first explained the supplementary notion that
the CISG does not preempt domestic tort claims. Then, the court supported this view by referring
to the opinion of Peter Schlechtriem, which suggested that the “CISG does not preempt claims
for ‘misrepresentation, fraud, betrayal and intentional harm to economic interests.’”485 In
considering the preemption of promissory estoppel, the court then took a close look at Article
16(2)(b) and its commentary. This is because the court perceived that promissory estoppel is
treated as another side of the contract claim,486 and noticed that “[t]he fact that Article 16(2)(b)
appears to employ a modified version of promissory estoppel suggests that if a plaintiff were to
bring a promissory estoppel claim to avoid the need to prove the existence of a ‘firm offer,’ that
claim would be preempted by the CISG.”487 Importantly, the court clarified that it would
contradict the CISG and hinder its goal of uniformity if the court permitted promissory estoppel
under US law which requires additional elements of either foreseeability or detriment beyond
those required by Article 16(2)(b).488 Eventually, the court considered a particular promissory
claim in this case, finding that “Invamed utilizes promissory estoppel to prove that a promise on
which it relied should be recognized as binding as if it were a contract.”489 The court also
emphasized that “if the CISG had contemplated a similar ‘reliance’ principle in its determination
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of whether a contract had formed, this promissory estoppel claim would be preempted.”490 The
court, however, found that Invamed’s particular promissory estoppel claim was not preempted,
because the defendants failed to argue that the CISG contemplates a similar ‘reliance’ principle
(emphasis added).491 It should be noted that while this court considered the actual scope of the
CISG when determining the permissibility of promissory estoppel, a more liberal approach to
permitting tort claims was followed when determining the CISG’s preemption of negligence and
negligent misrepresentation.492
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel493 is another US court decision which adopted the
compromise approach when taking the actual scope of the CISG into consideration and deciding
the preemptive effect of the CISG on a promissory estoppel claim.494 A promissory estoppel
action was brought against the seller, Usinor, by both an immediate buyer, CMSA, and a
downstream purchaser, Caterpillar. The court relied on the holding of Geneva Pharm. Tech.
Corp. and refused to extend the preemptive effect of the CISG to domestic claims for promissory
estoppel brought by plaintiffs.495 Accordingly, the court applied Illinois law496 to determine the
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validity of the state claim for promissory estoppel.497 Finally, the court dismissed CMSA’s
promissory estoppel claim for failure to state a claim, because the court found that the promise
made by the defendant-seller is similar to a warranty, and the immediate buyer, CMSA, could
use such promise to assert a claim for breach of warranty, and that CMSA had alleged precisely
such a contractual claim under the CISG.498 The court further reasoned that CMSA’s promissory
estoppel claim, in essence, duplicates its breach of warranty claim under the Convention, and
thus the court found no reason to allow CMSA to proceed with its domestic claim for promissory
estoppel.499 In contrast, the court upheld the downstream buyer, Caterpillar’s, state law claim for
promissory estoppel against a remote seller, Usinor, and reasoned that such a claim is not barred,
among other things, by the right to assert claims for breach of warranties under the CISG, since
the downstream buyer, who is not in privity of contract, cannot proceed with such a contractual
claim against the remote seller, Usinor, under the CISG.500
Additionally, a foreign decision of the Israeli Supreme Court501 devoted a significant
amount of attention to the preemption/concurrency problem. The Supreme Court suggested that
the definition of the substantive scope of the CISG is a question of the Convention’s
interpretation,502 in which its international aspect is innate. Although this decision was rendered
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under the ULIS503–the predecessor of the CISG– the court intentionally turned to practical and
academic discussions under the CISG to resolve the issue in this case.504 The main question to be
decided by the Supreme Court was whether a buyer who failed to give notice of defective goods
within the two-year period can circumvent the regulatory prescription required under the Sale
(International Sale of Goods) Law of 1971505 by raising a claim against the seller or
manufacturer in tort.506 Apparently, after discussing the competing approaches to deal with the
main question in the appeal,507 the Supreme Court chose to follow the compromise approach,
which distinguishes between interests and rights established by the contract that are thus
protected by applicable contract law or the CISG, and general interests which tort law intends to
protect.508 When defining the CISG’s scope under the circumstances of this case, the court
ultimately considered the obligations imposed on the seller, who was also the manufacturer.509
Notably, the court did not mention whether the plaintiff’s losses were to be considered as
contractual interests to be protected by the CISG.510 Instead, in supporting its holding, the court
deliberately drew from the general duty of care imposed on the manufacturer by competing tort
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law, which exists independent of the obligation created by the sales contract.511 The Supreme
Court ultimately upheld the District Court’s judgment, granting the buyer (i.e. importer) the right
to a concurrent tort claim against the seller and manufacturer for negligent manufacturing goods
that were sold.512 It should be noted here that the Supreme Court did not suggest the
circumstances under which the court would believe the requirement of notice under the CISG
could have an effect on tort remedies.
3.3 Critiques Based on Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Doubt regarding the
Sufficiency of Authoritative Methods of Interpretation
One must keep in mind that a claim for a breach of any general obligation, that infringes
on interests that are particularly protected by tort laws, cannot be impeded by the fact that the
breaching party engages in international trade. Although the compromise approach generally
grants the parties permission to pursue various claims in tort, the protection under tort law given
to the parties is still founded upon the regime of the CISG if it is functionally equivalent to the
relationship under an international sales transaction. However, some scholars feared that the
methods of interpretation of tort laws, in light of the Convention restricting the application of tort
laws, would lead to uncertain results in this context,513 especially when lacking specific
guidelines on how to interpret the two competing norms. Moreover, it still seems to be
undetermined whether the existing authoritative resources are sufficient for tribunals to rely on
when ascertaining the methods of interpretation. Skepticism might be raised since only a handful
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of decisions and few academic writings have recently emerged, exhaustively investigating the
CISG’s substantive scope and its goals, as well as possible competing tort claims in terms of the
preemption of tort remedies. This approach thus requires furtherance of the work done by
scholars and judicial bodies, establishing authoritative guidance about how to interpret the
CISG’s text together with the contract itself, and then identify the substantive scope of the CISG
which may overlap with the range of different tort claims.
4. Deviating from the CISG’s Preemption Problem, and Relying on the Doctrinal
Characterization of Claims within National Legal Systems
Apart from the three approaches focusing on the CISG’s preemption and concurrence of
tort remedies, some US court decisions adopt an entirely different method of analysis. Instead of
analyzing the extent of the CISG’s preemptive effect on tort claims, the issue of preemption is
turned into a question of characterization of claims. The courts thus mainly rely on domestic
rules governing the characterization of claims within national legal systems in making
determinative decisions.514 Accordingly, the court will hold that the alleged tort claim would be
displaced by the CISG insofar as the court finds that such a claim is, in essence, a contractual
claim.515 Notably, one might believe that the rules on doctrinal characterization are somewhat
similar to the rules and approaches to the right to concurrent claims between torts and contracts
within national legal systems. As can be seen in the following cases, this is because the court
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generally applies the forum law and approach to the right to concurrent claims in order to
characterize the alleged tort claim.
4.1 An Overview of Judicial Perspectives
Two US court decisions exhibit a way in which the courts deviate from the CISG’s
preemption of tort remedies, and turn to the question of characterization. The first example is
Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods LLC,516 which primarily relies on the doctrine of
characterization, which has its source in the domestic legal system to classify the alleged claims,
and then decisively determine the permissibility of domestic claims. The second case,
Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd.,517 began with considering and relying on the
doctrine of characterization, but later returned to counting on the CISG’s scope when handling
the preemption issue.
In Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods LLC,518 a United States Magistrate Judge
provided a Report and Recommendation in the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment regarding
the permissibility of tort claims alongside a breach of contract claim under the CISG. In
considering the permissibility of causes of action under tort laws, the Judge denied the negligent
misrepresentation claim, as well as the claim for negligent interference with the plaintiff’s
prospective economic advantage. In its analysis, instead of considering whether the alleged tort
claims fall within the scope of the CISG’s application, the Judge relied on the forum’s law,
which was New York law in this case. In particular, the court looked at the doctrine of economic
loss to characterize and determine whether the plaintiff was permitted to assert a concurrent tort
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claim.519 Clearly stated by the Judge, the plaintiff’s alleged negligence-based claims sounded in
contract, rather than tort, and was thus denied.
In Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd.,520 the defendant, Super Electric,
raised the preemptive effect of the CISG on domestic tort claims concerning negligence/strict
liability and tortious interference with business expectancy as one ground for its motion to
dismiss the plaintiff’s claims.521 The court ruled that under the supremacy clause, the CISG is a
federal law which preempts any inconsistent provisions of state law where applicable.522 The
court concluded that the CISG excludes only state law causes of action falling under the scope of
the CISG, such as state law claims in contract.523 The court held that it is more difficult to
determine the question of whether the plaintiff’s negligence/strict liability claim, in connection
with the allegedly defective refrigerator motors, fell within the scope of the Convention and thus
was preempted.524 Although the court considered and drew from several existing approaches
dealing with the preemption problem regarding tort claims,525 it emphasized the consensus
declaring that the CISG preempts concurring state contractual claims.526 Then, the court deviated
from the consideration of the CISG’s scope, turning to domestic rules527 on the characterization
of claims, in order to determine whether the alleged negligence/strict liability claim is essentially
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a contract claim in disguise, and is thus preempted under some US court decisions.528 In other
words, the court turned to the issue of characterization and applied the forum rules on the
issue,529 rather than applying US case law and approaches which dealt with the CISG’s
preemption of tort claim over the issue at bar. Notably, all national rules cited by the court in its
characterization process involve contractual and tort claims, i.e. concurrent claims, under
domestic laws of contract and tort.530 From what has been explained thus far, with respect to the
court’s analysis on characterization, this thesis observes that although the court found the alleged
claim is essentially the contract, it is still necessary for the court to explain the extent to which
such a claim falls under the CISG’s scope before firmly concluding that the CISG preempted the
alleged claim. It goes without saying that if the court fails to consider the CISG’s rules, it cannot
obtain an accurate outcome on the preemptive effect of the CISG, either on a contract claim or
tort claim.
The court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff, Electrocraft’s, negligence/strict liability
claim sounded in contract rather than tort, because “Electrocraft ‘concedes that its breach of
contract and warranty claims are rooted in the CISG’”531 and it further conceded that its
negligence/strict liability claim was also based on the same set of factual allegations that Super
Electric had a duty to deliver conforming goods, which it then failed to do, and its negligent
conduct caused damages to Electrocraft.532 The court further reasoned,
these are not allegations of wrongdoing that are extra-contractual or otherwise
amount to a breach of a duty distinct from or in addition to the breach of contract
528
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claim at issue in this action. Rather, the obligation of the seller to deliver goods
conforming to the contract and the interests of the buyer to use, consume, or to
resell the goods purchased, and therefore to receive them conforming to the
contract, as alleged by Electrocraft, are economic interests that are basically
contractual and regulated by the CISG and its rules and remedies for international
sales.533
Although the court, at the beginning of its analysis, referred to domestic laws
when classifying whether the plaintiff’s claim sounded in contract, the aforementioned
reasoning, along with the facts in its analysis, show that the court also considered the
scope of the CISG.534 In doing so, the court considered the protected interest and
contractual duty imposed by the CISG to reach an outcome for the preemption issue
regarding the negligence/strict liability claim. Besides, this thesis observes that the court
took the position of applying the CISG in a way so as to exclude the alleged tort claim535
that fell under the CISG’s scope, rather than permitting a tort remedy, on the condition
that it would be subject to the regulatory provisions of the CISG.
In the same decision, when faced with the preemption of tortious interference, this court,
however, cited Viva Vino Imp. Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.l.,536 and concluded that the CISG does
not preempt the plaintiff’s tortious interference claim alleging intentional harm to economic
interests, because the Convention is only concerned with sales of goods between merchants in
533
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different countries.537 As we can see, the court in this case believed that the CISG is inapplicable
to a domestic intentional tort action, irrespective of any other supportive reasons, other than
adopting the solution proposed by the liberal approach described in Part B-Section 2 of this
Chapter.538 It should be noticed that the Electrocraft Ark., Inc. case adopted two different
analyses of the CISG’s preemption of different alleged tort claims. Nevertheless, the
determinations regarding all alleged tort claims were also influenced by the national rules and
doctrines within domestic systems dealing with the interaction between contracts and torts. On
the one hand, the court applied the forum’s law on characterization in classifying the plaintiff’s
negligence/strict liability claim as a contract. On the other hand, this court, at the first stage,
qualified tortious interference action as a tort, and thus recognized such a tort claim to be outside
the scope of the CISG, which would not be preempted by the CISG.
4.2 Critiques Based on Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Against a
Consideration of Domestic Rules on Characterization in Deciding the CISG’s Preemption
Issue
The first criticism is that reliance on domestic rules on characterization is arguably
incompatible with Article 7(1), which requires tribunals to follow the guidance of “an
‘autonomous’ interpretation of the CISG’s provisions, including those defining the borders of the
CISG.”539 By recognizing that the CISG does not provide an autonomous definition of a
“contract” and “tort,” it is further argued that the contents and limits of domestic law regarding

537

Electrocraft Ark., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120183, at *24.

538

This court mainly adopted the expansive approach described in Section III.B.2, even though the court
also referred to Schlechtriem’s opinion, as stated in his article regarding the question of the CISG’s
preemption of a tort claim. See also Schlechtriem, supra note 317, at 474.
539

Schroeter, supra note 427, at 563.

153

the definition of these categories are uncertain and not internationally uniform.540 It is, therefore,
submitted that domestic characterization must not decisively play a role in, or should not have an
overwhelming influence on, the interpretation of the CISG’s regulations when attempting to
identify whether a certain matter falls under the Convention’s scope541 and to assess the relevant
boundaries of domestic laws. Tribunals must consider the functions of the relevant rules in
question, rather than characterizing the matters according to the domestic law of the forum.
Otherwise, applying domestic rules on characterization would encourage plaintiffs to engage in
forum shopping so as to find the most favorable domestic rules for their case.
Secondly, since the collision between the CISG and national law is not innately
considered a complete conflict of laws in the traditional sense,542 it is doubtful that the forum’s
conflict-of-law rules on characterization are appropriate for solving this kind of interrelation,
which is not the case in case of a conflict between the same level of national laws.
Thirdly, following this approach will contradict the notion underlying the express
provision excluding product liability claims for death or personal injury from the scope of the
Convention. In explaining, it can be inferred from Article 5 of the CISG that the doctrinal
characterization should not be relevant in drawing the line between the CISG and domestic law
on product liability. This general perception should be employed analogically to other causes of
action under domestic law. Although the discussion by delegates at the Diplomatic Conference
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supports the joint proposal of Article 5, based on the underlying assumption that whether product
liability is permitted would depend upon the characterization of “product liability” claims under
domestic laws,543 it is still claimed that the supposition relying on classification of claims is
fallacy, since it goes against both the goal of uniformity and the design of the CISG.544
Moreover, except for the unconvinced presupposition when legislating Article 5,545 it is not so
evident whether and how the characterization of claims as contract or tort was taken into account
in the deliberative process of drafting the CISG when enacting the provisions concerning the
parties’ rights, obligations, and remedies. Essentially, Article 5 is a significant indication that
exhibits the drafters’ intention to not rely on the different categories of product liability law in
different systems. To further illustrate, the drafters intended to enact Article 5 to prevent a
conflict between the CISG’s rules and domestic product liability rules,546 and to preclude
tribunals from engaging in characterization processes to define the boundaries between the
Convention and product liability laws. In this regard, it would be consistent with Article 5, that
in case of doubt, the doctrinal characterization should not be considerably relied on to determine
whether product liability claims for property damage would be included in the scope of the
CISG, and would thus be exclusively governed by the Convention.547 Instead, the consideration
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United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 11
April, 1980, supra note 150, at 245–46.
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CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 2.1 cmt. C.
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Some scholars consider this emerging presupposition, as well as the purpose underlying Article 5 of
preventing conflicts between the CISG’s rules and domestic product liability rules, when addressing the
CISG’s preemption of product liability. These scholars also opine that the CISG regulates its relationship
with domestic law irrespective of how domestic laws characterize and deal with product liability. See
Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 235, at 98, 100.
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Id. at 95.
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See Herber, supra note 232, at 50 (demonstrating that the characterization of claims is not decisive,
and the scope of application of the CISG’s provisions regarding defective goods is mainly taken into
consideration).
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should focus on the “interests” sought to be protected by the CISG,548 and interests which are
protected by domestic tort laws. Further, the underlying idea of disregarding the classification of
claims should be respected when considering the CISG’s preemption of other domestic tort
claims that seek recovery for property damage or economic loss.
C. Preliminary Conclusion
From the series of different approaches presented above, a moderate level of preemption
seems to be persuasive for this thesis to further optimistically embrace, clarify, and propose a
renewed legitimate and justified solution to the issue of preemption. For various reasons, this
thesis argues that the remaining three approaches are somewhat problematic and unconvincing.
The view of complete preemption should not be adopted because it clearly contradicts the
drafters’ intention in terms of scope, and it leads to an extreme intrusion of tort as a general law
that has a broader scope of application than a special law like the CISG. Given that the CISG
does not acknowledge an explicit preemption, it is likely unacceptable when an implied
preemption that is normally based on a field preemption549 brings about a complete exclusion of
all possible domestic law claims. Moreover, the CISG’s main goal of uniformity can be
accomplished through other solutions, even if the CISG is not applied as a mutually exclusive
law. Further, it is undeniable that a private law of tort remains necessary for granting civil
protections in all legal systems, particularly when the factual situations are even more
complicated than what the drafters perceived when enacting the uniform law. Also, the existence
of such complicated situations can be proven by other competing views.
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CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 2.1 cmt. 2.1.6.
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The situation where national laws attempt to regulate a matter in which the interest of the uniform law
is so dominant that it impliedly precludes an application of domestic laws to the same subject matter.
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Although it has been shown that among the four different approaches, the most lenient
approach of permitting competing tort remedies has been broadly adopted by US court decisions,
this thesis does not agree with the liberal approach. This is because if tribunals followed this
view, the outcome would be that any issue which is traditionally classified as a tort or treated as
an area of tort within the domestic system can be concurrently asserted alongside contractual
claims under the CISG. Consequently, it is most likely that the CISG’s rules have been put at
risk of being encroached by the competing tort remedy. This approach thus reflects an ignorance
of the importance of the CISG’s rules and principles. This thesis also holds that according to the
liberal approach, domestic rules on the right to concurrent claim appear to be out of place in
dealing with the question of the CISG’s preemption of tort remedies. As can be seen, this
solution, in essence, decisively adopts and applies domestic rules governing the interaction
between the general law of contract and law of tort, which play their functions at the same level,
to the interrelation between local law and international treaty. Adopting this approach would
overlook the actual problem of the tension between the supranational uniform law for
international sales and the general law of tort.
To prevent the phenomenon of forum shopping and to give regard to the international
character of the CISG’s rules, this thesis does not support the view that the issue of the CISG’s
preemption is not difficult to solve, as it is a matter of characterization. Additionally, the
traditional approach of characterization of claims, developed in the area of conflict-of-law rules,
is typically adopted to resolve the conflict between the national laws of relevant states/countries.
Hence, this thesis is inclined to suggest that forum laws on characterization have a dominant role
only for private international law purposes, in locating the law applicable to all matters,
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including alleged tort claims that are traditionally classified as legal matters outside the CISG’s
scope.
For the reasons given above, this thesis takes the view that the judicial bodies of the
Contracting States should deliberately reconsider the phenomena of the CISG’s preemption
problems. Also, they should reassess whether a careful analysis is needed, which takes into
account both the necessity of the CISG’s rules, and the nature of applicable tort rules,
establishing a proper dividing line between the CISG and tort law.
From the viewpoint of this thesis, counting on the CISG’s substantive scope and its aims,
and giving effects to the CISG insofar as the disputed matter falls under its scope, are the
essential elements for an analysis of the CISG’s preemption. Giving parties the right to
concurrent tort remedies when a tortious matter falls outside the CISG’s scope is also another
key element in coping with the CISG’s preemption of a tort claim. The main reason is that we
avoid a parallel application of competing claims, under unified and non-unified law, to the same
factual situations, if this will lead to contradictions and the invalidation of the underlying
purpose of one norm.550 Therefore, the legal solution to the problem of competing norms of the
CISG and tort law should focus on preventing such contradictions and the unaccepted
encroachment of both relevant norms.
As is explained in Part B-Section 3 of this Chapter, there have been attempts by some
scholars and judicial bodies to suggest a middle ground. This thesis is inclined to support this
moderate level of preemption, inasmuch as the compromise approach accords with both the
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See C. SCHMID, DAS ZUSAMMENSPIEL VON EINHEITLICHEM UN-KAUFRECHT UND NATIONALEM
RECHT: LÜCKENFÜLLUNG UND NORMENKONKURRENZ 84 (1996) cited in Diana Sewerin, International
Product Liability Law and Uniform Sales Law 50 (Mar. 2000) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Institute of
Comparative Law McGill University) (on file with McGill University Library).
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general obligation to give effect to the binding uniform law for international sales, as well as the
functions of national tort law in regulating extra-contractual conduct and compensating the loss
for extra-contractual interests. In the following chapter, this thesis will discuss certain essential
issues which still need to be clarified and analyzed with regard to the approach of acknowledging
the substantive scope and aims of the CISG. Also, the opinions on those aspects will be
developed and proposed to make this solution more convincing. That is, an analysis will be
provided to give sensible answers to the following emerging questions: (1) Can we use the
mechanisms existing in the CISG to solve the issue of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims?; (2)
Do we need to identify the inconsistency between competing norms?; (3) What is the criteria for
considering the establishment of fully overlapping situations in a particular case, which would
preclude a concurrent remedy under tort law?; (4) To what extent do domestic rules and
approaches play a role in the disputes concerning the CISG’s preemption of tort claims?; (5) To
what extent does an exculpatory clause have a legal effect on the alleged tort claim?; and (6)
Whether it is possibly justifiable to modify ancillary tort rules when a concurrent tort claim is
permitted?
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IV. OVERALL ANALYSIS AND OPINIONS: ESSENTIAL ASPECTS UNDER THE ADOPTED
APPROACH OF ACKNOWLEDGING THE CISG’S SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE AND AIMS
To diminish the risk of undermining the CISG’s fundamental goals, while reducing the
risk of excessive encroaching on the domain of tort law, this thesis addresses the CISG’s
preemption of tort remedies especially. Importantly, US tribunals have the power to deal with the
issue of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims sua sponte without a request or prior motion from
either party for consideration of such a preemption issue.551 As is accepted that the objectives
and functions of both competing norms must be sustained, it is significant to discuss and then
propose the most appropriate approach to solving the problem of friction between these two
norms. Otherwise, this thesis is apprehensive that, on the one hand, some jurisdictions tend to
cope with such a problem based on familiar concepts based in domestic law, particularly the
extreme idea of permitting the competing tort remedy. On the other hand, some adjudicators
prefer a radical idea of pro-convention. In addition to the goal of creating an optimal division of
functions between the uniform sales law and the law of tort, the more important purpose is to
identify and establish legitimate justifications for applying both norms to the disputes without the
fear of severely encroaching upon either.
Based on the analysis made through the preceding chapters, this thesis adopts the
approach of acknowledging the substantive scope and aims of the CISG. According to this
chosen approach, the substantive scope and aims of the CISG determine the extent to which the
CISG preempts domestic tort claims. In other words, tribunals must consider the scope of the
CISG and its purposes to see whether the alleged tort claim, in essence, falls under its scope. If it

551

See Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Level 8 Apparel, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688, at
*40 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014).
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does, the CISG has a preemptive effect on such a matter. Further, this thesis offers opinions552 on
the essential aspects under this approach of acknowledging the CISG’s substantive scope and
aims to make the renewed approach more convincing. Rules and opinions given by this thesis are
primarily offered to assist tribunals with the uniform application of the proposed solution when
dealing with the CISG’s preemption and concurrency issues. Those opinions relate to several
aspects that need to be further clarified, namely:
(1) the use of mechanisms existing in the CISG to solve the issue of its preemption of tort
claims;
(2) the indication of an inconsistency between competing norms;
(3) the criteria for considering the establishment of fully overlapping situations;
(4) the secondary roles of domestic rules and approaches in the disputes concerning the
CISG’s preemption of tort claims;
(5) the legal effect of an exculpatory clause on the alleged tort claim; and
(6) the policy of modifying ancillary tort rules when a concurrent tort claim is permitted.
Finally, this chapter provides a hypothetical case to demonstrate and solve the disputed
issue of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims by applying the proposed approach and following
the opinions put forth by this thesis.
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This thesis would suggest that, apart from the CISG Advisory Council Opinions, tribunals can follow
the opinions given in Parts A. to F. when addressing cases under the CISG and the CISG’s
preemption/concurrency issue is presented. Please note that the CISG Advisory Council Opinions are
available at http://www.cisgac.com/opinions/.
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A. The Use of Mechanisms Existing in the CISG for Solving the Issue of Its Preemption of
Tort Claims
The following opinions are provided to answer the question of whether we can use the
mechanisms existing in the CISG to solve the issue of its preemption of tort claims.
The principle of acknowledging the CISG’s substantive scope, together with the policy of
attaining its aims, are the primary notions underlying the preemptive effect of the CISG on tort
remedy. In terms of acknowledging the CISG’s substantive scope, this thesis would say that,
from a doctrinal perspective, the CISG’s preemption issue is essentially the problem of its scope
of application, which could be dealt with through the mechanisms provided by the CISG.
One important mechanism is the methods of interpretation of its provisions under the
CISG. René Franz Henschel, taking the interpretation of Article 35 as an example,553 signifies
that the juridical methods of dynamic doctrine and restrictive doctrine can be applied to
determine the scope of Article 35554 and its relation to domestic tort law.
For the sake of the constant development of international trade and the achievement of
the CISG’s aim to promote such advancement, the proposed approach adopts the effective
dynamic interpretation of the CISG as a predominant method of interpretation to solve the
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HENSCHEL, supra note 109, at 33–38, 42–48.
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René Franz Henschel concludes that the dynamic method of interpretation is more likely in line with
international law practices and doctrines. This methodological approach is also most likely followed in
applying Article 35, leading to autonomous interpretation and giving a broad scope of application of
Article 35. Under this method, ULIS’s historical account and the principles developed by other foreign
decisions were practically referred to when interpreting and applying Article 35. See id. at 303–04.
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preemption issue,555 rather than following the idea of restrictive interpretation.556 Adhering to
dynamic interpretation is justified by the extent of the Convention’s wording and the spirit of its
rules. Considering the CISG’s wording, it is submitted that the wording of the Convention should
be interpreted according to the ordinary, logical international meaning and context.557 In terms of
the spirit of the rules, it is said that, analogous to Article 7, the Convention encourages an
extensive interpretation of some of its provisions.558 Accordingly, tribunals are permitted to have
regard for the legislative history of the Convention in order to understand the purpose of the
CISG’s rules. Moreover, the good faith principle can serve as an important principle that
supports the flexible interpretation of the provisions in practice.559 It is believed that the principle
of good faith not only prevents the tribunals from applying the CISG to cases that the drafters did
not intend for it to cover, but also reminds them to exercise caution before resorting to domestic
law.560 Further, the dynamic method of interpretation is also supported by the interpretive rules
under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties of 1969.561 Therefore,
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It could be said that this thesis also adopts the approach of the functionally adequate solution, as
suggested by Franco Ferrari. See Ferrari, supra note 466.
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The proponent of restrictive doctrine is concerned about giving up national sovereignty and thus
prefers applying national laws and principles alongside the CISG. See HENSCHEL, supra note 109, at 34,
36–37, 75.
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Id. at 42.
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Ndulo, supra note 170, at 9.
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Article 31 (General rule of interpretation) states that,
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
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when interpreting the CISG to deal with its preemption issue, tribunals could consult all the
CISG’s features, including its text, history of evolution, purposes, functions, and approaches to
remedies and party autonomy as explained in Chapter Two. In this event, this thesis believes that
the analogical methodology is allowed, to the extent that it does not violate the drafting
committee’s intention or the Convention’s purposes.
Together with the method of dynamic interpretation, tribunals can use the main devices
under Articles 4, 5, and 7 to draw the CISG’s scope and give preemptive power to its rules and
principles. Article 4 is the main provision to be taken into account in determining the matters

(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one
or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.
Article 32 (Supplementary means of interpretation) states that,
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]; see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 306 cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 2018). Please note that Articles 31 and 32 are now generally accepted by the United States as
reflecting customary international law, although the United States is not a party to the Vienna
Convention.
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falling under the actual scope of the CISG. However, the extent of the CISG’s scope cannot be
completely resolved by considering and interpreting only Article 4. This thesis particularly
considers the wording “except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention,” stated in the
second sentence of Article 4, as the gap-filling device given within the uniform law itself, which
the interpreter can rely on to form the basis for applying the CISG.562 On the one hand, this
clause provides an exception for the CISG to govern certain validity matters and property issues.
On the other hand, it provides the basis for the CISG to govern matters that are not already
explicitly mentioned in Article 4. More importantly, this concept of an equivalent solution,
recognized in the wording of Article 4’s second sentence, requires tribunals to observe and
interpret Article 4 in connection with other relevant provisions. Those relevant rules include, but
are not limited to, provisions relating guidance on the interpretation of laws and the construction
of a contract, and, more importantly, provisions concerning other substantive matters of
obligations and rights to remedies, such as Article 35 and Article 16.563 Secondly, Article 5 is
another provision that expressly makes the CISG irrelevant when a contracting party claims for
death or personal injury to any person caused by the goods. Consequently, it assures the parties
that the CISG will not have any preemptive power over tort rules on claims for those types of
loss, unless the parties voluntarily bring those claims into the scope of the CISG through
contractual terms. Thirdly, Article 7(1) embraces the underlying concepts of giving primary
effect to the uniform rules of the CISG. Undeniably, the Contracting States are bound to apply
the uniform rules if the CISG is applicable. Also, tribunals are required to promote uniformity in
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See also supra note 555 and accompanying text.
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Chapter One sketches out Article 35’s scope of regulations and protections regarding a claim for
delivery of non-conforming goods, and describes Article 16’s protection of the offeree’s reliance on the
offer, as mainly discussed by the scholars. See supra Part I.D (discussing the CISG’s contractual claims in
terms of the scope of regulations and protections).

165

the application of this particular treaty, which was especially unified. Lastly, given that a fully
overlapping situation is where both the CISG and tort law get involved, and each has its own
interest in governing and settling the same alleged matter as described in Part C of this Chapter,
Article 7(2) is thus key to the problem of preemption. Article 7(2) reaffirms the underlying
requirement for uniform law being applicable as the first recourse, and then treating domestic
law as a last resort in filling the internal gap of the CISG’s rules and principles. Such an internal
gap is explained when the CISG governs the alleged issue, but such an issue is not expressly
settled therein. Thus, it follows a fortiori from the hierarchy of norms in solving the internal gap
that CISG’s rules should be given priority in application over the applicable tort law where a
fully overlapping situation occurs. Moreover, such a rule on the hierarchy of norms reflects the
accepted juristic method in all legal systems, providing that the special law has priority in its
application to the same matter over the general law (lex specialis derogat legi generali). This
thesis also believes that Article 7(2), in essence, prevents tribunals from applying both the CISG
and domestic law to an alleged matter when such a matter falls under the CISG’s scope.
B. The Preliminary Stage of Indicating an Inconsistency between Competing Laws
The opinions outlined in this part answer the question of whether we first need to identify
the inconsistency between competing norms.
This thesis aims to find an inconsistency between the Convention and tort law because
the CISG and the applicable law of tort appear not to protect some types of interests sought by
the injured party. Article 5 reflects the situation where there is only one law that has an interest
in compensating losses to the specific kinds of interests incurred by the aggrieved party. Since
Article 5 excludes liability from the CISG’s scope, for death or personal injury caused by the
goods to any person, this means the CISG does not protect such kinds of interests, for which the
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injured party asks. Therefore, the alleged tort liability for death or personal injury is exclusively
governed by the applicable tort law.564 In the case of liability for death and personal injuries, the
CISG is not hindered by permitting tort remedy, because the CISG does not intend to govern the
alleged matters. As a consequence, tort remedy for personal losses suffered from such alleged
liability should not be restricted by the protective rules of the CISG at all. Thus, this thesis
argues that there is no inconsistency between competing laws in the situation where the CISG
rejects protecting particular kinds of interests, and only the law of tort has an interest to
compensate losses with these kinds of interests.
Turning to the ambit of tort law, it appears that there exists a situation where the
applicable tort law does not have an interest to compensate damages in specific types of interests.
In other words, tort law does not protect certain kinds of interests suffering from improper
conduct. As we considered the tortious actions that are typically brought against parties to the
sale contract in Chapter One, we found that US tort laws, in some circumstances, do not intend to
protect pure economic loss sought by parties to the contract for sale. We can see such a refusal to
protect pure economic loss in tort rules on claims alleging (1) product liability for damage to the
goods itself;565 (2) liability for negligent breach of duty under the sales contract; and (3) liability
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Schlechtriem, supra note 272, at 129.
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The EC Member State’s product liability law transplanting the EC product liability directive is a good
example of another legal system’s product liability law, which does not protect damage to the defective
product itself.
Article 9 of the Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 states that
For the purpose of Article 1, ‘damage’ means:
(a) damage caused by death or by personal injuries;
(b) damage to, or destruction of, any item of property other than the defective
product itself, with a lower threshold of 500 ECU, provided that the item of property:
(i) is of a type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption, and
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based on negligent misrepresentation. Likewise, US tort law tends not to recognize (1) liability
based on negligent interference with contract or business relations; (2) liability for conversion
against the buyer’s act of withholding his payment; and (3) liability for tortious breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
By the same reasoning, when applicable tort law does not have an interest in its content
to compensate economic loss or to grant the injured party the protection in other cases
exemplified above, we do not find an inconsistency between the CISG and applicable tort law. It
is thus not necessary to take a further step to consider the existence of fully overlapping
situations to apply the CISG in a way so as to exclude such tort remedies. Accordingly, the
alleged matter must be exclusively governed by the realm of contract law for international sales,
particularly the CISG. In other words, tribunals must then consider whether a fully overlapping
situation is established, and the CISG thus subsumes tort claims only in the case where tort law
grants the injured party the protection of interest for which he asks, or protection against the
alleged tortious conduct. These protected interests could be damages to other property, or the
economic loss recognized under limited circumstances or permitted in particular causes of
action.
(ii) was used by the injured person mainly for his own private use or
consumption.
This Article shall be without prejudice to national provisions relating to nonmaterial damage.
Cf. Council Directive on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of
the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products (85/374/EEC), 25 July, 1985 (1985),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31985L0374&from=EN (last visited
Aug. 20, 2020).
However, in practice, there may be a limited range of cases where the realm of the EC product liability
directive interacts with the CISG, because most claims relating to consumer contracts available under the
EC directive are excluded from the CISG by virtue of Article 2(a).
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It is important to clarify that this thesis does not propose this analysis to perform the
function of an “interest analysis” under choice of law rules—that is, to locate which of the
various domestic laws apply. As noted in Chapter Three, the interrelation between the CISG and
national law of tort does not present a conflict of laws in the traditional sense. The analysis made
to indicate the inconsistency between the Convention and tort law is not the same kind of
“interest analysis” dealing with cases of conflict between the same level of national laws to find
whose law applies between the forum law or the law of the foreign country. According to the
analysis outlined above, after locating the relevant tort law that applies to the alleged tort
claim,566 tribunals should first consider the scope of tort law to see whether such an alleged
matter of tort is available or recognized within the scope of the applicable tort law. Since the first
step, in indicating the inconsistency between competing laws, is to ascertain whether the factual
situation essentially presents an interest that the applicable tort law wants to protect, this analysis
is somewhat comparable to the conflict-of-law approach of an “interest analysis.”567 However,
this thesis interprets this concept of interest in the narrow sense, which is restricted to the
consideration of the content of the laws or the substantive scope of two laws competing for
application. Also, this proposed analysis of indicating the inconsistency is based on a unilateral
interpretation of the scope of competing laws. It is premised on seeking a personal or territorial
reach of the uniform law and the applicable law of tort, in order to ascertain whether both norms
are promulgated to govern the alleged matter or not.
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The law which is indicated as an applicable law governing the issue in dispute depends on the conflictof-law approach adopted within the forum’s private international law.
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See Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271, 284–86 (1996).
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C. The Criteria for Considering the Establishment of Fully Overlapping Situations
This part provides opinions on what the criteria is for considering the establishment of
fully overlapping situations in a particular case, which would preclude a concurrent remedy
under tort law.
As we saw in Chapter Three, some proponents who support the idea of a moderate level
of preemption still take the position of allowing for the right to concurring tort claims even in a
fully overlapping situation. Instead of replacing the alleged tort claim in a case presenting such
an overlapping situation, such views suggest an alternative way to prevent an inadvertent
circumvention on the CISG’s rules and objectives. To this end, they submit a partial preemption
of tort remedy, permitting the right to a concurring tort claim in the case of a fully overlapping
situation, coupled with the method of modifying ancillary rules in tort to the protective rules of
the CISG as a matter of policy.
By considering a policy of attaining the CISG’s aims, coupled with the doctrinal
perspective discussed in Part A, this thesis adopts a different position regarding the degree of
preemptive force in case of a fully overlapping situation. Inasmuch as the Contracting States
place great value on the objectives of the CISG’s fundamental rules and are willing to reach such
a goal of establishing a fair balance between the conflicting interests of both parties and
achieving the development of international trade when ratifying or acceding to the Convention,
this thesis suggests that the alleged tort claim should be subsumed under the CISG when a fully
overlapping situation is established.568 Accordingly, the party is barred from relying on tort
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Nevertheless, this thesis submits that if tribunals do not adopt this view of replacing tort claims, they
should at least give the effect of the CISG’s protective regulations by modifying tort rules to adhere with
those protective regulations.
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remedy. If reverting to tort remedy under the domestic law of torts is permitted in a fully
overlapping situation, the uniform law’s purpose of creating a fair balance between the rights and
duties of the business seller and those of the commercial buyer will be completely impaired. It is
undeniable that the drafters did not intend such impairment because it destroys all attempts that
had occurred throughout a half-century. Another rationale for supporting such an effect on the
alleged tort claim is that both parties to the international sales contract should have no concern
about an impediment to trade and commerce due to the imposition of an unduly heavy and
uncertain burden of tortious liability. Thus, giving the CISG a full preemption of tort remedy in a
fully overlapping situation helps to achieve its goal to facilitate the development of trade. It
encourages a bargained-for exchange and prevents the business parties from liability beyond
their expectations that they intentionally dealt with through the arrangement of the contractual
relationship with equal bargaining power. At this point, it is to be critically noted that a full
preemption of tort remedy in a fully overlapping situation does not mean that when the CISG
applies, there can be no tort remedy at all in cases brought under the CISG. This thesis defines
and interprets a fully overlapping situation in a narrow sense, that such situations must be
considered on a case-by-case basis, as proposed in this part. Clearly stated, this thesis proposes to
interpret a fully overlapping situation in accordance with the principle of acknowledging the
CISG’s substantive scope, reflecting that both competing norms applicable to the dispute in a
single case entirely overlap, and the alleged matter of tort falls under the CISG scope.
Before analyzing the establishment of a fully overlapping situation, this part begins with
emphasizing party autonomy and placing high value on the contractual terms as an integral part
of the CISG.
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As a starting point, this thesis proposes that the international sales contract has a
considerable influence on the establishment of a fully overlapping situation. Although the CISG
is a special law promulgated to govern international sales, it still adopts the theory of party
autonomy. It respects the parties’ intention to determine their legal relationship insofar as this
exercise of freedom, especially between two sophisticated commercial parties, does not violate
mandatory rules or public policy of the relevant countries. This thesis thus suggests that the
contract should be treated as part of the CISG and has the preemptive force over tort remedy to
the same degree as those that the CISG’s default rules enjoy. Treating the contractual terms as
part of the CISG is consistent with the principle of observing good faith in international trade
when interpreting the CISG’s default rules. Thus, tribunals must consider both the CISG and the
contract itself to identify the contractual duties regulated and the protection of contractual
interests granted by international sales instruments. As a consequence, any duties generally
imposed by other laws, particularly the law of torts, will be considered as a contractual duty
arising out of an international sales contract when the CISG’s rules or the contractual terms also
embrace that duty into the realm of the parties’ contemplation. Let us consider the example of a
case where the parties contractually agree to impose the general duty not to act in the way that
the parties’ behavior falls below the standard of care and to bring such a duty to the parties’
contemplation when entering into the contract. In this event, the parties can incorporate clauses
into the contract, explicitly imposing on the parties the duty to observe a standard of care in
performing contractual obligations in order to prevent unpleasant conduct. On the one hand, the
parties may intentionally impose such liability based on fault alongside other strict liability
clauses under the CISG. Alternatively, the parties can agree to enforce liability only for breach of
a contractual duty with fault. To this effect, we could argue that the CISG and sale contract have
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already embraced liability for negligent conduct, so that such a matter of negligent breach falls
under the CISG’s scope.
In sum, given that contractual term is an integral part of the CISG, this thesis thus
submits that regard must be had to the international sales contract itself when considering
whether there exists a fully overlapping situation. In other words, tribunals must consider
whether parties voluntarily address in their contract what kind of conduct is to be regulated and
in what way to regulate such conduct, or to assume/allocate risks which one party incurs due to
the other party’s failure to perform the alleged obligation. It is then to be determined whether
such an agreed remedial solution is adequately equivalent to, or entirely overlaps with, the
solution provided by the law of torts.
Then this thesis proposes that a fully overlapping is established in two situations, which
are as follows:
First, a fully overlapping is established where the allegation of concurring tort claim
makes it clear that such a claim is entirely and solely rooted in the CISG and sale contract. Stated
another way, the allegation of tort claim is duplicative of the alleged breach of contract claim.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6),569 on pleading, also supports the finding of
this fully overlapping claim. Rule 12(b)(6) grants the party the right to assert the defense by a
motion to dismiss, for failure to state a cognizable claim upon which relief can be granted. That
is to say, despite rights to plead alternative statements of a claim and state separate claims under
FRCP 8(d)(2)(3),570 a failure to satisfy the federal pleading requirement on the alleged tort claim
is presumed to establish the first situation of full overlap. The reason for such criterion in order
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FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(2)(3).
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to find this fully overlapping situation is that it is unacceptable to permit parties to recharacterize the same set of facts alleged in a contractual claim as a non-contractual matter of
tort liability, which is, in general, not covered by the Convention. Besides, given that the factual
situations alleged in supporting tort claims are wholly predicated upon the same conduct
regulated or duty imposed by the CISG or contract itself, it is irrational to apply tort law with the
presumption against the CISG’s preemption of tort remedy. Still, this thesis emphasizes that the
CISG’s substantive scope must be principally taken into consideration when considering whether
the allegation of tort claim is rooted in the CISG, thereby holding that the CISG preempts such
an alleged claim due to the existence of this fully overlapping situation. Stated clearly, the mere
classification of a claim as a contract according to the forum’s law on characterization is not a
decisive criterion to establish this fully overlapping situation. From the viewpoint of this thesis,
the decisions of Caterpillar, Inc.571 and Electrocraft Ark., Inc.572 on the CISG’s preemption of
the immediate buyer’s promissory estoppel action and the CISG’s preemptive effect on the
alleged negligence/strict liability claim, respectively, could be seen as illustrative examples of
the existence of this fully overlapping situation, as suggested above.
Second, another fully overlapping situation is presented where the alleged tortious
obligation and respective interest protected under tort law are the same as the duty imposed and

571

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 681–82 (N.D. Ill. 2005); see supra Section
III.B.3.2.
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Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
120183, at *17–18 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009). Cf. Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Level 8
Apparel, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688, at *42–49 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014) (performing its
analysis, which was made on the CISG’s preemption of a counterclaim for breach of an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and the preemption of a claim for fraudulent inducement, in the same way
as the analysis made in Electrocraft Ark., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120183). See supra Section
III.B.4.1.
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the object of legal protection granted by the CISG and the sale contract in dispute. This second
situation of full overlap is presumably established even if the allegation of tort claim is not solely
rooted in the CISG and sale contract, or if it is not duplicative of the allegation of the contractual
claim. Instead, it centers on the elements of the tort claim under the applicable tort law, and does
not fail to identify sufficient facts to state the claim to relief that is plausible on its face. In other
words, the separate alleged factual situations supporting tort claims appear to be primarily rooted
in the regulations and the respective protections under the applicable tort law. Nevertheless, as
long as the alleged tort claim could also be settled by the CISG, which regulates similar conduct
and protects the same interest, a fully overlapping situation is presented. It could be said that the
criteria for considering the establishment of this second situation of a full overlap are (1) the
existence of the same duty imposed by competing norms–the regulation goal; and (2) the
presence of the same object of legal protection under competing norms–the protection goal.
Insofar as these two goals can be reached by applying the CISG’s rules to the alleged matter of
tort, such a matter essentially falls under the CISG’s scope, and there is no need to apply the
domestic law of tort to such alleged matters in this fully overlapping situation.
In finding whether the second situation of fully overlapping is established, tribunals are
then faced with the essential task of considering whether the duty imposed, and type of interest
for which the injured party asks for protection under tort law, are the same as the duty
established and interest protected within the realm of the CISG. As noted earlier, whether a full
overlap is established must be considered on a case-by-case basis, since tribunals inevitably need
to consider factual situations concerned in a single case.573 This thesis comes up with some basic
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For instance, factual situations are especially critical for indicating incidents of a fully overlapping
situation related to promissory estoppel, as demonstrated in Chapter One. See supra Sections I.B.2, I.D.2.
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ideas about when both norms are deemed to share the protection of the same interest and to
impose an identical duty.
As for the object of legal protection, this thesis submits that the CISG and the sales
contract are typically designed to protect economic loss. Thus, it is most likely that the interest of
pure economic loss limitedly protected by tort law can no longer be deemed as an extracontractual interest that is distinct from the similar interest protected under the CISG. On the
contrary, tort law typically protects the interest of safety in life, limb, and property other than the
contracted goods themselves. Thus, these types of interests are generally considered as extracontractual interests, irrespective of whether the party has a contractual relationship or not.
Nonetheless, there is an exception that the types of interests protected by tort law may no longer
be deemed as extra-contractual interests that are distinct from the same kind of interest protected
by the CISG. Such an exception could only be made when it is proved that the parties, at the time
of the conclusion of the contract, foresee or ought to have foreseen the possibility of suffering
losses to those kinds of interests, such as losses to other property that is separate from harm to
the contracted goods themselves. Thus, the parties are deemed to have the CISG’s rules and
contract, rather than tort law, protect such interests, particularly property interests. Taking the
cases suggested in the CISG-AC Opinion No. 12 as an example, where the parties foresee or
ought to have foreseen the possibility of suffering damages to property which is “attached to the
goods, or with which the goods are combined or commingled, or which are processed by the
goods, in the normal course of business or in the course of normal use.”574 Thus, the protection
of damages to such property is no longer considered as one of the extra-contractual interests.
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CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 3.2.
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Let us now turn to consider the existence of the identical duty imposed under the CISG.
This thesis then takes the duty to inform with accurate information as a demonstration of the case
where both the CISG and tort regulate the same duty. If the injured party alleged a claim of
breach of tortious duty to inform true information, namely a claim for innocent
misrepresentation, this thesis would submit that such a duty, which is imposed without the
element of fault under tort law, is the same as the duty imposed by the CISG on the seller as long
as the misrepresentation relates to, but is not limited to (1) the nature and quality of the goods;
(2) the suitability for use or the functions of products for a particular purpose; and (3) the skill
and ability of the seller. However, the element of negligent conduct or fraud required by tort law
generally makes particular tortious duty distinct from the duty owed under the CISG, unless the
CISG’s rules or the binding contract are interpreted to impose upon the breaching party a duty to
not commit negligent conduct or act in a dishonest manner.
All in all, the allegation of a claim brought by one party seeking the protection of
contractual interest against the other party’s breach of contractual duty falls under the scope of
the CISG. When it is so obvious that the allegation of tort claim is duplicative of the allegation of
a claim for breach of a contractual duty, the fully overlapping is presented. Similarly, if the CISG
provides the remedial solution that is adequately equivalent to or entirely overlaps with the
solution which is provided for the alleged claim under tort law, another fully overlapping
situation arises and thus leads to the CISG’s preemption of a tort claim.
D. The Secondary Roles of Domestic Rules and Approaches in the Disputes concerning the
CISG’s Preemption of Tort Claims
This part considers the role of domestic rules and approaches in disputes concerning the
CISG’s preemption of tort claims.
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This thesis argues that the problem of the CISG’s preemption or the interaction between
the CISG and domestic tort law is not the same as concurrent claims in contract and tort arising
from a purely domestic dispute. Such a preemption problem coming out of the transnational sales
governed by the CISG must be considered as distinct from the problem of concurrency arising
out of claims within a single domestic legal system. When the CISG gets involved, the answer to
the question of its preemption of tort remedy should not be provided differently, depending on
the legal tradition dealing with the issue of concurrent claims followed within the realm of
national law. It would be ill-suited and out of place if tribunals directly apply different domestic
laws and approaches in dealing with the problem of concurrent claims to issues of interaction
between the Convention and tort law. As suggested above, the CISG’s rules, the autonomous and
dynamic method of interpretation, and the notion of granting the CISG preemptive force in a
fully overlapping situation, are the key to dealing with the question of whether the CISG
preempts domestic tort claims. Theoretically, it is nevertheless suggested that domestic laws and
approaches of either contract or tort perform their subordinate roles in several aspects. From the
viewpoint of this thesis, allowing those rules to serve secondary functions for only specific
purposes would comply with the drafters’ intention to leave some matters indirectly related to
transnational sales in the area of domestic laws. Also, applying domestic laws and bringing those
laws into play, in a limited way for which they advocate, would not negate the CISG’s objectives
and functions altogether. Under the proposed approach of acknowledging the substantive scope
and aims of the CISG, domestic rules and approaches are optimally applied as a supplement for
four different but related purposes, as discussed subsequently.
Firstly, the forum rules and doctrines on characterization could be applied, for the
purpose of private international law, when tribunals engage in the preliminary stage of
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characterization, and thereby locate the applicable domestic law for the alleged claim. However,
when the alleged claim is classified as a tort, this does not mean the tort claim is always
considered to be outside the CISG’s scope and is thus governed by applicable tort law. That is to
say, the domestic qualification of a claim under private international laws is not determinative in
deciding whether the CISG displaces such alleged claims under domestic law. Applying the
forum’s law through the characterization process to decide the question of the CISG’s
preemption/concurrency may lead to a distortion of either the CISG as the applicable law to the
contractual claim, or the foreign law applicable to the alleged tort claim.575 Thus, tribunals must
additionally follow the opinions suggested under the proposed approach and apply the
mechanisms stated in Parts A, B, and C when considering the issue of the CISG’s
preemption/concurrency.
Secondly, domestic tort laws are applicable in considering whether an inconsistency
emerges between the CISG and tort law. That is, domestic tort law helps with determining
whether there is inconsistency between two competing norms. In doing so, tribunals must take
into account the elements of tort claim as required by the applicable tort law to see whether the
applicable tort law protects a particular kind of interest which the plaintiff seeks, such as
economic loss. To this end, the economic loss rules adopted within a particular jurisdiction, like
the US, would be relevant to determine whether the applicable domestic tort law restricts the
scope of interest to be protected under tort law.
Thirdly, tribunals apply domestic laws to determine the existence of a fully overlapping
situation. As suggested above, one fully overlapping situation is where the allegation of tort
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This view is supported by the discussions and opinions regarding the possible approaches to parallel
claims arising outside the realm of the CISG. Cf. FAWCETT, HARRIS & BRIDGE, supra note 242, ¶¶ 20.28–
.52, at 1203–13.
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claim makes it clear that such a claim is duplicative of the breach of contract claim and is, in
essence, a CISG-based claim falling under the CISG’s scope. Regarding the first fully
overlapping situation aforementioned, tribunals must first take into account domestic procedural
rules on pleading together with the supplement of rules on characterization, when determining
whether the statement of claim duplicates the breach of contract claim and thus falls under the
CISG’s scope. Another fully overlapping situation, as suggested above, is where the CISG and
the applicable tort law share an equivalent solution to the alleged matter. Thus, a consideration of
domestic tort law is required to find what tortious duty and its respective protection of interest
are, and whether the two aspects are adequately equivalent to the duty imposed and the
respective protection granted under the CISG.
Lastly, once it is established that the CISG does not exclude the concurring tort claim,
tribunals then apply the domestic law of torts to decide the validity or actionability of concurrent
tort claims and the merits of the case. However, when considering the merits, ancillary rules in
tort might be modified to the protective rules of the CISG, contingent upon the fulfillment of the
condition put forward, as stated in the following Part F.
In sum, tribunals can apply domestic laws and approaches in several aspects, as explained
above. However, tribunals must keep in mind that under the proposed approach, they are
principally required to adhere to the CISG’s substantive scope and its aims in making a
conclusive decision on the problem of its preemption of the alleged tort claim.
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E. The Effect of Exculpatory Clauses on Tort Claims
This part turns to the effect of exculpatory clauses on tort claims.
The issue of the effect of an exculpatory clause576 on tort claims arises only when the
CISG does not displace the concurring tort action. In a fully overlapping situation where the
legal consequence leads to the exclusion of tort claim, there is no need to determine the effect of
the exculpatory clause on the tort claim.
When parties agree on a disclaimer of contract liability, it is questioned whether such a
disclaimer clause is permitted and could be raised as a defense to exclude or limit contractual
liability. Another question is whether such a disclaimer is enforceable. Although Article 6
explicitly allows parties to vary the effect of the provisions that subject the breaching party to
contractual liability, it does not state anything about the enforceability or validity of the terms
purporting to exclude or limit a party’s liability in contract. This thesis agrees with the scholarly
opinion that the validity of disclaimer clauses excluding or limiting liability in contract is
excluded from the CISG’s scope by Article 4(a), and is thus left to domestic law, which is
located by private international law.577
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Please note that the word ‘exculpatory clause’ referred to in this thesis refers to a contractual clause
completely excluding the party’s liability, and a term limiting the types or the scope of the remedy.
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See also Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V. v. Ken M. Spooner Farms, Inc., No. C05-5538FDB, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 31262, at *3–7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 12, 2006) (following this view and applied domestic law
to decide whether an exculpatory clause is valid); see CISG-AC Opinion No. 17, Limitation and
Exclusion Clauses in CISG Contracts, Rapporteur: Prof. Lauro Gama Jr., Pontifical Catholic University
of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Adopted by the CISG-AC following its 21st meeting in Bogotá, Colombia, on
16 October 2015 r. 4(a) cmts. 4.1–.8,
http://cisgac.com/file/repository/CISG_Advisory_Council_Opinion_No_17.pdf (last visited Aug. 20,
2020) [hereinafter CISG-AC Opinion No. 17].
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Likewise, when parties agree on the exclusion of a tort remedy, a critical question is
whether liability in tort may be excluded or restricted by a contractual clause.578 Since neither the
wording of Article 6, nor the principle underlying the CISG, deals with the parties’ right to sign a
waiver of tort remedies, the issue of the effect that such a waiver of tort has on tort action is
outside the CISG’s scope and is subject to domestic law. Similarly, Article 4(a) excludes the
validity of the contractual clauses purporting to exclude or limit a party’s liability in tort from the
CISG’s scope. Such a validity issue is thus subject to domestic law. When both issues are left to
domestic law, it appears to create the conflict-of-law problem that requires application of private
international law in locating the applicable laws to determine those issues. In that regard, there
exists one approach that is in the interest of this thesis. Such a view proposes that while the
applicable contract law governs the validity of the waiver clause, the issue of whether tort claims
could be excluded or limited is governed by the applicable tort law.579 Accordingly, the laws of
different countries may govern two such separate but related issues mentioned above, leading to
dépeçage.580 It may follow that the exculpatory clause purporting to exclude or limit tort liability,
as a contractual defense, is valid under lex loci contractus; however, it is prohibited by lex loci
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We can see the example of Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V., which shows that the parties agreed to an
exculpatory clause explicitly releasing the seller from both contractual liability and liability based on tort
law. However, the injured party did not allege a tort claim in this case. See Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V.,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31262, at *7–8.
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FAWCETT, HARRIS & BRIDGE, supra note 242, ¶¶ 20.53–.58, at 1213–16; see P. M. North, Contract as
a Tort Defence in the Conflict of Laws, 26 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 914, 920–21, 931 (1977).
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The concept of dépeçage is defined broadly under the conflict-of-law theory to cover situations where
tribunals apply different laws of different countries to determine different issues in a single case brought
in a multistate dispute. See Willis L. M. Reese, Dépeçage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 58, 58, 75 (1973).
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delicti or vice versa.581 To this effect, this thesis argues that tort liability is still maintained in two
situations. First, the applicable law of contract invalidates the exclusion or limitation of tort
liability on grounds such as unconscionability582 or violation of public policy.583 Second, even
though the applicable law of contract (lex loci contractus ) validates the exculpatory clause, tort
liability is maintained when the applicable tort law (lex loci delicti), on the other hand, denies
giving the effect of a waiver of tort remedy. This thesis agrees with applying different laws to
these issues because the admissibility of a waiver as a defense on tort liability is separate from
the validity of the contractual term. Granting legal effect to a waiver of tort claim would intrude
into the tort law of a certain country. Therefore, the internal law of tort regarding the
admissibility of a disclaimer as a defense on tortious action must be considerably respected. That
is to say, when it appears that the mandatory law of tort prohibits any agreement purporting to
exclude liability for a particular claim in tort, this vital policy underlying such a mandatory rule
outweighs the parties’ bargain of interest in the allocation of their risks.
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The tribunals would not envisage such a conflict of the legal outcomes as mentioned if they adopted
the different approaches, which prefer applying one law to deal with the effect of exemption clauses on
tortious liability. See North, supra note 579, at 920–21.
582

See U.C.C. §§ 2-302, 2-719 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31262, at *4–7.
583

See 100 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Columbia Town Ctr. Title Co., 430 Md. 197, 234–37 (2013) (applying
Maryland law, which generally enforces the exculpatory clause. However, this court also specified three
exceptions to the general rule permitting exculpatory clauses. Those exceptions are mainly based on
public policy concerns, which invalidate exculpatory clauses when they are otherwise applicable); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (recognizing public policies
that underlie exceptions to the general rule permitting term exempting from liability); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 196 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (particularly stating a rule controlling a
contractual term that precludes a party from asserting any claims for misrepresentation given based on
tort). See generally S. Harrison Williams, Consumers and Remedies: Do Limitation of Liability Clauses
Do More Harm than Good?, 65 S. C. L. REV. 663 (2014) (proposing a new test comparable to the
liquidated damages test under the Restatement (second) of Contracts. It is suggested that this new test
would avoid the burdensome considerations of unconscionability and public policy when determining
whether a limitation of liability clause is enforceable).
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The last question regarding the effect of the exculpatory clause is whether the contractual
clause legally purporting to exclude or limit a party’s liability in contract affects tort action. To
resolve this question, the method of interpretation of a contract is of significant relevance. The
CISG recognizes the freedom of contract doctrine. Under such a doctrine, parties are free to
allocate their particular risks arising from international trade in a particular way. In some
circumstances, it may be required to prevent the plaintiff from suing in a parallel tort claim to get
around the exclusion or limitation of liability arising out of the contract. Thus, it could be the
case that a contractual term purporting to exclude or limit a party’s contractual liability may be
interpreted to reflect the parties’ actual intent to exclude or limit either contractual liability under
the CISG or plausible concurrent liability in tort (emphasis added).584 This thesis, however,
submits that without an express statement or conduct indicating the parties’ true intention, the
outcome of the interpretation cannot be reached in a way so as to exclude or limit tort liability.585
Clearly stated, a disclaimer clause purporting to exclude or limit liability in contract is not
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Compared to domestic laws and approaches to the right to concurrent claims, it is clear that the
applicable English tort rule denies imposing a tortious duty of care on the defendant if it is inconsistent
with what has been agreed upon by the parties. See, e.g., Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd., [2011]
EWCA Civ 9; [2012] QB 44 (CA) 63 (appeal taken from Eng.). However, it is not apparent that US
courts refuse to impose a tortious duty of care, which is inconsistent with the contractual arrangement.
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In light of Articles 8 and 9 stating rules of contract interpretation, and Article 11 recognizing proof of
the existence of contractual terms by any means, it is submitted that the CISG rejects common law rules
of the plain meaning, four corners, and parol evidence in contract interpretation. See CISG-AC Opinion
No. 3, Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule, Contractual Merger Clause and the CISG, 23 October
2004. Rapporteur: Professor Richard Hyland, Rutgers Law School, Camden, NJ, USA. Adopted by the
CISG-AC on its 7th meeting in Madrid with no dissent r. 1–3, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISGAC-op3.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2020) [hereinafter CISG-AC Opinion No. 3]; see also CISG-AC
Opinion No. 17, supra note 577, r. 1 cmts. 1.16–.17, 1.20–.21. Thus, this thesis submits that the indication
of the parties’ true intention covers the statement used in an entire contract and some sort of statement or
conduct extrinsic to the contract itself. Cf. Clements Auto Co. v. Serv. Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 178–
79, 181 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that a disclaimer of warranty is ineffective to negate reliance on false
representations made with or without intent to deceive. Besides, this court took the view that Minnesota
tort law would be distorted if the court held that “under the U.C.C., an action for fraud, based on innocent
misrepresentation, could not be maintained where the contract validly disclaimed all warranties”).
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autonomously treated as a means for excluding or limiting tort remedy, unless the parties’ intent
to that effect is found.586 To this effect, the fundamental rule of contract granting the effect to the
parties’ mutual consent would be truly sustained. The breaching party cannot argue that party
autonomy is weakened by creating an ignorance of the exculpatory clause and thereby granting
the plaintiff the right to remedy under tort law. Further, this thesis suggests that the disclaimer
clause being interpreted to exclude tort liability must be subject to the domestic law of tort on the
admissibility/availability of such clause as a defense on tortious action.
In dealing with the effect of an exculpatory clause, one should bear in mind that the
applicable law governing the issue of the validity of contractual clause is one of the areas on
which the law of one country may not be typical of all laws on a global scale. For example, US
law is extremely committed to the general principle of party autonomy, to the point that the
parties to the contract, even a contract with a consumer,587 are generally allowed to waive their
right to all remedies with some limited exceptions.588 Therefore, there is a strong likelihood that
tribunals will grant legal force to exculpatory clauses under US law. On the contrary, when other
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See Schlechtriem, supra note 425, at 80.
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See Williams, supra note 583 (discussing the decision of Gladden v. Boykin, 402 S.C. 140 (2013),
which reviewed a limitation of liability clause according to the contentions of unconscionability and
conflict with public policy).
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See Trinity Indus. v. McKinnon Bridge Co., 77 S.W.3d 159 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the
contractual provision between sophisticated business parties, who possess equal bargaining power when
providing for a limited repair-and-replace remedy, is enforceable); see also Fifth Third Leasing Co. v.
Cherokee Pontiac, No. E2001-01628-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Ct. App. Mar. 13,
2002) (holding that the contractual clause excluding consequential damages in an arms-length contract
between the parties is enforceable); Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V. v. Ken M. Spooner Farms, Inc., No.
C05-5538FDB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31262 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 12, 2006) (primarily treating
exclusionary clauses incorporated in a commercial transaction as presumably enforceable unless two
types of unconscionability are established); 100 Inv. Ltd. P’ship, 430 Md. at 232–37 (stating that under
Maryland law, exculpatory clauses are generally valid insofar as they are consistent with the public policy
underlying the principle of freedom to contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (AM. LAW
INST. 1965) (stating a rule on an express assumption of the risk of harm arising from negligent or reckless
conduct).
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systems adhere less to the principle of party autonomy, in comparison with the US system, the
disclaimer clause agreed upon might be invalidated by such foreign law applicable to the
contract. With respect to the issue of the validity of the disclaimer clause, one should also keep
in mind that such an issue could be solved by the non-binding UNIDROIT Principles,589 if they
are the applicable law chosen by the parties. One way to reach a uniform outcome to the validity
issue is to advise parties to agree to the UNIDROIT Principles, which are widely recognized as
the general principles of international commercial contracts governing the question of validity.
More importantly, this thesis agrees with the method suggested by the CISG Advisory Council
Opinion, stating that the validity tests to exculpatory clauses under the otherwise applicable law
still need to be interpreted and applied in accordance with international standards and principles
of the CISG.590 Those include not only the distinctive priority of freedom of contract but also the
standard of fairness in international trade, the autonomous concept of fundamental breach, and
the principle of reasonableness. Apart from promoting uniformity in the application of the CISG,
this suggestion maintains the international character of the CISG and supports the observance of
good faith in international trade.
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The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016 (PICC) provides some
substantive rules for validity issues such as fraud, gross disparity, the validity of exemption clauses
limiting or excluding liability for non-performance, and the validity of liquidated damages for nonperformance. See UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016,
https://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2016/principles2016-e.pdf (last visited
Aug. 25, 2020) [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles 2016].
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See CISG-AC Opinion No. 17, supra note 577, r. 4(b).
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F. The Possibility of Modifying Ancillary Tort Rules When a Concurrent Tort Claim Is
Permitted
When it turns out that the CISG does not displace the competing tort claim, it seems
justifiable to apply whatever rules in tort appear favorable to the injured party. However, the
policy concern is raised over whether the right to rely on the parallel claim in tort is a way to get
around the prerequisites for, or restrictions on, exercising the right to remedies required by the
CISG. Thus, it seems rationally persuasive to modify some ancillary rules in tort to the CISG’s
protective regulations, which are aimed at putting a prerequisite for, or restriction on, exercising
the right to remedies under the CISG. The reason is that those regulatory provisions are
uniformly formulated to guarantee fairness in the relationship under international trade and
allocate risks to the parties’ interests in various appropriate ways. Those protective regulations
include fundamental rules on the (1) requirement of notice, (2) test for the scope of recoverable
consequential damages, (3) exemptions from liability provided by the CISG, and (4) duty to
mitigate the loss. Thus, it is worth considering the extent of such fundamental rules, and the core
concepts underlying these rules.
1. The Requirement of Notice591
The notification is considered a crucial concept in protecting the benefits of the trader,
who needs to know where he stands so he can avoid any possible losses or expenses. Article 39
imposes a technical duty to give notice, specifying the nature of defect or the non-conformity of
goods, to the seller. It further provides that the buyer must give notice within a reasonable time
after he has discovered the lack of conformity or ought to have discovered it. The primary

591

Article 39 of the CISG is arguably one of the most distinctive CISG features. See Schroeter, supra note
427, at 553.
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purpose of the notification requirement is to allow the seller to do what he must do in case of
non-conformity. For instance, the seller would be able to remedy the lack of conformity, conduct
his own examination of the goods, and gather all evidence required to defend against the buyer’s
evidence in his allegation of a lack of conformity.592 If the buyer fails to provide the required
notice, this regulation protects the seller by cutting off the buyer’s right to all remedies provided
under the CISG.593 Such deprivation of the buyer’s remedies allows the seller to regard the sale
transaction as the final relationship, thereby relieving the seller from keeping records and
evidence at hand for a certain period of time, in order to defend himself against potential claims
from the buyer.594
It is also important to note that, in any event, the buyer must give notice no later than two
years from the date on which the goods were actually handed over to the buyer. The two-year
limitation signifies the drafters’ intent to protect the seller’s rights not only to obtain the timely
evidence in the dispute, but also to pursue any claim against the person who may be liable to the
seller for his supplies or manufacturing.595 Given the purposes this notice requirement serves, it
is a fundamental defense provided under the uniform law, and is thereby typically raised to
restrict the buyer’s right to remedies in case of liability for delivery of non-conforming goods.
Thus, we should be particularly aware of its prominence when permitting concurrent tort claims
that are closely related to a contractual claim for lack of conformity of the goods. One way to
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sustain this fundamental regulation is to put this same restriction on the right to such a parallel
tort remedy. The condition and reasons for an adjustment made to tort rules will be further
discussed in Section Five.
2. The Test for the Scope of Recoverable Consequential Damages
The right to damages provided by the CISG is subject to the test of foreseeability under
Article 74. This Article defines the scope of recoverable consequential damages available under
the CISG and sets forth the basic rule for the calculation of damages.596 Article 74 is based on
the concept of placing the injured party in the same position which he would have been in, had
the contract been fully performed. Under Article 74, the injured party can recover damages as a
sum equal to the loss suffered as a consequence of any breach of obligations, including loss of
profit. Importantly, the parties’ foreseeability at the time when concluding the contract draws the
extent of damages granted. That is, recoverable damages may not exceed “the loss which the
party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in
the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible
consequence of the breach of contract.”597 This suggests that the test of the breaching party’s
foreseeability under Article 74 primarily intends to allocate risks of loss between the parties to
the international sales, not a stranger. When both the CISG and the law of tort share the protected
interest, particularly economic interest, this thesis argues that it makes sense to apply the same
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rule as Article 74 so as to limit the extent of damages for which the injured contracting party
asks, based on tort remedy.
3. The Exemptions from Liability Provided by the CISG
Another protection given for the parties in case of a breach is an exemption from liability.
This part will address the defense of the exemption from liability based on three main grounds.
Let us begin with the defense of impediment to performance, which is most frequently raised and
discussed among scholars. Article 79(1) exempts the breaching party from liability to pay
damages for failure to perform any of his obligations in the case of impediment (emphasis
added). However, it does not prevent the other party from exercising his right to other remedies
he might have, such as the appropriate remedy of the declaration of avoidance. In relying on such
an exemption, the breaching party must prove that non-performance was due to “an impediment
beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment
into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract, or to have avoided or overcome it, or
its consequences.”598 As we realized, the underlying premise of liability for lack of conformity
under Article 35 requires for the seller to be responsible for non-conformity by virtue of
contractual arrangements, irrespective of his fault in the delivery of defective goods.599 However,
it is submitted that Article 79 essentially constitutes an exception to the concept of strict liability
for non-performance of the contractual obligation under the CISG.600 Secondly, Article 80
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exempts one party from responsibility for all kinds of remedies, where the cause of nonperformance is attributable to some extent to the other party. Article 80, based on the principle of
comparative fault, prevents the injured party from relying on the other party’s breach of duty to
the extent that the former’s act or omission causes such failure to perform. Thirdly, Article 35(3)
particularly grants the exemption from liability for breach of implied warranties specified under
Article 35(2). Such an exclusion of liability is allowed when the buyer knew or could not have
been unaware of such a lack of conformity at the time of the contract’s conclusion. This same
basis of exemption applies to the case of a breach due to a third-party right or claim.601 In sum, it
should be stressed here that the defense of those exemptions from liability is granted based on
the concept of assigning risks to the party who should bear those risks. Permitting a parallel tort
claim notwithstanding a successful proof of those exemptions would make this concept of
assigning risks to the right person meaningless, especially where tort remedy is closely linked to
the protections under the CISG.
4. The Duty to Mitigate the Loss
It should be noted, too, that besides being granted the defense of exclusions from liability
for damages or other remedies explained above, the breaching party is provided with the right to
claim a reduction in the damages claimed, when the aggrieved party fails to mitigate avoidable
losses. Under Article 77, the aggrieved party must fulfill the duty to undertake possible and

http://www.cisgac.com/file/repository/CISG_Advisory_Council_Opinion_No_7.pdf (last visited Aug. 25,
2020) [hereinafter CISG-AC Opinion No. 7] (taking the view that the wording of “a failure to perform
any of his obligations” is interpreted to include a breach of duty to deliver conforming goods). But see
HONNOLD, supra note 163, at 477–78 (taking the opposing view that the seller may benefit from the
defense of impediment where the buyer brings claims against him for failure to perform any of his
obligations, rather than a claim for delivering defective goods).
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Please see the seller’s duty to deliver goods free from a third-party right or claim as imposed under
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reasonable measures to prevent or mitigate loss arising from the breach. The aggrieved party
must take steps as may be reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate all losses that are not
limited to loss of profit resulting from the breach. Otherwise, the breaching party can reduce
damages by the amount in which the loss should have been mitigated. Even if tort law that is
developed within a single nation has its own rule on mitigation of damages, this thesis argues
that for the sake of uniformity and certainty of the legal outcome regarding the right to damages,
modification of tort rule on the obligation to mitigate the loss is still advisable.
5. The Theoretical and Practical Justifications for Modifying Ancillary Rules in
Tort to the CISG’s Regulatory Provisions
All that said, those protective regulations may get involved as the defense to a contractual
claim under the CISG. Permitting the right to a concurrent tort claim without any restrictions
would otherwise be seen as a deprivation of the defenses for which the Convention provides,
resulting in the infringement of fundamentals set by the uniform sales law. Thus, this thesis lays
a policy foundation for sustaining the objectives of the CISG’s fundamental rules and places
great value on an equally voluntary bargain of the contract despite recognizing the concurrent
tort action. This thesis proposes that these fundamental rules should operate as defenses to
concurrent tort claims as well. In other words, as long as the breaching party in a single case
could benefit from any CISG defense of those fundamental rules, he should be able to raise the
same defense to his tortious liability.
One may argue that tribunals are not legitimately permitted to recognize defenses to tort
claims that are not included in the relevant common law or statutory tort regime. Nevertheless,
this thesis asserts that the extension of the CISG’s fundamental rules to the domestic tort remedy
is possibly permitted, provided such modification is supported by theoretical and practical
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justifications. This thesis holds that modifying tort rules to the CISG’s protective regulations is
justified and facilitated when the concurrent tort remedy is closely linked to the legal protection
of interests under the CISG, even if not fully overlapping with the remedial solution given by the
CISG. Such a close link is found when both the CISG and tort law protect the interest of the
same kind. As can be seen, such a condition of having the same interest protected is one of two
pillars required in showing their equivalent solution to the alleged matter – the fully overlapping
situation. Whenever both the CISG and tort law grant protection to the same kind of interest, it is
justified to extend the CISG’s regulations to the parallel tort remedy for three main reasons.
First, proving a close link by showing that both the CISG and tort law protect the same interest is
sufficient to justify the adjustments to tort rules, because the CISG’s protective regulations are
most likely to reflect its goals of protecting parties’ interests. Such protective goals include
allocating risks to the parties’ interests, as well as compensating damages to the party who
should not bear risks arising out of the international trade. By engaging in the contractual
relationship, the parties, contrary to the third party’s position, have benefited from sale laws and
contracts. Thus, it is typical for contracting parties to take any risks arising through their
contractual relationship, as long as those risks are related to interests in their reasonable
contemplation. As discussed, this thesis accedes that tort remedy is necessarily permitted when
tort law still deters and regulates unlawful conduct that is different from the behavior controlled
by the CISG. However, when tort law protects the same interest as the kind which is protected by
the CISG, and the party is deemed to contemplate such an interest, the parallel tort claim should
not be allowed in a way that it is inconsistent with the goals of the CISG’s protective regulations.
Second, this thesis argues that resorting to the protection of the interest of the same kind given by
domestic tort law to avoid the restrictions under the CISG violates the duty of good faith. In
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essence, Article 7 embraces the principle of good faith in international trade. Through the
method of interpretation, such a principle could be applied to impose on the parties a duty to act
in good faith, and such a duty is supplementary to other obligations agreed upon by contract or
imposed by the CISG on the parties.602 Under the CISG, each party is thus bound to not exercise
their right to the protections coming out of the relationship under international trade in a way that
is inconsistent with the good faith covenant. Only by means of modifying tort rules to the
CISG’s protective regulations, in the case where both norms protect similar interests, can we
discourage an act that is against the duty of good faith. Last but not least, parties are deemed to
impliedly agree to such modification when both the CISG and the law of tort protect the same
kind of interest. Typically, the sophisticated business party to the contract is put in a position
whereby the party can recognize the restrictions on remedies, or the duty to comply with some
prerequisites for exercising the right to remedies under the regime of uniform sales law when
entering into an international contract. This thesis argues that the party has contemplated the
effect that the CISG’s protective regulations may have on the protection of the interest of the
same kind under tort law when the same party is, at the same time, subject to the other regime of
tort law. This is to assume that the parties have a consensus on the basis that the party’s right
relating to the same protected interest will be subject to protective regulations imposed by the
CISG, irrespective of whether the right to remedy is based on the theory of contract or not. Thus,
the adjustment made to tort rules could be treated as an implied term of the contract.
Accordingly, the modification of tort rules, as suggested, does not create an undue intrusion of
the protection of interest given to the contracting parties beyond their expectations.
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Given all these reasons, it can be said that the parties’ presumed intention to have a tort
claim conditional upon the reservations and requirements provided under the Convention
justifies a modification of tort rules. Thus, tribunals are allowed to recognize certain defenses to
tort claims based on the presumed intention to modify tort rules, although those defenses are not
provided by tort law itself. However, a higher value of the policy underlying tort law may
outweigh this policy matter of modifying tort rules. On the one hand, in light of a greater policy
underlying tort law in deterring outrageously wrongful conduct, this thesis advances an
exception to such a modification of tort law, as suggested. That is to hold that such modification
of ancillary rules in tort is prohibited if tort law appears to be principally aimed at deterring a
particular kind of outrageously wrongful conduct, such as fraud or gross negligence, rather than
compensating for the loss. Such an exception to the modification of tort laws thus prevents the
CISG from overly intruding into the mandatory law of tort that purportedly punishes and deters
extremely unaccepted tortious conduct. On the other hand, this thesis suggests that tribunals must
take great caution when relying on this notion of the parties’ presumed intention in order to
modify the relevant rules in tort, thereby giving effect to the CISG’s protective regulations. Such
a precaution requires having regard for the mandatory character of the applicable tort law. In
other words, tribunals must consider whether such a relevant tort law system liberally permits
them to make equitable adjustments to the application of tort law based on certain theoretical and
practical justifications.
G. Applying the Proposed Approach to Solve the Issue of the CISG’s Preemption of Tort
Claims Raised in the Hypothetical Case
At this point, it is worth considering a hypothetical case of an international sale for rubber
as an illustration of the issue of the CISG’s preemption of tort remedies. This part demonstrates
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the legal methods used and the outcomes of solving the preemption issue by employing the
proposed approach and adopting the opinions put forth by this thesis.
Hypothetical case: There has been a negotiation between X, a company incorporated in
Canada, a rubber component supplier, and Y, a company incorporated in the US, a
manufacturer of end products containing rubber as their main component. During the
negotiation, Y specified the quality of the rubber components to be purchased. It required the
rubber to be highly resistant to high heat and chemicals. As for the qualification of heat and
chemical resistance, X provided the documents confirming that all rubber materials that X
previously sold to other customers have excellent temperature and chemical resistance. Also, X
insisted that all rubber components previously sold had never exploded during the production
process. In fact, X had not been aware that all previous customers did not put the rubber
purchased into the chemicals with a high temperature. Relying on the statement regarding the
characteristics required, Y ordered and bought the rubber from X. A sale contract between them
was drawn and concluded at Y’s place of business in the US. Other than giving an express
warranty on the quality specified, the parties also agreed in the contract that X has an additional
duty to perform quality tests of the rubber purchased, in a standard laboratory. Later, it turned
out that the rubber purchased cannot withstand the heat of the high temperature and the
chemicals used in production. As a result, the rubber exploded during production.
The explosion caused damage not only to the rubber itself, but also to other property.
Moreover, it resulted in pecuniary loss incurred from the lack of end products intended to be
sold to Y’s customers. Apart from damage to the property, the employees who have worked at the
factory suffered from personal injuries. Further, Y is responsible for the employees’ injuries as
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per the employment relationship between Y and its employees. The factory is located at Y’s place
of business in the US. X has its place of business in Canada.
Accordingly, Y filed a complaint in the US federal court.
Y asserted both contractual and tort claims. As for the contractual claim, Y, the plaintiff,
relied on the CISG and alleged that X, the defendant, is in breach of the express warranty by
failing to deliver the goods specified under the contract. The plaintiff lodged several other claims
under American domestic law as follows: (1) claim for damages under promissory estoppel; (2)
claim for negligent misrepresentation; (3) claim for fraudulent inducement; and (4) claim for
negligent breach of duty in performing chemical laboratory testing.
However, the defendant contended that when the CISG governs the international sale
contract, the plaintiff cannot concurrently assert any claims under domestic laws. The defendant
argued that the CISG, as the governing international convention, preempts all claims under
domestic laws.
According to the hypothetical situation, the CISG governs the international sales between
Y and X, because both parties have their places of business in different countries, namely the US
and Canada, which are Contracting States to the CISG.603 Let us, then, suppose that under the
conflict-of-law rules, the US law of torts is the applicable law to the alleged tort claims.
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According to the facts, the plaintiff-Y asked for various types of losses, including a loss
to the goods themselves, pecuniary loss of profit, damages to other property, and loss for the sum
of money paid to its employees who suffered from personal injuries.
By applying the proposed approach, the court begins with the preliminary stage of
determining whether there is an inconsistency between the CISG and domestic tort laws. Based
on the reasons given in Chapter Two-Part B-Section 2.2(2), this thesis agrees with the majority,
holding that Article 5 excludes a recourse action, regarding personal injury brought by the buyer
against the seller, from the scope of the Convention. Thus, there is no inconsistency between the
CISG and the law of torts regarding the alleged tort claims for the sum paid to compensate his
employees’ personal injuries. Claims for such loss are thus exclusively applied by US law of
torts. Then, let us turn to consider the right to allege domestic claims for damages to property
and economic loss.
(1) Recovery for damages to property and economic loss under promissory estoppel
Under US law, it is most likely that the economic loss doctrine does not bar a promissory
estoppel claim. Thus, US law on promissory estoppel has an interest in governing this alleged
claim. However, the representations constituting the alleged promise regarding qualities of
goods, at the same time, emerge from or are predicated on warranty of the quality of goods given
by the binding sale contract. Accordingly, promissory estoppel alleging a committed declaration
to pay for the consequences of a breach of that promise is duplicative of the allegation of the
warranty claim recognized by Article 35(1) of the CISG. Thus, a fully overlapping situation is
established. As a result, the claim for damages under the promissory estoppel is preempted by
the CISG.
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(2) Recovery for damages to property and economic loss based on negligent
misrepresentation
Let us suppose that the applicable state law of tort has adopted the rule in Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 552 (1977).604 Such rule holds a seller, who negligently supplies
misinformation concerning goods sold, liable for pecuniary loss caused to the purchaser who
relies upon the misinformation. Also, US law, adopting the rule in Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Prod. Liab. § 9 (1998), holds a commercial product seller liable for harm to property resulting
from negligent misrepresentation of material fact concerning the goods sold. Since the element
of negligent conduct required by tort law generally makes the cause of action independent from a
claim for non-conformity under Article 35, a claim for negligent misrepresentation is not
preempted by the CISG unless the fully overlapping situation is presented.
Neither the CISG’s provisions, nor the contractual terms, impose upon the seller a duty of
care in communicating information regarding characteristics of the goods. Thus, this thesis holds
that both the CISG and the tort rule on negligent misrepresentation do not impose the same duty
on the seller. As a result, the fully overlapping situation is not established, so the alleged claim
for negligent misrepresentation does not fall under the scope of the CISG.
In terms of the recovery for damages to other property, the protection of safety of other
property under tort law is generally seen as an extra-contractual interest. Because no set of facts
indicates that the parties foresee or ought to have foreseen the possibility of having other
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property destroyed due to the defective goods at the time of contract, we do not consider this
kind of interest as an object of legal protection under the CISG. To this effect, the plaintiff is
allowed to assert a negligent misrepresentation claim seeking recovery for damages to other
property as a distinct cause of action in tort, alongside a claim for non-conformity.
As for the recovery of economic loss, namely loss to the goods and loss of profit, it is
clear that this kind of economic loss purely arises from the alleged negligent conduct in
providing the statement concerning the quality of goods, which turned out to be defective.
Accordingly, this thesis would say that the limited protection of pure economic loss given to the
contracting party by tort law can no longer be deemed as an extra-contractual interest. Thus, the
negligent misrepresentation claim seeking recovery for pure economic loss is considered as a
related but separate tort claim under the tort law that protects the same kind of interest, which is
protected under the CISG. As a result, the governing ancillary tort rules could probably be
modified to the protective regulations of the CISG if the seller raised the defense to the seller’s
liability as a merit of the case at bar.
(3) Recovery for damages to property and economic loss based on a claim for fraudulent
inducement
Claims for fraudulent inducement seeking recovery for damages to property and
economic loss are recognized under the US law of torts. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod.
Liab. § 9 (1998) apparently covers the case of harm to other property in justifiable reliance on
fraudulent misrepresentation. Under § 9, the defrauded person is permitted to assert a tort action
of fraudulent misrepresentation against a seller who engages in selling products and makes a
fraudulent misstatement of material fact concerning the product sold. Under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 525 (1977), the seller is subject to tortious liability to the buyer in deceit for
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pure economic loss caused to him if the seller fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact,
opinion, intention, or law to induce the buyer to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon
such a statement. Similar to negligent misrepresentation, proof of the particular act of fraud is
seen as the main element of a tort action of deceit. Thus, it makes this claim independent from a
claim for non-conformity under Article 35. When the allegations show that the seller’s fraudulent
misrepresentation was made during the pre-contractual stage and prove that such an act of fraud
induces the buyer to enter into the contract, these specific allegations make a claim in fraudulent
inducement arise independently from the breach of contract claim. As we can see, neither the
CISG’s provisions nor the terms of the contract impose on the seller a contractual duty not to act
in a dishonest manner when communicating information regarding certain features of the goods.
Thus, one could not say that both the CISG and tort rule on fraudulent misrepresentation impose
the same duty on the seller. The fully overlapping situation is thus not established, and this claim
for fraudulent inducement does not fall under the CISG’s scope. As a result, the CISG does not
preempt such a claim. Since the recovery for harm to other property is not typically considered
as the object of legal protection under the CISG, the plaintiff is permitted to concurrently rely on
the fraudulent inducement claim, seeking recovery for damages to other property as a distinct
cause of action in tort.
In terms of the modification of tort rules governing a tort claim of fraudulent inducement
seeking recovery for pure economic loss, the final result is contrary to the outcome of the claim
in negligent misrepresentation for pecuniary loss. Although the CISG and the law of tort are
deemed to protect the same interest of pecuniary loss arising from the alleged fraudulent
misrepresentation of the quality of goods, the modification of ancillary rules in tort governing
this related but separate tort claim is prohibited. This is because the US rule on fraudulent
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misrepresentation mostly aims to deter parties’ outrageous conduct so as not to commit fraud,
rather than compensating for losses incurred.
However, it is necessary to evaluate further conditions necessary for liability in
fraudulent misrepresentation so that the seller’s misrepresentation may be actionable. Those
conditions include fraudulent character of the misrepresentation, a requirement of intent or an
expectation of influencing conduct, and the buyer’s justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation.
(4) Recovery for damages to property and economic loss based on a claim for negligent
breach of duty in performing chemical laboratory testing.
According to the facts, the seller is bound by a contract to perform laboratory testing. As
we can see, the buyer alleged negligent conduct in performing laboratory testing, rather than
claiming against the seller for loss suffered from the defective goods. Thus, it is likely that US
tort law imposes a separate duty of care on the seller and recognizes a claim for negligent
liability for damages to property or even for economic loss.
As for whether the fully overlapping situation is created, we can see that neither the CISG
nor the contractual term expressly holds the seller liable for his conduct, which falls below the
standard of due care when performing the additional duty agreed upon by the contract. Further, it
is said that the party’s right to damages, resulting from the other party’s breach of contractual
duty under the CISG, does not require proof of faulty conduct. Consequently, no fully
overlapping situation is presented, and this claim of negligence does not fall under the CISG’s
scope. The CISG does not exclude this tort claim in negligence.
Based on the same reasons provided when deciding claims of negligent
misrepresentation, the buyer can, on the one hand, concurrently assert tort of negligence, seeking
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recovery for damages to other property as a distinct cause of action in tort. On the other hand, the
court could, as a matter of policy, modify the ancillary tort rules that govern this related but
separate tort claim for negligent liability for pure economic loss. This is because the CISG and
the law of tort are deemed to protect the same interest of economic loss arising from the alleged
negligence in actively performing the duty to test the goods.
H. Preliminary Conclusion
Among the existing approaches to the issue of CISG’s preemption of a tort remedy, the
compromise approach of acknowledging the substantive scope and aims of the CISG is the most
appropriate and convincing one. However, certain essential aspects of such an approach need to
be further analyzed and developed by this study. This thesis comes up with the proposed
compromise approach that generally supports the presumption against the CISG’s preemption of
tort remedy. However, such a presumption can be rebutted in a single case at bar, when the
alleged matter of tort falls under the scope of the CISG, thereby leading to the CISG’s full
preemption of tort remedy. Such a position on the CISG’s full preemption taken by this thesis is
supported by the notions underlying Article 4, 5, and 7 as the leading doctrinal grounds. Further,
as a policy matter, this thesis suggests the modification of tort rules to the CISG’s protective
regulations in the case where the alleged tort claim is not replaced, and where the two competing
norms protect the same interests.
Under the proposed approach, tribunals play significant roles in interpreting the CISG’s
rules and finding the CISG’s actual scope, as well as in signifying the scope and functions of
applicable tort law in each case. This continuing task of interpreting both norms helps to generate
more resources addressing the CISG’s substantive scope of application and its preemption of tort
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claims. Thus, it contributes to guidance necessary for the task of resolving the problems of the
CISG’s scope of application and its interaction with domestic tort laws.
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CONCLUSION
By considering the CISG’s rules and their underlying principles, particularly Articles 4,
5, and 7, together with other features of the CISG, including the history, objectives, and
functions, this thesis develops the approach of acknowledging the CISG’s substantive scope and
aims as a basis for resolving the issue of the CISG’s preemption of the tort claim. Under the
proposed approach, the main theoretical viewpoints are that (1) the CISG’s regulations and
protections, including legal commitments agreed by transnational sales, determine the outermost
limit of its scope; (2) the CISG is exclusively applied to any matters falling under its substantive
scope, thereby excluding the equivalent remedial solutions under domestic law; (3) insofar as the
alleged matter of tort is distinct, or related but separate, from the remedial solutions given under
the realm of the CISG, the domestic law of tort is simultaneously applied to settle the disputes
even if a tort claim is connected with the relationship under the international sales contract. The
study also puts forward a policy perspective about the condition on, and the extent of, modifying
ancillary rules in tort when the applicable tort law simultaneously governs the alleged claim in
tort.
A. Summary
Under the proposed approach, the rules would be that:
an application of the CISG does not preempt the alleged claim in tort that would be
otherwise available under the domestic tort law of any country. It does not matter whether the
applicable domestic law classifies the alleged tort claim founded as a contract, a tort, or
otherwise.
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The presumption against the CISG’s preemption of tort remedy is rejected when a fully
overlapping situation is established. To this effect, the CISG exclusively governs and settles the
alleged matter, thereby precluding the injured party from relying on remedy under tort law.
The fully overlapping situation is established when
(1) the allegation of concurring tort claim makes it clear that such a claim is completely
and solely predicated upon the CISG and sale contract. Or
(2) the CISG and the applicable tort law share an adequately equivalent solution to the
alleged matter. The equivalent remedial solution can be shown through the presence of two
pillars as follows:
(2.1) both the CISG and the law of tort intentionally impose the same duty upon the party
in regulating same kinds of conducts by the breaching party and
(2.2) the protection of interest granted to the injured party by tort law is the same as that
interest of the kind for which the CISG provides.
By adopting the rule stated above, the CISG is applied in a way so as to exclude a
concurring tort claim only in the situation of full overlap. Before considering the existence of a
fully overlapping situation, tribunals should consider whether there is an inconsistency between
competing norms of the CISG and the law of tort. If only one norm intends to compensate losses
for particular kinds of interest or to give protection against the alleged wrongful conduct, there
will be no inconsistency which needs to be solved by taking the additional step of considering
the fully overlapping situation. Accordingly, only such a pertinent norm, which has an interest in
its content to compensate losses to such kinds of interest or to protect against the alleged
conduct, governs the alleged claim exclusively. However, if both the CISG and the law of tort
intend to protect the party seeking damages for particular kinds of interest against particular
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wrongful conduct, tribunals are required to consider whether a fully overlapping situation is
established.
Two situations of full overlap could be proved according to the rule stated above. In
indicating the fully overlapping situation, tribunals must interpret the CISG’s rules. At the stage
of interpretation, tribunals are required to rely on specific guidance for the method of
autonomous interpretation, and to take into account the contractual terms and all relevant
provisions possibly related to the alleged claim, so as to uncover the CISG’s substantive scope
and thus identify the remedial solutions provided under the Convention. Then, tribunals are also
charged with the essential task of investigating the applicable law of tort to examine the elements
of action and to specify the scope of regulations and protections given to the alleged tort claim.
According to the proposed approach, the CISG’s rules and methodology, in particular the
idea of the hierarchy of rules underlying Article 7(2), decisively deals with the issue of its
preemption. Neither the rules on doctrinal characterization, nor the domestic rules or principles
on the right to concurrent claim, have a considerable influence on the decisive determination of
how the CISG interacts with tort law. Nevertheless, the doctrinal characterization of claims still
serves its function for the primary process of locating law applicable to the alleged tort claim.
Likewise, domestic rules or principles on the right to concurrent claim have operated as part of
tort law in three respects. Firstly, those rules and principles are considered to indicate the
inconsistency between competing norms, identifying whether the applicable tort law intends to
protect the particular interest, especially the economic loss suffered from the alleged tortious
conduct, or whether it recognizes a particular claim in tort. Secondly, domestic tort laws are
considered in order to find the existence of a fully overlapping situation. Lastly, once it is
established that the CISG does not preempt the alleged tort claim, the validity of concurrent tort
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claims, including the merits of the case, would be subject to the law of torts. Given that the
defense of the exculpatory clause is concerned, the domestic law of contract and the law of tort
govern the questions of whether the disclaimer is valid and whether it is admissible as a defense
on tort liability, respectively. However, the method of interpretation of contract under the CISG
remains applicable when discovering the parties’ intent to exclude or limit their liability,
particularly tortious liability.605
Under the proposed approach, it could be said that in the constellation of international
sales governed by the CISG, the injured party is provided with two types of concurrent tort
claims. The first one is a distinct cause of action in tort, which is a situation where the concurring
claim in tort is completely distinct from the contractual claim of the CISG. The second one is a
related, but separate, tort claim. It is considered related because there exists one of the elements
required to establish a fully overlapping situation, i.e. either the existence of the same duty
imposed or the presence of the same protected interest.
Given that the CISG does not preempt the aforementioned two types of concurrent tort
claims, this thesis submits that the plaintiff can be granted all the provided remedies under both
the CISG and the domestic law of tort. However, the plaintiff will not have a double recovery.
Alternatively, the plaintiff can otherwise exercise a choice, as it sees appropriate. As a matter of
policy, in maintaining the goal of creating fairness between both parties and achieving the
development of international trade through the uniform application of its regulatory provisions,
tribunals are justifiably permitted to modify some auxiliary rules in tort to the CISG’s protective
rules, provided that both the CISG and tort law protect similar kinds of interests. However, an
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exception to such a modification of tort law is advanced when tort law embraces a relatively
highly valued policy in deterring outrageously wrongful conduct. Additionally, this thesis
suggests that tribunals must consider whether such a relevant tort law system liberally permits
them to make equitable adjustments to the application of tort law based on certain justifications,
e.g., the parties’ presumed intent on modifying rules in tort.
All in all, this thesis hopes to develop a more appropriate solution to criticism606
regarding the interaction between the uniform sales law and possibly concurrent domestic law
remedies, particularly those based on tort laws. This approach accords with both the international
spirit of the Convention and the essential functions of tort laws. These proposed rules on the
CISG’s preemption of tort remedy not only promote the uniform application of international
rules on transnational sales, but also uphold the separate functions of tort laws either in
regulating improper behavior or in protecting the injured party’s extra-contractual interests.
Consequently, the traders would mostly have their rights and obligations protected by both the
uniform sale law and the law of tort. Finally, it comes as no surprise that applying the proposed
approach to the preemption issue at bar to different cases may produce a different outcome. This
is because there cannot be a one-size-fits-all answer to the issue of preemption. Following the
opinions suggested and applying the mechanisms put forth in Chapter Four, a different result
could emerge either when (1) there is only one pertinent norm of either the CISG or national tort
law that has an interest in governing the alleged claim; (2) the CISG applies exclusively to the
alleged matter in dispute and thus excludes domestic claim in tort; or (3) tort law applies to the
alleged tort claim concurrently with the CISG’s rules governing contractual claim. The
possibility of diverse outcomes depends on the different circumstances and factual situations
606
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concerned in a single case, as well as on the range of different tort laws applicable to the alleged
claim. Given that the US law of torts has been analyzed, as an illustration, it is always advisable
to adopt those viewpoints, rules, and opinions even though the applicable tort law is that of a
foreign country, rather than US law.
B. Avenues for Further Study and Research
As is arguably suggested by this thesis, contractual terms greatly influence the extent to
which parties can rely on a concurring tort claim which would otherwise be available under
domestic tort law. This is not to deny that the proposed approach poses relevant questions on the
rules and methodology, and to what extent the international sales contract is interpreted.
Determining the meaning of the contract or the parties’ actual or presumed intent is not simple,
especially when international sophisticated commercial parties are typically engaged in
sequences of negotiations, course of dealing, and usages of trade in the international context.
Also, the different characteristics of the parties, as well as their different backgrounds in
language, legal, and cultural systems may play a role in determining the meaning of the contract
so as to apprehend it fully. Thus, it is worthy of exploring and analyzing the rules and methods of
interpretation of the international commercial contract, particularly of international sales
contracts. For the sake of the development of rules and methods for interpreting transnational
sales, further study of this topic would be beneficial.
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